Previous work

I haven't worked out how to link to word documents yet, but this is one of my previous essays.

What challenges does transnational terrorism pose to the international system?

The conventional definition of terrorism is an act or threat of violence to achieve a political objective, of a regional or national nature. When using the term transnational terrorism, the properties of traditional terrorism are retained, but shifted to a dimension beyond these national considerations. So the funding, infrastructure, and personnel have a multinational form; the acts of terrorism can occur anywhere internationally; and the objectives of the terrorists are not limited by international boundaries. By operating without regard for national frontiers and international laws, terrorist groups force the individual states to respond collectively, but the challenge for the international system is how best to co-ordinate this response.

Historically acts of terrorism have aimed to achieve a regional or national socio-political objective. Likewise the actual acts of terrorism have been against local targets or interests related to those local targets. With often limited funds and limited objectives, terrorism has had a narrow remit for its struggle.

Terrorism’s origins can be traced to the 11th century Middle East, where the Hashshashin murdered their enemies through low level tactics. Terrorism has always existed as a tool of insurgency and as a way of seeking political change. It is only since the start of the post war period, that it has become an organized and self conscious phenomenon. The Irgun in Israel adopted terrorist tactics in its attempt to establish a Jewish state. As did the Algerian FLN undertook a terrorist campaign in 1954, in its war of independence against France. Terrorist groups slowly shifted their operations onto the international stage, partly to hit softer targets and partly to gain international attention. The Provisional IRA was one of the first local militant groups to undertake this migration, attacking targets on the UK mainland in the 1970s.

Transnational terrorism was born in the early 1970s. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) always held the same central objective, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, but experienced a similar shift to the IRA, albeit more rapid, in the direction of its terrorist campaign. They fought a prolonged guerrilla war against their ‘occupier’, but also exported this campaign beyond the Middle East and into mainland Europe. Hijackings, hostage taking and assassinations were commonplace in the 1970s, mostly against Israeli targets or targets loosely connected to Israel.

Historically terrorism has been counteracted at a local level, internal disputes have been dealt with through internal laws or force if necessary. As terrorist groups formed into transnational structures with transnational plots, the international community has, slower than perhaps originally anticipated, responded collectively. International mechanisms, such as UN Resolutions or law enforcement treaties, have slowly developed to counteract the growing threat.

Terrorism became truly transnational during the 1990s. Militant Islamic groups, having been formed during the Afghanistan war against the Soviet Union, tried to spread their struggle across the Middle East and into Western Europe. Although regional grievances, were a driving force – whether US military presence in Saudi Arabia or the Israel-Palestinian conflict – the groups involved formed transnational structures, aiming at US targets, regardless of where they were. During the 1990s targets ranging from New York to Riyadh to Nairobi were all attacked. Militant Islam previously was concerned with parochial grievances, such as attempts to overthrow governments in Algeria and Egypt, but a shift in strategy by Al-Qaeda from the ‘lesser enemy’ to the ‘greater enemy’ occurred in the mid 1990s. This shift would galvanise the support of disparate militant groups operating at the time. [1]

The term transnational is defined as transcending national boundaries. A transnational organization can be defined by the types of movements it undertakes: movement of physical objects, including human populations; movement of money or credit; and movement of information and ideas. A transnational terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda fits this definition through its movement of personnel across the Middle East and especially prior to October 2001 through Afghanistan; its transfer of funds through the international financial system via Islamic charities, unsuspecting legitimate businesses, organized crime and other money laundering ventures; and its intent to spread a militant radical form of Wahhabism Islam. One of the ultimate aims of Al-Qaeda, is the creation of a transnational Islamic superstate or Caliphate.

Although transnational terrorism is not committed solely by Islamic groups, the international system has had to respond to this threat specifically. As the response incorporates cultural and religious factors, it has provided a greater challenge to states. How states respond to political Islam is discussed later.

***

Terrorist groups have traditionally operated as non-state actors: vehemently opposing states and their policies. However the distinction between terrorists and the states has blurred, when states have used terrorism as a proxy for conflict, providing logistical support, funds and arms to these groups. When terrorism is state sponsored, the threat to international order increases, since the culpability cannot be simply passed off onto an unaccountable rogue group.

State terrorism became an international issue in the 1980s, having previously only existed in a covert capacity. Palestinian affiliated groups had been the main perpetrators of terrorist acts throughout the 1970s, but never received consistent state backing. Transnational terrorism would gain greater momentum from the growing regional influence of states such as Syria, Iran and Libya.

The transition from terrorism being the perpetrated by rogue groups to individual states, albeit indirectly, made the issue international. The bombing of a West Berlin nightclub in April 1986 led to US air strikes on Libya 10 days later, and was the first occasion in modern times that an act of terrorism had created an inter state conflict.

Although the US and Libya had clashed covertly previously, the bombing presented a challenge to the international system, as it polarised international opinions on the appropriate response to such acts. Operation El Dorado Canyon was condemned by France, the Soviet Union and all Arab states, but supported by Britain, Australia and Israel.

The prosecution of terrorist groups through international law enforcement was a laborious and frustrating process, so the US – having suffered a series of terrorist acts in the 1970s and early 1980s – decided to prosecute individual states, who it perceived as the driving force.[2] As states are unable to attack other states in open conflict, terrorism has been used, as a way to stay within international law and attack other states covertly. As will be discussed later, the link between states and terrorism is complex and states have tried to establish links, so as to justify their own policies.

***

The growth of transnational terrorist groups has meant that very few states within the international system are unaffected. Historical alliances within Western Europe and the Middle East have been reshaped as greater preventative co-operation has developed, with other states playing important roles. The international system has always operated in a state structure, through institutions such as the UN or alliances like NATO. But the nature of transnational terrorism is that it is not state defined, so a new approach has been adopted. Ideological and religious factors are harder to counteract with traditional interstate methods.

As terrorism developed from a local to a transnational issue, international institutions responded. Since 1963, 12 major conventions and protocols have been established by the United Nations relating to states’ responsibilities in combating terrorism. These range from civil aviation safety to attacks on senior government officials and diplomats to the financing of terrorism. Additionally numerous UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions have been passed – relating to specific terrorist incidents. The UN is made up of many different organizations, agencies and programmes, which also have counterterrorist functions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is concerned with the proliferation of nuclear materials to terrorists. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) deals with airline and airport security. The Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP) looks at the links between drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism.[3]

Greater coordination in law enforcement has underpinned these international agreements. Terrorism is ultimately a criminal activity and has been recognised as such, on an international level since the 54th General Assembly in Washington in 1985 when Resolution AGN/54/RES/1 was passed calling for the creation of a specialized group within Interpol’s Police Division to 'co-ordinate and enhance co-operation in combating international terrorism'.[4]

International law enforcement agencies were exposed as failing to effectively prevent terrorism, firstly by the September 11th attacks and then the 2004 Madrid bombings. Agencies like Europol, established in 1999 after the relaxation of European border controls, have increased in importance, as inter state co-operation has become a necessity. At the US-EU summit on counterterrorism cooperation in May 2002, both sides of the Atlantic agreed to joint initiatives covering terrorist funding, extradition laws, criminal trend data, identifying of terrorist organisations and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Madrid terrorist attacks underlined the need for a coherent EU anti-terrorism policy. A summit held in the wake of the attacks proposed the creation of a ‘counter-terrorism czar’, enforcement of the use of the European Common Arrest Warrant, and creating a clearer definition of the term ‘terrorism’. Europol’s effect had been limited; as its remit did not include a coherent anti-terror policy.[5]

Despite a long history of cooperation between international intelligence organisations, recent acts of terrorism have forced governments to re-examine the effectiveness of this co-operation. Traditionally strong ties have existed between US and Western European intelligence agencies, having worked closely during the Cold War. The expansion of operations by Middle Eastern and South Asian terrorist groups has required a reciprocated expansion of intelligence gathering as a counterterrorist measure.

After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United States sought greater co-operation with countries with far from obliquitous reputations. The intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran contain elements sympathetic to terrorist groups, but were asked to provide assistance for US investigations. States without any history of international co-operation in intelligence operations have also been brought into the fold. This spread of co-operation travels from North African states, such as Morocco and Algeria to South East Asian states, including the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.
"The extent of co-operation with other intelligence agencies around the world is unprecedented, as is the willingness on the part of many governments - including some unexpected ones - to co-operate,"[6]

***

Establishing conventions and structures to deal with terrorism is only a limited solution and an obvious one at that. Given that terrorism is not arbitrary and has an ultimate objective, governments or groups of governments have to look at the root causes of terrorism; either to develop a way of eliminating by means such as force or to consider how to resolve the issues driving it.

The creation of transnational mechanisms is a preventative move against terrorism, but ultimately states are forced to undertake a deeper analysis of the causes of terrorism. In a recent interview, Tony Blair’s analysis was that it was possible to “take security and military measures against terrorism but ... the best prospect of peaceful coexistence [lied] in the spread of democracy and human rights".[7]

Terrorism is a method of conflict used to achieve certain goals, but it is driven by a combination of factors including economic inequality, political misrepresentation, religious tension and ideological conflict. All acts of terrorism are motivated by at least one of these factors. Governments have ultimately needed to look at these factors, when constructing their response to terrorism.

Transnational terrorism developed as a result of migration from the Middle East and North Africa, but is driven by globalisation. The end of East-West confrontation, rapid developments in means of communication, easing of travel restrictions, greater fluidity in international finance markets, changed the face of terrorism.[8] Immigration control is a key preventative measure against transnational terrorism. Porous borders in the Middle East and also in Europe have led to a proliferation of terrorist groups in terms of personnel, ideology and expertise, and international agreements on immigration (in particular within the EU) have been renegotiated since the increased threat of transnational terrorism.
The structure of transnational terrorism has changed as a result of globalisation and counterterrorist measures have had to respond to this change. Globalisation has opened new opportunities for terrorists and presented new challenges to state security. The proliferation of information and ideology has travelled from the Middle East across to South East Asia, through religious teachings and technologies like the internet. Post Cold War economic development has been driven by privatisation, deregulation, the free movement of capital and labour, and technological advances, which has in turn fed the finances of terrorist groups. Globalisation has allowed non state transnational entities, such as terrorist groups, freedom to flourish in a more economically liberal world. It is estimated that the terrorist economy - including legitimate businesses, drug trafficking, organised crime and arms sales - could be valued at up to $1.5 trillion.[9] The extent to which transnational terrorism has integrated into global systems, has presented unprecedented challenges to the international system, leading to the need for greater co-operation. ***
Regional terrorism is normally resolved by regional actors, with occasional assistance from a neutral party. Attempts to resolve the Northern Ireland troubles have been undertaken by the British and Irish governments, with input from US Senator George Mitchell on the issue of decommissioning. This is the traditional model for resolving regional issues that give rise to terrorism. Transnational terrorism is more complicated as it involves more actors and its remedy is often less defined.

The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is essentially a regional political and geographical conflict, but it has become a transnational issue, as it has drawn in other states. Palestinian terrorist groups have been supported by states such as Iran and Syria, likewise Israel’s response to terrorism has been endorsed by the United States. Palestinian terrorism is unique in that although its objectives are regional, its practice, backing and the response to it has been transnational.

Modern terrorism has developed as Western societies have formed complex multicultural structures. The spread of political Islam has been across national boundaries; as a result disillusionment in one country can be determined by the situation in another state. Muslims have opposed government foreign policy in states such as Iraq, despite not sharing any common national identity. Acts of terrorism that have followed are caused in part by this interdependence. Transnational terrorism is driven by transnational causes – one state’s foreign policy can fuel acts of terrorism against it. The Madrid bombs were seen as an act of revenge against Spain’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq. Muslim communities exist across Europe, and as the Madrid bombs showed, Western societies need to strike the balance between protecting these communities and having effective law enforcement.

Western governments have been consistently intransigent in the face of groups like Al-Qaida, but they would not deny, that they are ultimately seeking to resolve some of the grievances that are also driving terrorism. Greater equality and democratic rights in the Middle Eastern countries, resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a peaceful end to the US occupation of Iraq, are political objectives shared by Western governments and these terrorists. Al-Qaeda has tried to divide the international community by exploiting the divisions between US and Europe in how to treat these causes of terrorism. [10]

Foreign policy has played a major role in driving modern terrorism. Al-Qaeda has cited US foreign policy - whether support of Israel, a military presence in Saudi Arabia or imposing strict sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s – as its prime motivation. The United States response to the September 11th attacks has been criticised because it further antagonised militant Islamic movements, firstly in Afghanistan and then Iraq. States opposing the invasion of Iraq cited growth of terrorism as one of their major concerns. Divisions in the international response towards terrorism have been created by contrasting internal politics, historical standpoints on international issues and established alliances with other states. For example France’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq was partly driven by having a large Arab population, strong historical ties in the Middle East and a centre left government.

As transnational terrorism operates outside national boundaries, the response traverses national boundaries, which in turn can jeopardise individual state sovereignty. Terrorist groups who reside in certain states may become retaliatory targets, for example Israel has targeted Hamas activists in Syria, and in February 2004 Russia assassinated the Chechen rebel Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev in Qatar.[11] As terrorist groups now operate with an international infrastructure, states have had to respond across borders. The international system has had to strike a balance between defending a state’s right to manage its own internal affairs and to prevent states from (if not always intentionally) harbouring terrorist groups.

Preserving this balance has been pushed to the limit, in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. Both states were accused of supporting terrorism. Both invasions received mixed international support: Middle Eastern states generally opposed both; Western states mostly favoured the former but only a handful the latter. When the response to terrorism is interstate – the international community does not always share the same outlook.

The preservation of international law has been a critical issue for the international system, both in terms of preserving state sovereignty when dealing with counterterrorist measures and preservation of human rights. The law enforcement measures discussed earlier have had to consider human rights legislation. Although clear differences have emerged, with European powers understanding how consideration of human rights in law enforcement is crucial to stemming the growth of terrorism. The United States has adopted a more draconian approach to counter terrorist law enforcement.

***

Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US State Department designated seven states as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. This linkage between states and terrorist groups may be framed by one state’s definition. “State sponsors of terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. These countries provide a critical foundation for terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have a much more difficult time obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations.”[12] Other states may not always share this assessment, partly through their own intelligence, partly because of their own definitions of the term ‘state sponsor’. Some Arab states believe Israel’s policies during the current Intifada constitute state terrorism. Although Israel might not support individual terrorist groups, its operations against Palestinians fall within certain definitions of terrorism. The links between states and terrorism are also often hard to prove. The US government tried to assert a link between the September 11th terrorists and Iraqi intelligence, in the build up to the invasion. Iraq was also accused of providing a safe haven for Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, despite being ideological opposites. Unclear and divided definitions present the international system with a challenge when providing a clear and unified response to terrorism.

An independent terrorist group is harder to counteract than a group that relies on state funding. The process of being able to successfully link states to terrorist groups, which begun under the Reagan administration, has underpinned counter terrorist foreign policy. The use of economic sanctions had been the standard counter measure, prior to recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their effectiveness is limited in comparison to military or covert actions, but has been successful with certain states. The imposition of sanctions on Libya, eventually led to the extradition of two agents suspected of involvement in the 1988 Pan-Am bombing. Sanctions have also been used to encourage co-operation in fighting terrorism: Pakistan had its previous sanctions waived in exchange for supporting the United States attempts to overthrow the Taliban in October 2001.

Issues driving transnational terrorism have often been resolved through diplomatic means. As discussed earlier, terrorist groups are often reliant on state sponsorship, a role Syria and Iran have both recently been accused of. Western states fear that state sponsorship can empower a terrorist group with biological or chemical weapons, but this threat of terrorism is often overstated to maintain diplomatic pressure. States like Iran and Syria have been accused of harbouring terrorists, developing WMD and financing terrorist groups. The reality is that the threat from transnational terrorism has been developed as much by non state actors. The blackmarket for nuclear technology was developed by Pakistani scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in the 1990s, supposedly without state knowledge. Charities and businesses in the Middle East channel funds to terrorist groups in large quantities.

***

Since almost all modern forms of terrorism have a transnational element, the international system will always have to respond, but whereas terrorism has developed a transnational structure; the international system has not always mirrored this effectively with transnational countermeasures of its own. Traditional responses to terrorism - whether sanctions and conflict at the state level, or intelligence and law enforcement at sub state level - have not always succeeded, as individual states have not always been united in their responses.










[1] Al-Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror, Jason Burke p.149-150
[2] World Politics since 1945, Peter Calvocoressi P101.
[3] UN website: The United Nations system and terrorism

[4]Interpol website: Interpol’s involvement in the fight against international terrorism
[5]BBC news online: The European terror challenge, 24/03/2004
[6] Financial Times: A Catastrophic failure of Intelligence, 29/11/2001 – unnamed CIA official.
[7] The Guardian: The Twin Pillars, 20/01/2005 – Tony Blair interviewed by Timothy Garton Ash.
[8] International Terrorism: What kinds of response? Rohan Gunaratna. http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/
[9] Modern Jihad Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks by Loretta Napoleoni. Extract in The Guardian 3/11/2003
[10] See BBC News 15/04/2004. Straw rejects Bin Laden truce. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3627943.stm
[11] See also US assassination of Al-Qaeda suspects in Yemen – November 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2402479.stm
[12] Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism, US Department. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31944.pdf