Tomorrow marks the half century anniversary of one of Iraq's most significant 20th century moments. The July 14 1958 revolution marked the end of the Hashemite monarchy and cut the ties of colonialism that had existed since the Arab Revolt. It ushered in a violent, turbulent and polarising era that would make the country synonymous dictatorship, purges, wars and sectarian bloodshed. The coup d'etat executed by the Iraqi Free officers under the leadership of Abd al-Karim Qasim against the ruling monarchy was swift and brutal. King Faisal II and his family were executed at 8:00am and the military officers took control of Baghdad by noon. Prime Minister Nuri as-Said - having evaded capture on the 14th - was shot dead the following day.
Consquences
International reaction
Sunday, July 13, 2008
Monday, November 12, 2007
South Asia’s militarists
South Asia is in the grip of a dual crisis - neighbours Iran and Pakistan face invasion and implosion respectively. The latest can be summarized as this: Iran is accused of developing a nuclear weapons programme, exporting terror and generating regional instability; Pakistan has a nuclear weapons programme, has exported and currently is an epicentre of terror, regarded by the West as a vital ally, but now faces an unpredictable internal political crisis. Both countries have arrived at these current states through dramatic upheaval over the last thirty years, but specifically, two individuals Reza Shah Pahlavi and General Zia ul-haq were critical players in this process. It would be easy to criticise the American foreign policy that supported these two regional strongmen, as part of its anti Soviet geopolitical strategy. The lack of foresight and application of realpolitik is a widely distributed critique and not without merit. But more importantly both dictators thrived in post colonial environments, where nationalism, industrialisation and militarism catapulted their respective states into revolution and division. South Asia’s desire to re-assert itself against the West was a stronger dynamic in shaping today’s predicament than misguided American foreign policy.
American support undoubtedly contributed to both leaders dominance. The Shah was considered by his opponents as America’s puppet, although he would gain the upper hand in the relationship after the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973. General Zia seizure of power – including the execution of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – drew American criticism, but the Pakistani leader re-positioned his country as a vital weapon against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. American aid provided the basis for industrialisation for both countries, Iran in the 1960s from the Johnson administration, Pakistan in the 1980s from Carter then Reagan. Arms were the pivot of the dependency. Unprecedented volumes of military equipment were sold to Iran following Nixon’s 1972 carte blanche in exchange for oil revenues; Pakistan acted as the CIA’s conduit, supplying and training the Afghan mujahedin whilst building its own military capacity at the same time. In the post Vietnam era both nations benefited from a relocation of American arms supplies, but it was the ambition of these two leaders that drove their military dictatorships. It was their ambitions that led in different ways to two highly volatile states, now regarded as preeminent international security threats.
The obvious similarity between these two is the critical role designated to them by American Cold War strategy to contain communism. The Shah feared Soviet influence from the early days of his rule, was restored to power by the CIA’s 1953 coup against perceived communist influence, established the brutal security service SAVAK to repress domestic communism, and built up a fearsome military arsenal to counter Soviet influence in Iraq and the Gulf. Zia considered communism the preeminent ideological threat to Islam, cultivated relations with anti-communist hardliners in Washington, and directed Pakistan’s entire military resources in the Afghan-Soviet war.
Domestically both leaders consolidated their power through expansive economic development. The Shah pushed for stratospheric industrialisation fuelled by oil revenues, his ego, and Persian nationalism. Zia presided over modest growth in comparison - seven percent annually - but this development favoured the elites, the military class and Zia political allies. Whilst the Shah used Iran’s natural resource for development, Zia relied on Gulf and American aid. Corruption and economic mismanagement characterised both regimes, eventually creating widespread popular opposition.
The critical constant is Islam, but in totally opposing ways. The Shah acknowledged Shia Islam as part of Persian culture, but presented Pahlavi nationalism as preceding Islam and by implication superior. His extravagances, absolutism and, critically, alliance with the United States alienated the Shia clergy. By focusing on Marxist opposition, the Shia infrastructure – led by Khomeini – was free to develop, laying the path for Islamic revolution. Zia had seen how the power of Islam in Iran shaped politics, so sought to avoid the Shah’s mistakes. Once Zia had seized power, he embarked on an extensive Islamization programme, turning against the grain of Pakistani secular culture, imposing strict Sharia law, restructuring the economy to Islamic precepts, and elevating political party Jamaat e Islami to a central role. Pakistan received vast donations from Saudi Arabia and across the Middle East to establish madrasas and build mosques. Zia encouraged foreign support for both the Afghan jihad and Pakistan’s own Islamic renaissance. But ultimately the consequence of the Shah’s ambivalence and Zia’s proselytizing was the same – the growth of militant Islamism.
The second devastating legacy left by these two autocrats was the proliferation of nuclear technology. The Shah’s nuclear programme – assisted by Kissinger from 1975 - was short-lived and dismantled by Khomeini after 1979, but the infrastructure and expertise plus the very concept of an Iranian bomb remained. Zia’s contribution to South Asia’s nuclear arms race was clearer. Building on the programme established by Bhutto in the early 1970s, Zia pursued an active nuclear agenda – led by AQ Khan – that was ignored by the American leadership, for the sake of preserving Pakistan’s role against the greater Soviet threat. The balance between containment and proliferation always swung to the former in America’s Cold War policy.
Similarities continue in how they managed relations with the West. Both were opportunists, adept at exploiting American geopolitical interests against the backdrop of Cold war policy. The Shah played up the Soviet threat across Iran’s north border, exploited Nixon’s weak foreign policy position through 1972 and 1973, and ultimately received the freedom to purchase any military hardware needed and pursue a hawkish oil policy. Zia likewise seized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to re-establish relations in Washington and improve his poor international reputation, then exploited Reagan’s hardline against communism to up the military aid.
American arms policy and pursuit a wider geopolitical interests are commonly cited as factors in the region’s transformation in the last two decades of the Cold war, but it was the extremism that developed during both reigns that dominated. Khomeini’s militant rhetoric was inadvertently cultivated by the Shah’s excesses and American alliance, whilst Zia directly cultivated Islamic extremism, creating prototypes for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Just as the Shah pursued his pro Western secular rule to the end – despite fierce clerical opposition; Zia continued his support for the most radical elements in the Afghan jihad - especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – until his death.
The consequence of such autocratic behaviour differed in gestation. The Shah’s excesses exploded in Iran at the end of his reign; Zia’s legacy emerged again with a vengeance in the second year of this century in New York. Both leaders left a legacy of resentment, division and brutality. Critically both leaders used American foreign policy and military aid to reinforce their own positions, and while doing so, creating the impression that America only saw South Asian states as pawns against the Soviets. The anti-West sentiment that now exists in South Asia is as much down to the Shah and Zia’s thirst for militarism and its consequences, as it was from American foreign policy.
Saturday, October 27, 2007
Algeria's FIS - democratic or theocratic
How democratic were the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)?
The democratization process in Algeria between 1988 and 1992, and subsequent civil war, provides a valuable case study in the debate surrounding the compatibility of democracy and Islam. The period also marks the end of the region’s post-colonial era, characterised by disillusionment with socialism and one party rule; and a transition to a time of political upheaval with Islamist movements seeking power democratically and through violence. At the centre of Algeria’s political crisis was the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a coalition of contrasting Islamist groups. Although FIS participated in elections at this time, were successful but prevented from assuming power by a military coup; how democratic they were, in provisional municipal power or would have been in parliamentary power, is debatable. Opposing arguments see FIS as either intent on establishing an Islamic theocracy or having the moderation to govern a pluralistic political system.
To consider their democratic credentials, it is possible to look at four key areas: the democratic and Islamic tradition in Algeria, under French colonial rule and the National Liberation Front (FLN); the political events of 1988 – 1992, FIS’ actions and their record in power; the structure of FIS and their leadership at the time; and the international context and role of external influences on Algerian democracy. Beyond Algeria, it is also necessary to look at the debate surrounding the compatibility of Islam and democracy.
The absence of a democratic tradition, the decline in economic and social conditions, and the suppression of Islam in Algeria, created the conditions whereby an Islamist movement like FIS could gain mass popular support. The FLN and the ruling elite’s previous dominance also meant that they were unprepared for loss of power. The policies of the FLN created such dissatisfaction amongst large parts of Algerian society, that rather than aspiring for gradual reform, a large proportion sought radical change. Such strong opposition to the ruling order meant that FIS would face their own internal tensions over what should follow FLN rule.
Algeria’s submergence into the French empire with its mission to civilize restricted Islam’s value. Tocqueville saw Islam as just another feature of Algerian society to be subsumed, doubting its long term influence. Despite this dominance, Algeria retained links to the rest of the Arab Islamic world, through the spread of newspapers, books and journals, plus regular pilgrimages to Mecca.[1] Political Islam developed a more national and parochial nature, with an emphasis on holy men and living saints.[2]
The first resistance came in Islamic form, led by Amir Abd al-Qadir. During a temporary truce in 1837 with France, al-Qadir applied sharia law, prohibiting alcohol, tobacco and gambling; suppressing prostitution and homosexuality.[3] But despite advocating jihad against French rule, he was forced to compromise his principles, conceding land to France and using non-Islamic courts and legal officials to administer secular laws.[4]
In 1931 Abdelhamid Ben Badis formed the Association of Algerian Ulama (AUMA), an organization that gathered Islamic intellectual thought of the time. The AUMA provided a modern progressive message to wider parts of Algerian society, including the mercantile class. Ben Badis believed the goal of re-establishing true Islamic beliefs and practices was compatible with French colonial rule. The AUMA would compromise and co-operate to ensure their preservation. However radical members emerged and the AUMA merged into the FLN and its armed struggle in the war of independence. Parallels between the AUMA and FIS show that Islamic movements have been willing to cooperate with the ruling elites of the time, but as a power struggle emerged the membership radicalised.
AUMA’s apolitical tradition continued with the formation of the al-Qiyam al-Islamiyya (Islamic Values) Association in 1964. In universities during the 1960s intellectual Malek Bennabi, developed his Islamic writings, adopting a Francophone position on Islamic thought. Bennabi perceived democracy as the result of a humanistic cultural development,[5] but rejected Western forms of democracy. His French orientation and scepticism of salafism however limited his influence on the Islamist movement.
In the independent Algeria, Islam was valued by the FLN leaders, although there was a clear separation between religion and state. Democracy and Islam were defined in restrictive terms. At the Tripoli Congress, May-June 1962, a new constitutional program promoted a “popular democratic revolution” and Islam was to be “stripped of all excrescences and superstitions that have smothered or corrupted it”.[6] The compromises made to Islamist groups under the FLN, prevented a full explosion of Islamic activism, but also encouraged their confidence and expanded their role within Algerian society.
So as the FLN issued decrees from the 1970s onwards - covering gambling, alcohol or seminars on Islamic thought – Islamists rejected this expanding state monopoly.[7] The incorporation of Islam into the state apparatus provided the political impetus for Islamists and led to the first instances of violence in Ben Aknoun, November 1982. Algerian Islamists had a stronger determination, than other dissident groups, to violently oppose the established order.[8] An uncompromising opposition in Algerian universities in the early 1980s and the emergence of militant groups like the Mouvement Algérien Islamique Armé (MAIA); contrasted to future leader Abassi Madani’s temperate and independent approach that rejected armed struggle. The fragmented nature of the Islamist movement was a major hindrance in the 1980s and would remain so with the creation of FIS.
Algerian society polarized as FLN economic policies favoured the Francophone population. A well-educated but unemployed Arabic-speaking generation had the intellectual training and political awareness to mobilise opposition.[9] Poor governance and corruption amongst the ruling elite added to the disillusionment. Opposition to the FLN also emerged from the failure to fulfil the expectations of the war of independence - this disappointment led to Islamism becoming the inheritor of the revolutionary mantle of Algerian national identity.[10] As Madani would state in 1990: “The Algerian state of 1962 had nothing to do with what had been projected on 1st November 1954, for which we had taken up arms: an independent state founded on Islamic principles. The state that has risen before our eyes was founded on secular, socialist principles. This was a serious deviation.”[11]
The structure of the FLN and their monopoly on political expression meant that Algeria’s opposition, when it was permitted, lacked political sophistication and often made unreasoned pronouncements on policies.[12] After gaining independence, the new leaders, in fear of a pluralistic society, built a strong state that required unity around the ideology of nationalism.[13] Political opposition could only develop in mosques, madrassas and universities; as a result, it took on an Islamic nature and was prevalent amongst the young unemployed. Prior to 1988, there was an absence of a political class: “the professional class, the intellectual bourgeoisie, has been deliberately excluded from politics. They have no expertise and no political experience”.[14] This void allowed FIS to flourish as an opposition movement.
The final and probably most damaging flaw in FLN rule was their economic mismanagement. By 1986, nearly 75% of Algerians aged between 16 and 25 were unemployed; national debt was $24.6bn in 1987; and oil and gas revenues (Algeria’s primary export) fell by 40% in 1986-7.[15] Restoring economic stability became the defining political issue in the late 1980s.
With all these failures, the emergence of the FIS was not surprising, although unexpected by FLN leaders. The desire for a complete change of political system had developed over the previous 20 years, resulting in a rejection of FLN’s socialist ideology. For a significant proportion of the Algerian electorate in June 1990, Islam was perceived as the alternative.
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The breaking point for Algerian society came at the October 1988 riots. The demonstrations were widespread but Islamist groups only participated a few days after the initial eruption. Discontent with economic conditions was a major factor in the riots, but journalists, attorneys, and academics also protested against freedom of speech, legal independence and torture respectively.[16] With no obvious organizer of the protests, the Islamists assumed the de facto leadership, even though the demonstrations represented a wide selection of grievances. The resolution of the protests came after President Chadli met with Islamist leaders including Madani and Ali Belhadj. This meeting provided an opportunity for the FLN elite to re-connect with the Algerian people, and also for Islamists to use the political system to their favour.
The 1989 Constitution that followed guaranteed “freedom of expression, of association and assembly”, but did not permit political associations to base their actions on religious, linguistic or regionalist ingredients.[17] Despite this, Chadli and the National Assembly overlooked the ambiguities and FIS was formally endorsed in September 1989. This decision partly reflected genuine democratic reforms and confidence that FIS would conform to the democratic rules. It also reflected Chadli’s desire to suppress FLN opposition; potentially split the Islamist movement; renew his own international support against the expansion of the Islamist movement.[18] FIS used this new recognition to mobilise their supporters, through mosques, newspapers, leaflets and rallies. FIS chose to trust the government[19] and its promises of democratic reform, and joined other newly formed groups under a multi-party system. Chadli also encouraged economic liberalization.
Despite the promise of a new system, the lack of pre-existing institutional and financial structures for supporting a pluralistic system, and lack of conviction that engagement in political debate was worthwhile or safe[20], meant that political activism was hesitant amongst new political parties. In contrast, FIS relied on its solid history of political Islamic organization, to give itself an advantage.
The political programme of the FIS was instigated by the March 1989 policy document Projet du Front Islamique du Salut. The document, described as structurally and thematically disorganized, is more a self-justification, mixing Islam with a demonstration of national pride, than a programme for resolving massive social problems,[21] proclaiming that “FIS has adopted a moderate political approach”.[22] The abolition of the state monopoly, usury and intermediaries, was to be replaced by private ventures and free competition.[23] This aspect of their political programme appealed directly to the entrepreneurial middle class.
Whilst FIS prepared for forthcoming elections in June 1990, details emerged of their local activities, raising concerns over how any future rule might be. Intimidation and violence against journalists and women opposed to their views; and the emergence of an Islamic police force, were attributed to FIS activists.[24] In the build up to the elections, the FIS leadership presented a nationalist and non-violent message, aimed at alleviating FLN fears and widening their support. Madani rejected violence, maintained openness towards and coexistence with other political parties, and stated that political alliances were possible if “in compliance with the interests of the country”.[25] Democracy was seen as a means, rather than a political end, but was not to be repealed after gaining power: “Democracy is opening up the opportunity for the people so as it chooses the alternative it wants and a leadership to represent it. If democracy has this meaning, we must adopt democracy as a way of life. As for the allegation that we want to embrace democracy and deny it the day we reach power firstly, was this found in the project of our political programme? Was it found in our official statement? No it was not.”[26]
A multiparty system was declared feasible by Madani: “The presence of numerous parties and numerous bodies is necessary for the serious management of the nation's affairs.”[27] FIS also showed commitment to democratic accountability by urging the creation of a multi-party committee including constitutional lawyers to oversee the local elections.[28] However FIS’ fragmented structure meant that contrasting messages on democracy emerged; Belhadj consistently stated his opposition to pluralism and democracy, whilst Madani represented the moderate viewpoint.
At the same time, the “democratic opposition” made up of other political organizations demonstrated in support of democracy in opposition to FIS activism. Businessmen, women’s rights and Berber activists, voiced opposition to both the FLN and FIS, fearing the replacement of one dictatorship with another.[29]
FIS presented a mixed message when it came to women’s rights. Women’s rights were curtailed in FIS controlled areas – imposition of the hijab, restrictions of speech, extra surveillance – but women also acted as “guardians of moral order” and there was also “militant women, including university women, who worked extremely hard for the charitable associations and for the [FIS] electoral campaign.”[30] Madani proposed the establishment of FIS women’s section and large numbers of women attended rallies prior to the 1990 election.[31]
The true test of any democratization process is elections. In the June 1990 municipal elections, FIS gained the majority vote in 853 of 1,539 communes (Assemblée Populaire Communale). They also won the majority in 32 wilayas or provinces (Assemblée Populaire de Wilaya) from a total of 48. It has to be noted that 34.85% of the population did not vote.[32] Madani sought to enhance FIS’ democratic credentials firstly by emphasizing their electoral participation, but also reiterating that the victory had been achieved with the help of the women’s vote and that an opposition must exist if Algeria was to achieve economic, political and intellectual renewal.[33]
Criticisms of FIS and fears over its future rule were widespread. The advent of a FIS national government would lead to the implementation of sharia law, believed Said Saadi, who represented Kabyle Berber interests. As leader of the secular Rally for Culture and Democracy and opposed to both FLN and FIS, he believed that ''without a satisfactory solution to the people's lack of confidence, we face either the helmet (of the military) or the turban (of the Islamic fundamentalists).''[34] The lack of democratic tradition meant the electorate had an uncomfortable choice. Tahar Bensmina, an independent candidate: ''If national elections were held now, the FLN would certainly win because, as unhappy as people are, they would fear the others' inexperience.''[35] The electorate faced stark choices between FLN economic incompetence and untested Islamist policies. The vote for the FIS was a protest vote against the FLN by a large part of the electorate, but there was also a genuine appeal to FIS’ Islamic principles.
FIS social policies were also scrutinized as they managed welfare services in local poor communities. This included housing projects and work for the unemployed, the expansion of the FIS mosque network and the Islamization of education.[36] FIS’ attempts to govern locally were hindered by the poor mismanagement of previously FLN run administrations and by government tactics to prevent progress.[37] Concerns that administrations would install strict social policies were not misplaced, FIS municipalities brought in controls over Raï music, co-educational schools and clothing shortly after the election.[38] Doubts existed over their ability to move from municipal to national rule, where decisions of state and management of the economy were needed. The economist Rachid Mimouni: ''The ideology they preach is not capable of running a modern country and leading the economy out of catastrophe''.[39]
FLN attempts to regain the political initiative came through the approval of a new electoral bill in April 1991. The law included the creation of new assembly seats, predominantly in southern Algeria where the FLN had its strongest support. Discontent with these FLN gerrymandering tactics led to a radicalisation in the expression of FIS opposition, as general strikes and demonstrations were called; the government responded by declaring a state of siege and then arresting Madani and Belhadj. The FIS were accused of challenging the system, undermining state security and obstructing the democratic process; but they were merely a responding to an undemocratic law.[40]
Although Madani stated that he was “ready to embark on [further] elections, but with guarantees”[41], divisions within the FIS emerged during the demonstrations and many political actors, especially radical activists, turned their backs on the opportunities created by the democratic transition.[42] Under pressure from repressive government measures, the usually moderate Madani issued statements on the right to jihad and preparedness to fight the military if demonstrations were blocked. Preserving a democratic image was still important to the FIS: “We want laws that will allow the people a free choice and a cleansing of the political climate”.[43] However the militant wing of FIS gathered pace after these confrontations with the state and less democratic influences became more influential.
FLN leaders were prepared to maintain FIS’ inclusion in the democratic process prior to the December 1991 legislative elections. With the imprisonment of FIS’ leadership and from a perceived position of strength, FLN leaders were able to make concessions that, it was hoped, would lead to an Islamist party that was domesticated and when integrated into the institutional system would not question the political survival of the regime.[44] Despite real damage to the democratic credentials of both sides during the unrest in May-June 1991, a commitment to democracy from both remained. Abdelkader Hachani, provisional FIS leader, stated in August 1991: “We can not arrive in power other than through free and proper elections”.[45] President Bendjedid announced in October 1991: “The democratic process goes on, as pluralism has entered the political arena, and democracy has become an optimum way of running the affairs of the nation and keeping abreast of the age.”[46]
After the December 1991 election, criticisms of FIS adherence to the democratic process came in the form of accusations of ballot rigging, intimidation and loss of 900,000 electoral cards in their municipalities.[47] Despite ongoing criticisms of FIS’ democratic credentials from opposition parties, the FLN were prepared to accept FIS as sufficiently democratic to participate and potentially form a government of national unity, after victory in the first ballot on 26 December 1991. Links between FLN’s Islamic wing and FIS had developed in late 1991 and when faced with a requirement to cooperate with other political forces, FIS also adopted a more nationalist stance, including accepting Berber culture.[48] Accusations of possibly changing the constitution or establishing popular tribunals to try FIS enemies were explicitly denied.[49] Hachani issued statements at this time that presented a moderate and tolerant message, but were carefully qualified by adherence to Islamic principles: “FIS will guarantee individual and collective liberties in the framework of Islamic law and will tolerate the existence of parties other than Islamic ones”.[50]
Despite the undemocratic actions of the military in forcing President Chadli Benjedid to resign, effectively undertaking a coup d’état and dissolving FIS, it was the Islamist movement that was denounced as having no interest in democracy. The crisis was blamed on FIS, even though they had simply adhered to the democratic process as encouraged. Mohammed Boudiaf: “FIS tried to use democracy in order to liquidate democracy. The use of Islam for political and partisan aims, and also the resorting to democracy and lies found….listening ears from amongst the deprived and marginalised sections of the population.”[51] Boudiaf put the Islamist electoral success down to exploitation of the younger generation’s despair and compared FIS to French fascists.[52]
Concerns had developed amongst the Algerian population from a combination of FIS municipal rule, increasing militancy from mid 1991 and ambiguous statements on what their Islamic rule would entail. But the end of a democratic process came as much from the reluctance of the ruling elite and the military to give up the power hard fought-for during Algeria’s war of independence, as the population’s fear of the unknown. Despite Madani’s statements of moderation, the democratic process had not advanced enough for the ruling elite to relinquish their position. Boudiaf, as the mouthpiece of the military junta, tried to portray the action as protecting democracy, but this was not convincing when thousands of FIS activists were tortured and sent to detention centres, newspapers were banned and mosques and welfare centres closed.[53] As Hocine Ait Ahmed, leader of the Socialist Forces Front, said: “They won’t make anyone believe that stopping the electoral process is a democratic advance”.[54]
The Sant' Egidio Platform of January 1995 was an attempt to end the civil war that followed the coup. Alongside other political parties opposed to the military junta, including the FLN, FIS rejected violence, called for the release of Madani and Belhadj, and made clear statements about adherence to democratic principles. These included respect for “alternation of power through universal suffrage”; “respect for popular legitimacy”; “the guarantee of fundamental liberties, individual and collective, regardless of race, sex, confession or language”; and the “consecration of pluralism”.[55] The proposals in Rome were a significant shift for FIS, despite mixed statements from their representatives Rabah Kebir and Anwar Haddam towards relations with militant groups, and doubts over whether the imprisoned leadership accepted the proposals.[56] The rejection of the Rome plan by the Algerian government shows again that the regime had little true interest in democratic principles. Likewise the simultaneously rejection by the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé) shows that violent groups were still able to undermine FIS’ credibility as a democratic movement.
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The personalities, structure and influences of FIS are critical to understanding how democratic the movement was. Shortly after the approval of the new constitution in February 1989, the new organization Front Islamique du Salut was formed, with Madani as president and Belhadj as deputy. Disputes over the merits of an Islamic political party meant that FIS was regarded as a breakaway from the Islamist movement. The absence of several leading Islamist figures meant that it was able to pursue a more popular and political course.[57] The link between Algeria’s older generation of preachers (religious Islamists) and the new politicians (reformist Islamists) was seen in Madani’s leadership.[58]
Madani had been involved in the FLN fight against France, giving him personal legitimacy and credibility when criticising their post independence failures; and also acting as a continuity of the FLN’s revolutionary ideals and hegemony, although in an Islamic guise.[59] He had an overseas education, making him more open to conflicting political and religious ideals. Madani was consistent in his moderate tone. Belhadj, also a preacher, had no experience of the world outside Algeria, which fed into his denouncements of democracy as a tool of the West. His hardline attitude towards democracy and the FLN also came from a strict Arabic education and less privileged background than other Islamist activists. Both leaders were influenced in their development as Islamic activists by Bennabi, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu Al-Ala al-Mawdudi. Madani had attended rallies in support of Qutb and studied under Bennabi. Belhadj also cited Algerian Islamists as being influential.[60]
Madani’s views on Algeria’s political future are not dissimilar to Bennabi’s. Alongside other moderate FIS activists - Abdelkader Bachani, Rabah Kebir, Anwar Baddam – Madani was committed to an "Algerian" solution to Algerian problems. Inspired by the writings of Bennabi, that rejected all internationalist models of Islamic society; he believed in an electoral strategy for assuming power and supported the idea of gradually applying the sharia to Algerian society.[61] As the leading advocate of democracy in FIS, Madani argued that the Islamic version was superior to the liberal and socialist model[62], and that it represented the best opportunity for justice, freedom and equality. Democratisation was seen by Madani as a means of achieving Islamic goals, but the sharia held precedence, and once in power they would review anything judged incompatible with the sharia.[63] Madani sought a unique Algerian democratic model neither FLN nor Western influenced.
In contrast, Belhadj, with other sympathisers of Mustafa Bouyali’s MAIA, represented the confrontational and often militant wing of FIS. The radical message of Belhadj – “In Islam sovereignty belongs to the divine Law; in democracy, sovereignty belongs to the people, to the mob and to charlatans”[64] – was uncompromising and although Madani attempted to temper his rhetoric, it led parts of the electorate to see FIS as undemocratic. His religious background underpinned many of his statements: “Democracy is a stranger in the House of God. There is no democracy in Islam”[65]. By equating democracy with blasphemy and emphasizing the religious side of FIS’ struggle for power, Belhadj was able to mobilise a large segment of the population who saw Islam as the alternative future, but at the same time he also allowed militant activists to strengthen their influence.
Although Madani often made attempts to pave over cracks in FIS rhetoric after Belhadj’s outburst, he could not alter the fundamental splits in the movements structure. On one side were the preachers/reformers like Madani with an adaptive, evolutionary and social approach; on the other side were the Salafi radicals/revolutionaries who were Arabophone, confrontational and influenced by Qutb: Belhadj, Said Mekhloufi and future GIA leaders. A third group overlapped both wings, the technocrats had Western university backgrounds and represented professional classes: scientists, engineers and physicians. Abdelkader Hachani fell into this category.[66] Beyond ideological contrasts, the hierarchical structure did not allow a consistent level of communication amongst FIS acitivists. Decisions were made mostly by a Majlis Shura consisting of 35 members, but the exact composition was unknown and only Madani regularly spoke to the media.[67] With such a structure, it was impossible to have on every level, consistent stances on democracy, women’s rights or political pluralism.
FIS mass support lay in poor urban areas that suffered most hardship from the FLN’s economic failure. Belhadj used the October 1988 unrest to promote FIS as the true representatives of their interests. Middle class traders and entrepreneurs also supported FIS, in anticipation of a more liberal economic alternative to the FLN, but this support declined between the 1990 and 1991 elections, as fears grew of the movement’s real intentions.[68] The strong support that developed amongst the Hittists [69] came through improvements in social services and local amenities. However support for idealistic democratic principles was a lower priority than economic policies, given the sharp decline in living conditions that had occurred in the 1980s.
Internal tensions developed after the arrests of Madani and Belhadj, but had already emerged after three founding members publicly criticized FIS tactics: “we should not have entered the municipal elections…we should have begun to form the nation, form the youth, and to explain the meaning of true Islam”; accused militant forces of gaining influence: “corrupt elements have infiltrated the ranks of the FIS and have begun to add fuel to the flames”; and denounced Madani as dangerous.[70] Judging how democratic the FIS were in their first few years is hindered by this fractured structure. Although Madani was the primary mouthpiece for the movement, he had a range of contrasting views below him.
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When Madani was asked whether democracy existed in the Algerian arena, he responded: “No we endeavour to raise democracy higher to the freedom of Islam in its largest, most honest and complete sense.”[71] As the leader of Islamist party, his adherence to democratic principles can be regarded as surprising, not just because of the absence of democratic tradition in Algeria, but also due to historical difficulties in combining Islam and democracy. Madani and Belhadj would provide conflicting arguments on their compatibility. The political parties opposed to FIS maintain that by its very nature, as an Islamist movement, it could not be democratic.
Elements of traditional Islamic thought give an understanding of how compatible democracy and Islam are. The Islamic scholar Mawdudi stated that the political system was based on three principles: Tawheed (Unity of God), Risalat (Prophethood) and Khilafat (Caliphate).[72] It is argued that it is impossible to have an Islamic democracy, because the sovereignty of the people conflicts with the Tawheed concept that there is no God but God – i.e. the sovereignty of God.[73] Authority and laws are made by God not man, as in a democracy. Islam, from the viewpoint of political philosophy, is therefore the very antithesis of secular Western democracy as it repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty.[74] Mawdudi’s view does not reject democracy outright, rather it advocates a theocracy ruled by the whole community of Muslims, described as a “theo-democracy”.[75]
However the capacity for an Islamic democracy can be developed through Islamic concepts of independent interpretive judgement (ijtihad), consensus (ijma) and consultation (shura).[76] The commitment to ijtihad was interpreted by FIS activists that no entity has a monopoly on interpreting the kind of political order God intends, so secularists have as much right to rule as Islamists.[77] Ijma can provide an effective basis for accepting majority rule, offering legitimacy to an Islamic democracy and a procedure to carry it out.[78]
This liberal Islamic view sees the shura as critical to the argument of compatibility with democracy. FIS activists proposed the shura as an Algerian governing body.[79] FIS’ political programme of 1989, indicated that the shura would permit the “elimination of political, economic and social oppression and monopoly….will make the principle of equality one of its main lines of action, alongside a policy which aims to raise the restrictions on public freedoms”.[80]
The shura ensures ongoing scrutiny of the decisionmaking process and also involves representatives of all classes, including those who have no chance of winning an election, in consensusbuilding.[81] However it is debatable whether consultation is a duty of the ruler; he is bound by the decisions of those consulted; they are his own choice or the elected representatives, members of political parties, religious specialists or community leaders; or whether they decide by majority-rule.[82] The relative merits of shura based rule versus democracy are also clouded by negative views of Western ideologies. An unemployed nineteen-year-old from Algiers said, “I’m opposed to democracy because it’s a western invention. It isn’t Islamic. I support the FIS, so I support the shura.” Asked what the shura was, he continued: “The shura is Islamic. It means that the people can decide their own destiny”.[83]
Western democracy has developed over longer periods than in the Middle East or Africa, so using the normative Western definition of democracy is problematic. In addition, Arab regimes have used the term selectively, referring to themselves as “democratic”[84], without any clear democratic principles. Belhadj denounced democracy as a Western concept, but this derived as much from a Qutb influenced anti-West and anti-liberal ideology than actual opposition to the tenets of democracy. FIS leaders believed the West used double standards when advocating democracy.
***
The development of the Islamist movement in Algeria was far from unique. The struggle for political power was mirrored in other North African states from the 1970s onwards. As the post colonial governments faltered economically, politically and socially; and pluralistic politics was suppressed in one party states across the region, a false idea of democracy was presented by ruling elites. The democratization process that occurred in the late 1980s in Algeria was repeated in Egypt and Jordan, then Tunisia and Morocco in the 1990s. Islamist movements were in the ascendancy in Afghanistan, Palestine, Sudan and Lebanon[85]; and democratic forces gained major impetus from the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.[86] Just as solidarity existed amongst North African governments when they formed a task force to combat radical Islam a few months before the 1992 coup;[87] the FIS also gained solidarity abroad. Their democratic credentials were defined by these relations.
A large proportion of FIS’ funding was received from Saudi Arabia through the World Daawa League, and although a puritan Wahhabist influence fed into municipal morality policies, the influence was generally moderate and as a counterweight to Iranian militant Islamism.[88] Criticisms of FIS’ democratic principles often came through inaccurate comparisons to other Islamist groups in the region, especially Iran. The influence of the Iranian revolution on Algeria’s Islamists was limited to the early 1980s; and Madani and Belhadj emphasised theological differences when asked of similarities.[89]
The possibility of an Iranian style theocracy in the southern Mediterranean was an alarming prospect for western diplomats and politicians. The fear of Islamic fundamentalism clouded the West’s views on the democratic intentions of FIS. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian stated opposition to the possibility of “One man, one vote, one time” in Algeria prior to the 1991 elections, doubting FIS long term democratic intentions. Madani and Belhadj were critical of the United States action during the Gulf war, their economic power and double standards regarding democracy. But Madani maintained that he desired a constructive cooperative relationship with the United States based upon recognition of Algeria’s autonomy.[90] In contrast, Western attitudes at this time perceived Islam as inherently extremist and treated it as a single or monolithic force.[91]
The lack of condemnation of the 1992 coup from the West was borne out of a desire to maintain regional stability, rather than a fear (or understanding) of FIS itself. By 1995 and the Sant' Egidio negotiations, the West, in particular France and the United States, adopted a more even handed position – calling for dialogue with moderate Islamists.[92] Having seen how the Algerian government lacked any serious democratic credentials, the West slowly developed a better understanding of how democratic FIS were.
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and FIS’ reaction was a turning point for relations with the ruling elite, in particular the armed forces, and also internally as radical undemocratic elements became more assertive. Madani visited Iraq to defend Saddam Hussein in 1990, but also opposing the annexation of Kuwait. This position shifted to a pro Iraqi one, as Belhadj called for the formation of volunteer force to confront the West. This move was perceived by the armed forces as an intrusion into their turf,[93] and ended Saudi Arabia’s financial support. This support was replaced by jihadist groups involved in the war in Afghanistan.
Smaller Islamic groups had merged to form FIS’ including the local chapter of the South Asian Jamaat al-Tabligh, who were involved in recruiting young Algerians to the Afghan jihad.[94] The Afghan veteran fringe in FIS was a small minority but as anti-government protests became more violent in mid 1991, its actions undermined the movements democratic credentials. After the 1992 coup, the Afghan fringe formed the GIA, taking with it some of FIS’ more radical members, and in turn targetting its former colleagues as well.
***
A judgement of FIS’ democratic credentials can be achieved by analysing Algeria’s democratic tradition and the Islamist movement’s organizational structure, as these two factors directly influenced their actions between 1988 and 1992. The absence of a democratic tradition meant that neither the ruling elite nor FIS had matured enough to cope with any political transition. FIS needed a longer period to overcome internal disputes and be able to present a unified democratic message, the ruling elite’s experiment with democracy was corrupted by an authoritarian past with no real interest in long term democratic reform.
The fragmented structure and the contradictory statements from FIS leaders means that contrasting conclusions can be made. Whilst Madani was the public face during the 1988 – 1992 period; other more radical elements gathered momentum. With this in mind, how democratic FIS would have been in full power is debatable. The extreme level of resistance to the military junta firstly by the AIS (Islamic Salvation Army) and then the GIA, indicates that these elements would have looked to dominate FIS. The salafi wing of FIS rejected democracy as it conflicted with the concept of Tawhid, but for moderates like Madani - FIS had a nationalist and pluralist agenda that looked to create economic and social reform through democracy.
[1] Benjamin Stora, Algeria: 1830 – 2000, (Ithaca: London, 2001), p.11
[2] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.13
[3] Ibid, p.4
[4] Ibid, p.5
[5] Zoubir, Yahia H, ‘Algerian Islamists' conception of democracy’ , Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), 22.6.1996
[6] Benjamin Stora, Algeria: 1830 – 2000, (Ithaca: London, 2001), p.125
[7] Ibid, p.171
[8] Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized – John P. Entelis, p.85
[9] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.52
[10] Ibid, p.101-2
[11] Slimane Zeghidour, "Entretien avec Abbasi Madani," Politique Etrangere, No. 49, 1990, p. 180. quoted in Takeyh, R., ‘Islamism in Algeria: A struggle between hope and agony’, Middle East Policy, Summer 2003
[12] James Ciment, Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge, (New York, 1997), p.131
[13] Andrew J. Pierre & William B. Quandt, The Algerian crisis : policy options for the West, (Washington, 1996), p.6
[14] Peter Ford, ‘Unnamed Western Diplomat quoted in Algeria's Tortuous Road to Democracy’, Christian Science Monitor, 10.10.1991,
[15] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.99-100
[16] Benjamin Stora, Algeria: 1830 – 2000, (Ithaca: London, 2001), p.196
[17] Mohand Salah Tahi, ‘The Arduous Democratisation Process in Algeria’,The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3. (Sep., 1992), pp. 397-419.
[18] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.119-121
[19] Frederic Volpi, Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria, (London: Sterling, 2003), p.47
[20] Ibid, p.47
[21] Ahmed Rouadjia, Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement (1986-1992), in Laura Guazzone, (ed.), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, (Reading, 1995), p.80-81
[22] Ibid p.81
[23] Ibid, p.83
[24] Francis Ghiles, ‘FLN still looks backwards as Algeria seeks a way forward’, Financial Times (London,England), 28.11.1989, AND Peter Hiett, ‘Algerian police to investigate security force’, The Guardian, 23.11.1989
[25] Algeria Islamic Salvation Front Leader Interviewed After Meeting with President Benjedid, Algerian TV – 8 1.1990
[26] Algeria Islamic Leader Sets Out His Party’s Policies, Algerian TV, 27 2.1990
[27] Ibid
[28] Philip Shehadi of Reuters, ‘Muslims show their strength at Algiers rally’, The Independent, 21.4.1990
[29] Francis Ghiles, ‘Algerians demonstrate in support of democracy’, Financial Times, 11.5.1990
[30]Rabia Bekkar; Hannah Davis, ‘Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The Islamist Occupation of Urban Algeria’, Middle East Report, No. 179, Islam, The State and Democracy. (Nov. - Dec., 1992), pp. 11-15.
[31] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.134
[32] Algerian agency comments on FIS victory in elections, APS in English, 17.6.1990
[33] Susan MacDonald, ‘Poll results in Algeria bring Islamic state nearer’, The Times, 14.6.1990
[34] Howard LaFranchi, ‘Local Elections Are First Step For Democracy, but Most Algerians Want More’, Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 12.6.1990
[35] Ibid
[36] Rabia Bekkar; Hannah Davis, ‘Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The Islamist Occupation of Urban Algeria’, Middle East Report, No. 179, Islam, The State and Democracy. (Nov. - Dec., 1992), pp. 11-15.
[37] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.160
[38] Algeria Islamic Salvation Front supporters impose morality controls, Radio France Internationale, 14.7.1990
[39] Howard LaFranchi, ‘Algerians Test Support for Islam in Free Vote’, Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 7.6.1990
[40] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.164
[41] Abassi Madani, speech to party rally in Oran, 3.5.1991, Summary of World Broadcasts
[42] Frederic Volpi, Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria, (London: Sterling, 2003), p.51
[43] Rabah Kebbir, head of the FIS political commission, quoted in Peter Ford, ‘Algeria's Tortuous Road to Democracy’, Christian Science Monitor, 10.10.1991
[44] Francois Burgat, Islamic Movements in North Africa, (London, 1994), p.299
[45] Interview with Abdelkader Hachani, Algérie Actualité, 1.8.1991
[46] Algerian President Announces Elections for 26th December 1991, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 15.10.1991, Text of address to the nation by President Chadli Bendjedid
[47] Fundamentalists accused of ballot rigging, intimidation, Agence France Presse, 30.12.1991 AND Francis Ghiles, ‘Establishment takes fright at Algeria election results’, Financial Times, 2.1.1992
[48] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.238
[49] Ibid, p.239
[50] Ibid, pp.239-240
[51] Boudiaf says Algeria needs ''Radical change'' to escape from crisis, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 22.4.1992
[52] Algeria Boudiaf holds news conference for foreign journalists, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 16.2.1992
[53] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.166
[54] Jonathan Randall, ‘Algerian Elections Cancelled’, Washington Post, 13.1.1992
[55] Platform for a Political and Peaceful Solution to the Algerian Crisis, 13 January 1995
[56] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.345
[57] Ibid p.117
[58] John P. Entelis, Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non Violent Dimension, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.59
[59] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.102
[60] Ibid, p.151
[61] John P. Entelis, Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non Violent Dimension, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.57
[62] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.159
[63] Azzedine Layachi, Political Liberalisation and the Islamist Movement in Algeria in Bonner, M., Reif, M., & Tessler, M. (ed.s), Islam, democracy and the state in Algeria: lessons for the western Mediterranean and beyond, (London, 2005), p.58
[64] M. Al-Ahnaf, B. Botiveau, F. Frégosi.El Mounquid, no.23, L’Algérie par ses islamistes, p.93
[65] Alger Republicain, December 1989, quoted in L’Algérie – Catherine Belvaude, p.108
[66] John P. Entelis, Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non Violent Dimension, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.60
[67] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.149
[68] Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, (London, 2003), pp.168-169
[69] Translated as “those leaning against the wall”. Slang for the urban poor unemployed.
[70] Algeria FIS founder members criticise Madani in Television appearance, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 29.6.1991
[71] Algeria Islamic Salvation Front Leader Interviewed After Meeting with President Benjedid, Algerian TV, 8.1.1990
[72] al-Mawdudi quoted in John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.23
[73] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.23
[74] Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam in Khurshid, A., Islam: Its Meaning and Message, (Leicester, 1976)
[75] Ibid
[76] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.27
[77] James Ciment, Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge, (New York, 1997), p.12
[78] John. O. Voll & John L. Esposito, ‘Islam’s Democratic Essence’, Middle East Quarterly, September 1994
[79] Mamoun Fandy, ‘Algerian Opposition Isn't 'Fundamentalist'’, Christian Science Monitor, 17.6.1991
[80] Ahmed Rouadjia, Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement (1986-1992), in Laura Guazzone, (ed.), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, (Reading, 1995), p.82
[81] Ehud Ya'ari, ‘Democracy and Shuracracy’, The Jerusalem Report, 27.6.1991
[82] Gudrun Kramer, ‘Islamist Notions of Democracy’, Middle East Report, No. 183, Political Islam (Jul. - Aug., 1993), pp. 2-8
[83] Difraoui, Abdelasiem el-. 1994. La critique du système démocratique par le Front islamique du Salut. In Keppel, G. (ed.), Exils et royaumes, (Paris, 1994), 105–24
[84] Francois Burgat, Islamic Movements in North Africa, (London, 1994), p.125
[85] Paul Berman: Terror And Liberalism, New York 2003, p.155-156 and Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror, (London, 2003), p.181
[86] William A. Zarman, The International Politics of Democracy in North Africa, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.209
[87] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.166
[88] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.151
[89] Ibid, p.150
[90] John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, (New York: Oxford, 1999), p.180
[91] Robin Wright, ‘Islam, Democracy and the West’, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992
[92] Roula Khalaf, ‘Algerian opposition parties draft peace plan’, Financial Times, 12.1.1995
[93] Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, (London, 2003), p.172
[94] John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, (London, 2002), p.167
The democratization process in Algeria between 1988 and 1992, and subsequent civil war, provides a valuable case study in the debate surrounding the compatibility of democracy and Islam. The period also marks the end of the region’s post-colonial era, characterised by disillusionment with socialism and one party rule; and a transition to a time of political upheaval with Islamist movements seeking power democratically and through violence. At the centre of Algeria’s political crisis was the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a coalition of contrasting Islamist groups. Although FIS participated in elections at this time, were successful but prevented from assuming power by a military coup; how democratic they were, in provisional municipal power or would have been in parliamentary power, is debatable. Opposing arguments see FIS as either intent on establishing an Islamic theocracy or having the moderation to govern a pluralistic political system.
To consider their democratic credentials, it is possible to look at four key areas: the democratic and Islamic tradition in Algeria, under French colonial rule and the National Liberation Front (FLN); the political events of 1988 – 1992, FIS’ actions and their record in power; the structure of FIS and their leadership at the time; and the international context and role of external influences on Algerian democracy. Beyond Algeria, it is also necessary to look at the debate surrounding the compatibility of Islam and democracy.
The absence of a democratic tradition, the decline in economic and social conditions, and the suppression of Islam in Algeria, created the conditions whereby an Islamist movement like FIS could gain mass popular support. The FLN and the ruling elite’s previous dominance also meant that they were unprepared for loss of power. The policies of the FLN created such dissatisfaction amongst large parts of Algerian society, that rather than aspiring for gradual reform, a large proportion sought radical change. Such strong opposition to the ruling order meant that FIS would face their own internal tensions over what should follow FLN rule.
Algeria’s submergence into the French empire with its mission to civilize restricted Islam’s value. Tocqueville saw Islam as just another feature of Algerian society to be subsumed, doubting its long term influence. Despite this dominance, Algeria retained links to the rest of the Arab Islamic world, through the spread of newspapers, books and journals, plus regular pilgrimages to Mecca.[1] Political Islam developed a more national and parochial nature, with an emphasis on holy men and living saints.[2]
The first resistance came in Islamic form, led by Amir Abd al-Qadir. During a temporary truce in 1837 with France, al-Qadir applied sharia law, prohibiting alcohol, tobacco and gambling; suppressing prostitution and homosexuality.[3] But despite advocating jihad against French rule, he was forced to compromise his principles, conceding land to France and using non-Islamic courts and legal officials to administer secular laws.[4]
In 1931 Abdelhamid Ben Badis formed the Association of Algerian Ulama (AUMA), an organization that gathered Islamic intellectual thought of the time. The AUMA provided a modern progressive message to wider parts of Algerian society, including the mercantile class. Ben Badis believed the goal of re-establishing true Islamic beliefs and practices was compatible with French colonial rule. The AUMA would compromise and co-operate to ensure their preservation. However radical members emerged and the AUMA merged into the FLN and its armed struggle in the war of independence. Parallels between the AUMA and FIS show that Islamic movements have been willing to cooperate with the ruling elites of the time, but as a power struggle emerged the membership radicalised.
AUMA’s apolitical tradition continued with the formation of the al-Qiyam al-Islamiyya (Islamic Values) Association in 1964. In universities during the 1960s intellectual Malek Bennabi, developed his Islamic writings, adopting a Francophone position on Islamic thought. Bennabi perceived democracy as the result of a humanistic cultural development,[5] but rejected Western forms of democracy. His French orientation and scepticism of salafism however limited his influence on the Islamist movement.
In the independent Algeria, Islam was valued by the FLN leaders, although there was a clear separation between religion and state. Democracy and Islam were defined in restrictive terms. At the Tripoli Congress, May-June 1962, a new constitutional program promoted a “popular democratic revolution” and Islam was to be “stripped of all excrescences and superstitions that have smothered or corrupted it”.[6] The compromises made to Islamist groups under the FLN, prevented a full explosion of Islamic activism, but also encouraged their confidence and expanded their role within Algerian society.
So as the FLN issued decrees from the 1970s onwards - covering gambling, alcohol or seminars on Islamic thought – Islamists rejected this expanding state monopoly.[7] The incorporation of Islam into the state apparatus provided the political impetus for Islamists and led to the first instances of violence in Ben Aknoun, November 1982. Algerian Islamists had a stronger determination, than other dissident groups, to violently oppose the established order.[8] An uncompromising opposition in Algerian universities in the early 1980s and the emergence of militant groups like the Mouvement Algérien Islamique Armé (MAIA); contrasted to future leader Abassi Madani’s temperate and independent approach that rejected armed struggle. The fragmented nature of the Islamist movement was a major hindrance in the 1980s and would remain so with the creation of FIS.
Algerian society polarized as FLN economic policies favoured the Francophone population. A well-educated but unemployed Arabic-speaking generation had the intellectual training and political awareness to mobilise opposition.[9] Poor governance and corruption amongst the ruling elite added to the disillusionment. Opposition to the FLN also emerged from the failure to fulfil the expectations of the war of independence - this disappointment led to Islamism becoming the inheritor of the revolutionary mantle of Algerian national identity.[10] As Madani would state in 1990: “The Algerian state of 1962 had nothing to do with what had been projected on 1st November 1954, for which we had taken up arms: an independent state founded on Islamic principles. The state that has risen before our eyes was founded on secular, socialist principles. This was a serious deviation.”[11]
The structure of the FLN and their monopoly on political expression meant that Algeria’s opposition, when it was permitted, lacked political sophistication and often made unreasoned pronouncements on policies.[12] After gaining independence, the new leaders, in fear of a pluralistic society, built a strong state that required unity around the ideology of nationalism.[13] Political opposition could only develop in mosques, madrassas and universities; as a result, it took on an Islamic nature and was prevalent amongst the young unemployed. Prior to 1988, there was an absence of a political class: “the professional class, the intellectual bourgeoisie, has been deliberately excluded from politics. They have no expertise and no political experience”.[14] This void allowed FIS to flourish as an opposition movement.
The final and probably most damaging flaw in FLN rule was their economic mismanagement. By 1986, nearly 75% of Algerians aged between 16 and 25 were unemployed; national debt was $24.6bn in 1987; and oil and gas revenues (Algeria’s primary export) fell by 40% in 1986-7.[15] Restoring economic stability became the defining political issue in the late 1980s.
With all these failures, the emergence of the FIS was not surprising, although unexpected by FLN leaders. The desire for a complete change of political system had developed over the previous 20 years, resulting in a rejection of FLN’s socialist ideology. For a significant proportion of the Algerian electorate in June 1990, Islam was perceived as the alternative.
***
The breaking point for Algerian society came at the October 1988 riots. The demonstrations were widespread but Islamist groups only participated a few days after the initial eruption. Discontent with economic conditions was a major factor in the riots, but journalists, attorneys, and academics also protested against freedom of speech, legal independence and torture respectively.[16] With no obvious organizer of the protests, the Islamists assumed the de facto leadership, even though the demonstrations represented a wide selection of grievances. The resolution of the protests came after President Chadli met with Islamist leaders including Madani and Ali Belhadj. This meeting provided an opportunity for the FLN elite to re-connect with the Algerian people, and also for Islamists to use the political system to their favour.
The 1989 Constitution that followed guaranteed “freedom of expression, of association and assembly”, but did not permit political associations to base their actions on religious, linguistic or regionalist ingredients.[17] Despite this, Chadli and the National Assembly overlooked the ambiguities and FIS was formally endorsed in September 1989. This decision partly reflected genuine democratic reforms and confidence that FIS would conform to the democratic rules. It also reflected Chadli’s desire to suppress FLN opposition; potentially split the Islamist movement; renew his own international support against the expansion of the Islamist movement.[18] FIS used this new recognition to mobilise their supporters, through mosques, newspapers, leaflets and rallies. FIS chose to trust the government[19] and its promises of democratic reform, and joined other newly formed groups under a multi-party system. Chadli also encouraged economic liberalization.
Despite the promise of a new system, the lack of pre-existing institutional and financial structures for supporting a pluralistic system, and lack of conviction that engagement in political debate was worthwhile or safe[20], meant that political activism was hesitant amongst new political parties. In contrast, FIS relied on its solid history of political Islamic organization, to give itself an advantage.
The political programme of the FIS was instigated by the March 1989 policy document Projet du Front Islamique du Salut. The document, described as structurally and thematically disorganized, is more a self-justification, mixing Islam with a demonstration of national pride, than a programme for resolving massive social problems,[21] proclaiming that “FIS has adopted a moderate political approach”.[22] The abolition of the state monopoly, usury and intermediaries, was to be replaced by private ventures and free competition.[23] This aspect of their political programme appealed directly to the entrepreneurial middle class.
Whilst FIS prepared for forthcoming elections in June 1990, details emerged of their local activities, raising concerns over how any future rule might be. Intimidation and violence against journalists and women opposed to their views; and the emergence of an Islamic police force, were attributed to FIS activists.[24] In the build up to the elections, the FIS leadership presented a nationalist and non-violent message, aimed at alleviating FLN fears and widening their support. Madani rejected violence, maintained openness towards and coexistence with other political parties, and stated that political alliances were possible if “in compliance with the interests of the country”.[25] Democracy was seen as a means, rather than a political end, but was not to be repealed after gaining power: “Democracy is opening up the opportunity for the people so as it chooses the alternative it wants and a leadership to represent it. If democracy has this meaning, we must adopt democracy as a way of life. As for the allegation that we want to embrace democracy and deny it the day we reach power firstly, was this found in the project of our political programme? Was it found in our official statement? No it was not.”[26]
A multiparty system was declared feasible by Madani: “The presence of numerous parties and numerous bodies is necessary for the serious management of the nation's affairs.”[27] FIS also showed commitment to democratic accountability by urging the creation of a multi-party committee including constitutional lawyers to oversee the local elections.[28] However FIS’ fragmented structure meant that contrasting messages on democracy emerged; Belhadj consistently stated his opposition to pluralism and democracy, whilst Madani represented the moderate viewpoint.
At the same time, the “democratic opposition” made up of other political organizations demonstrated in support of democracy in opposition to FIS activism. Businessmen, women’s rights and Berber activists, voiced opposition to both the FLN and FIS, fearing the replacement of one dictatorship with another.[29]
FIS presented a mixed message when it came to women’s rights. Women’s rights were curtailed in FIS controlled areas – imposition of the hijab, restrictions of speech, extra surveillance – but women also acted as “guardians of moral order” and there was also “militant women, including university women, who worked extremely hard for the charitable associations and for the [FIS] electoral campaign.”[30] Madani proposed the establishment of FIS women’s section and large numbers of women attended rallies prior to the 1990 election.[31]
The true test of any democratization process is elections. In the June 1990 municipal elections, FIS gained the majority vote in 853 of 1,539 communes (Assemblée Populaire Communale). They also won the majority in 32 wilayas or provinces (Assemblée Populaire de Wilaya) from a total of 48. It has to be noted that 34.85% of the population did not vote.[32] Madani sought to enhance FIS’ democratic credentials firstly by emphasizing their electoral participation, but also reiterating that the victory had been achieved with the help of the women’s vote and that an opposition must exist if Algeria was to achieve economic, political and intellectual renewal.[33]
Criticisms of FIS and fears over its future rule were widespread. The advent of a FIS national government would lead to the implementation of sharia law, believed Said Saadi, who represented Kabyle Berber interests. As leader of the secular Rally for Culture and Democracy and opposed to both FLN and FIS, he believed that ''without a satisfactory solution to the people's lack of confidence, we face either the helmet (of the military) or the turban (of the Islamic fundamentalists).''[34] The lack of democratic tradition meant the electorate had an uncomfortable choice. Tahar Bensmina, an independent candidate: ''If national elections were held now, the FLN would certainly win because, as unhappy as people are, they would fear the others' inexperience.''[35] The electorate faced stark choices between FLN economic incompetence and untested Islamist policies. The vote for the FIS was a protest vote against the FLN by a large part of the electorate, but there was also a genuine appeal to FIS’ Islamic principles.
FIS social policies were also scrutinized as they managed welfare services in local poor communities. This included housing projects and work for the unemployed, the expansion of the FIS mosque network and the Islamization of education.[36] FIS’ attempts to govern locally were hindered by the poor mismanagement of previously FLN run administrations and by government tactics to prevent progress.[37] Concerns that administrations would install strict social policies were not misplaced, FIS municipalities brought in controls over Raï music, co-educational schools and clothing shortly after the election.[38] Doubts existed over their ability to move from municipal to national rule, where decisions of state and management of the economy were needed. The economist Rachid Mimouni: ''The ideology they preach is not capable of running a modern country and leading the economy out of catastrophe''.[39]
FLN attempts to regain the political initiative came through the approval of a new electoral bill in April 1991. The law included the creation of new assembly seats, predominantly in southern Algeria where the FLN had its strongest support. Discontent with these FLN gerrymandering tactics led to a radicalisation in the expression of FIS opposition, as general strikes and demonstrations were called; the government responded by declaring a state of siege and then arresting Madani and Belhadj. The FIS were accused of challenging the system, undermining state security and obstructing the democratic process; but they were merely a responding to an undemocratic law.[40]
Although Madani stated that he was “ready to embark on [further] elections, but with guarantees”[41], divisions within the FIS emerged during the demonstrations and many political actors, especially radical activists, turned their backs on the opportunities created by the democratic transition.[42] Under pressure from repressive government measures, the usually moderate Madani issued statements on the right to jihad and preparedness to fight the military if demonstrations were blocked. Preserving a democratic image was still important to the FIS: “We want laws that will allow the people a free choice and a cleansing of the political climate”.[43] However the militant wing of FIS gathered pace after these confrontations with the state and less democratic influences became more influential.
FLN leaders were prepared to maintain FIS’ inclusion in the democratic process prior to the December 1991 legislative elections. With the imprisonment of FIS’ leadership and from a perceived position of strength, FLN leaders were able to make concessions that, it was hoped, would lead to an Islamist party that was domesticated and when integrated into the institutional system would not question the political survival of the regime.[44] Despite real damage to the democratic credentials of both sides during the unrest in May-June 1991, a commitment to democracy from both remained. Abdelkader Hachani, provisional FIS leader, stated in August 1991: “We can not arrive in power other than through free and proper elections”.[45] President Bendjedid announced in October 1991: “The democratic process goes on, as pluralism has entered the political arena, and democracy has become an optimum way of running the affairs of the nation and keeping abreast of the age.”[46]
After the December 1991 election, criticisms of FIS adherence to the democratic process came in the form of accusations of ballot rigging, intimidation and loss of 900,000 electoral cards in their municipalities.[47] Despite ongoing criticisms of FIS’ democratic credentials from opposition parties, the FLN were prepared to accept FIS as sufficiently democratic to participate and potentially form a government of national unity, after victory in the first ballot on 26 December 1991. Links between FLN’s Islamic wing and FIS had developed in late 1991 and when faced with a requirement to cooperate with other political forces, FIS also adopted a more nationalist stance, including accepting Berber culture.[48] Accusations of possibly changing the constitution or establishing popular tribunals to try FIS enemies were explicitly denied.[49] Hachani issued statements at this time that presented a moderate and tolerant message, but were carefully qualified by adherence to Islamic principles: “FIS will guarantee individual and collective liberties in the framework of Islamic law and will tolerate the existence of parties other than Islamic ones”.[50]
Despite the undemocratic actions of the military in forcing President Chadli Benjedid to resign, effectively undertaking a coup d’état and dissolving FIS, it was the Islamist movement that was denounced as having no interest in democracy. The crisis was blamed on FIS, even though they had simply adhered to the democratic process as encouraged. Mohammed Boudiaf: “FIS tried to use democracy in order to liquidate democracy. The use of Islam for political and partisan aims, and also the resorting to democracy and lies found….listening ears from amongst the deprived and marginalised sections of the population.”[51] Boudiaf put the Islamist electoral success down to exploitation of the younger generation’s despair and compared FIS to French fascists.[52]
Concerns had developed amongst the Algerian population from a combination of FIS municipal rule, increasing militancy from mid 1991 and ambiguous statements on what their Islamic rule would entail. But the end of a democratic process came as much from the reluctance of the ruling elite and the military to give up the power hard fought-for during Algeria’s war of independence, as the population’s fear of the unknown. Despite Madani’s statements of moderation, the democratic process had not advanced enough for the ruling elite to relinquish their position. Boudiaf, as the mouthpiece of the military junta, tried to portray the action as protecting democracy, but this was not convincing when thousands of FIS activists were tortured and sent to detention centres, newspapers were banned and mosques and welfare centres closed.[53] As Hocine Ait Ahmed, leader of the Socialist Forces Front, said: “They won’t make anyone believe that stopping the electoral process is a democratic advance”.[54]
The Sant' Egidio Platform of January 1995 was an attempt to end the civil war that followed the coup. Alongside other political parties opposed to the military junta, including the FLN, FIS rejected violence, called for the release of Madani and Belhadj, and made clear statements about adherence to democratic principles. These included respect for “alternation of power through universal suffrage”; “respect for popular legitimacy”; “the guarantee of fundamental liberties, individual and collective, regardless of race, sex, confession or language”; and the “consecration of pluralism”.[55] The proposals in Rome were a significant shift for FIS, despite mixed statements from their representatives Rabah Kebir and Anwar Haddam towards relations with militant groups, and doubts over whether the imprisoned leadership accepted the proposals.[56] The rejection of the Rome plan by the Algerian government shows again that the regime had little true interest in democratic principles. Likewise the simultaneously rejection by the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé) shows that violent groups were still able to undermine FIS’ credibility as a democratic movement.
***
The personalities, structure and influences of FIS are critical to understanding how democratic the movement was. Shortly after the approval of the new constitution in February 1989, the new organization Front Islamique du Salut was formed, with Madani as president and Belhadj as deputy. Disputes over the merits of an Islamic political party meant that FIS was regarded as a breakaway from the Islamist movement. The absence of several leading Islamist figures meant that it was able to pursue a more popular and political course.[57] The link between Algeria’s older generation of preachers (religious Islamists) and the new politicians (reformist Islamists) was seen in Madani’s leadership.[58]
Madani had been involved in the FLN fight against France, giving him personal legitimacy and credibility when criticising their post independence failures; and also acting as a continuity of the FLN’s revolutionary ideals and hegemony, although in an Islamic guise.[59] He had an overseas education, making him more open to conflicting political and religious ideals. Madani was consistent in his moderate tone. Belhadj, also a preacher, had no experience of the world outside Algeria, which fed into his denouncements of democracy as a tool of the West. His hardline attitude towards democracy and the FLN also came from a strict Arabic education and less privileged background than other Islamist activists. Both leaders were influenced in their development as Islamic activists by Bennabi, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu Al-Ala al-Mawdudi. Madani had attended rallies in support of Qutb and studied under Bennabi. Belhadj also cited Algerian Islamists as being influential.[60]
Madani’s views on Algeria’s political future are not dissimilar to Bennabi’s. Alongside other moderate FIS activists - Abdelkader Bachani, Rabah Kebir, Anwar Baddam – Madani was committed to an "Algerian" solution to Algerian problems. Inspired by the writings of Bennabi, that rejected all internationalist models of Islamic society; he believed in an electoral strategy for assuming power and supported the idea of gradually applying the sharia to Algerian society.[61] As the leading advocate of democracy in FIS, Madani argued that the Islamic version was superior to the liberal and socialist model[62], and that it represented the best opportunity for justice, freedom and equality. Democratisation was seen by Madani as a means of achieving Islamic goals, but the sharia held precedence, and once in power they would review anything judged incompatible with the sharia.[63] Madani sought a unique Algerian democratic model neither FLN nor Western influenced.
In contrast, Belhadj, with other sympathisers of Mustafa Bouyali’s MAIA, represented the confrontational and often militant wing of FIS. The radical message of Belhadj – “In Islam sovereignty belongs to the divine Law; in democracy, sovereignty belongs to the people, to the mob and to charlatans”[64] – was uncompromising and although Madani attempted to temper his rhetoric, it led parts of the electorate to see FIS as undemocratic. His religious background underpinned many of his statements: “Democracy is a stranger in the House of God. There is no democracy in Islam”[65]. By equating democracy with blasphemy and emphasizing the religious side of FIS’ struggle for power, Belhadj was able to mobilise a large segment of the population who saw Islam as the alternative future, but at the same time he also allowed militant activists to strengthen their influence.
Although Madani often made attempts to pave over cracks in FIS rhetoric after Belhadj’s outburst, he could not alter the fundamental splits in the movements structure. On one side were the preachers/reformers like Madani with an adaptive, evolutionary and social approach; on the other side were the Salafi radicals/revolutionaries who were Arabophone, confrontational and influenced by Qutb: Belhadj, Said Mekhloufi and future GIA leaders. A third group overlapped both wings, the technocrats had Western university backgrounds and represented professional classes: scientists, engineers and physicians. Abdelkader Hachani fell into this category.[66] Beyond ideological contrasts, the hierarchical structure did not allow a consistent level of communication amongst FIS acitivists. Decisions were made mostly by a Majlis Shura consisting of 35 members, but the exact composition was unknown and only Madani regularly spoke to the media.[67] With such a structure, it was impossible to have on every level, consistent stances on democracy, women’s rights or political pluralism.
FIS mass support lay in poor urban areas that suffered most hardship from the FLN’s economic failure. Belhadj used the October 1988 unrest to promote FIS as the true representatives of their interests. Middle class traders and entrepreneurs also supported FIS, in anticipation of a more liberal economic alternative to the FLN, but this support declined between the 1990 and 1991 elections, as fears grew of the movement’s real intentions.[68] The strong support that developed amongst the Hittists [69] came through improvements in social services and local amenities. However support for idealistic democratic principles was a lower priority than economic policies, given the sharp decline in living conditions that had occurred in the 1980s.
Internal tensions developed after the arrests of Madani and Belhadj, but had already emerged after three founding members publicly criticized FIS tactics: “we should not have entered the municipal elections…we should have begun to form the nation, form the youth, and to explain the meaning of true Islam”; accused militant forces of gaining influence: “corrupt elements have infiltrated the ranks of the FIS and have begun to add fuel to the flames”; and denounced Madani as dangerous.[70] Judging how democratic the FIS were in their first few years is hindered by this fractured structure. Although Madani was the primary mouthpiece for the movement, he had a range of contrasting views below him.
***
When Madani was asked whether democracy existed in the Algerian arena, he responded: “No we endeavour to raise democracy higher to the freedom of Islam in its largest, most honest and complete sense.”[71] As the leader of Islamist party, his adherence to democratic principles can be regarded as surprising, not just because of the absence of democratic tradition in Algeria, but also due to historical difficulties in combining Islam and democracy. Madani and Belhadj would provide conflicting arguments on their compatibility. The political parties opposed to FIS maintain that by its very nature, as an Islamist movement, it could not be democratic.
Elements of traditional Islamic thought give an understanding of how compatible democracy and Islam are. The Islamic scholar Mawdudi stated that the political system was based on three principles: Tawheed (Unity of God), Risalat (Prophethood) and Khilafat (Caliphate).[72] It is argued that it is impossible to have an Islamic democracy, because the sovereignty of the people conflicts with the Tawheed concept that there is no God but God – i.e. the sovereignty of God.[73] Authority and laws are made by God not man, as in a democracy. Islam, from the viewpoint of political philosophy, is therefore the very antithesis of secular Western democracy as it repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty.[74] Mawdudi’s view does not reject democracy outright, rather it advocates a theocracy ruled by the whole community of Muslims, described as a “theo-democracy”.[75]
However the capacity for an Islamic democracy can be developed through Islamic concepts of independent interpretive judgement (ijtihad), consensus (ijma) and consultation (shura).[76] The commitment to ijtihad was interpreted by FIS activists that no entity has a monopoly on interpreting the kind of political order God intends, so secularists have as much right to rule as Islamists.[77] Ijma can provide an effective basis for accepting majority rule, offering legitimacy to an Islamic democracy and a procedure to carry it out.[78]
This liberal Islamic view sees the shura as critical to the argument of compatibility with democracy. FIS activists proposed the shura as an Algerian governing body.[79] FIS’ political programme of 1989, indicated that the shura would permit the “elimination of political, economic and social oppression and monopoly….will make the principle of equality one of its main lines of action, alongside a policy which aims to raise the restrictions on public freedoms”.[80]
The shura ensures ongoing scrutiny of the decisionmaking process and also involves representatives of all classes, including those who have no chance of winning an election, in consensusbuilding.[81] However it is debatable whether consultation is a duty of the ruler; he is bound by the decisions of those consulted; they are his own choice or the elected representatives, members of political parties, religious specialists or community leaders; or whether they decide by majority-rule.[82] The relative merits of shura based rule versus democracy are also clouded by negative views of Western ideologies. An unemployed nineteen-year-old from Algiers said, “I’m opposed to democracy because it’s a western invention. It isn’t Islamic. I support the FIS, so I support the shura.” Asked what the shura was, he continued: “The shura is Islamic. It means that the people can decide their own destiny”.[83]
Western democracy has developed over longer periods than in the Middle East or Africa, so using the normative Western definition of democracy is problematic. In addition, Arab regimes have used the term selectively, referring to themselves as “democratic”[84], without any clear democratic principles. Belhadj denounced democracy as a Western concept, but this derived as much from a Qutb influenced anti-West and anti-liberal ideology than actual opposition to the tenets of democracy. FIS leaders believed the West used double standards when advocating democracy.
***
The development of the Islamist movement in Algeria was far from unique. The struggle for political power was mirrored in other North African states from the 1970s onwards. As the post colonial governments faltered economically, politically and socially; and pluralistic politics was suppressed in one party states across the region, a false idea of democracy was presented by ruling elites. The democratization process that occurred in the late 1980s in Algeria was repeated in Egypt and Jordan, then Tunisia and Morocco in the 1990s. Islamist movements were in the ascendancy in Afghanistan, Palestine, Sudan and Lebanon[85]; and democratic forces gained major impetus from the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.[86] Just as solidarity existed amongst North African governments when they formed a task force to combat radical Islam a few months before the 1992 coup;[87] the FIS also gained solidarity abroad. Their democratic credentials were defined by these relations.
A large proportion of FIS’ funding was received from Saudi Arabia through the World Daawa League, and although a puritan Wahhabist influence fed into municipal morality policies, the influence was generally moderate and as a counterweight to Iranian militant Islamism.[88] Criticisms of FIS’ democratic principles often came through inaccurate comparisons to other Islamist groups in the region, especially Iran. The influence of the Iranian revolution on Algeria’s Islamists was limited to the early 1980s; and Madani and Belhadj emphasised theological differences when asked of similarities.[89]
The possibility of an Iranian style theocracy in the southern Mediterranean was an alarming prospect for western diplomats and politicians. The fear of Islamic fundamentalism clouded the West’s views on the democratic intentions of FIS. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian stated opposition to the possibility of “One man, one vote, one time” in Algeria prior to the 1991 elections, doubting FIS long term democratic intentions. Madani and Belhadj were critical of the United States action during the Gulf war, their economic power and double standards regarding democracy. But Madani maintained that he desired a constructive cooperative relationship with the United States based upon recognition of Algeria’s autonomy.[90] In contrast, Western attitudes at this time perceived Islam as inherently extremist and treated it as a single or monolithic force.[91]
The lack of condemnation of the 1992 coup from the West was borne out of a desire to maintain regional stability, rather than a fear (or understanding) of FIS itself. By 1995 and the Sant' Egidio negotiations, the West, in particular France and the United States, adopted a more even handed position – calling for dialogue with moderate Islamists.[92] Having seen how the Algerian government lacked any serious democratic credentials, the West slowly developed a better understanding of how democratic FIS were.
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and FIS’ reaction was a turning point for relations with the ruling elite, in particular the armed forces, and also internally as radical undemocratic elements became more assertive. Madani visited Iraq to defend Saddam Hussein in 1990, but also opposing the annexation of Kuwait. This position shifted to a pro Iraqi one, as Belhadj called for the formation of volunteer force to confront the West. This move was perceived by the armed forces as an intrusion into their turf,[93] and ended Saudi Arabia’s financial support. This support was replaced by jihadist groups involved in the war in Afghanistan.
Smaller Islamic groups had merged to form FIS’ including the local chapter of the South Asian Jamaat al-Tabligh, who were involved in recruiting young Algerians to the Afghan jihad.[94] The Afghan veteran fringe in FIS was a small minority but as anti-government protests became more violent in mid 1991, its actions undermined the movements democratic credentials. After the 1992 coup, the Afghan fringe formed the GIA, taking with it some of FIS’ more radical members, and in turn targetting its former colleagues as well.
***
A judgement of FIS’ democratic credentials can be achieved by analysing Algeria’s democratic tradition and the Islamist movement’s organizational structure, as these two factors directly influenced their actions between 1988 and 1992. The absence of a democratic tradition meant that neither the ruling elite nor FIS had matured enough to cope with any political transition. FIS needed a longer period to overcome internal disputes and be able to present a unified democratic message, the ruling elite’s experiment with democracy was corrupted by an authoritarian past with no real interest in long term democratic reform.
The fragmented structure and the contradictory statements from FIS leaders means that contrasting conclusions can be made. Whilst Madani was the public face during the 1988 – 1992 period; other more radical elements gathered momentum. With this in mind, how democratic FIS would have been in full power is debatable. The extreme level of resistance to the military junta firstly by the AIS (Islamic Salvation Army) and then the GIA, indicates that these elements would have looked to dominate FIS. The salafi wing of FIS rejected democracy as it conflicted with the concept of Tawhid, but for moderates like Madani - FIS had a nationalist and pluralist agenda that looked to create economic and social reform through democracy.
[1] Benjamin Stora, Algeria: 1830 – 2000, (Ithaca: London, 2001), p.11
[2] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.13
[3] Ibid, p.4
[4] Ibid, p.5
[5] Zoubir, Yahia H, ‘Algerian Islamists' conception of democracy’ , Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), 22.6.1996
[6] Benjamin Stora, Algeria: 1830 – 2000, (Ithaca: London, 2001), p.125
[7] Ibid, p.171
[8] Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized – John P. Entelis, p.85
[9] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.52
[10] Ibid, p.101-2
[11] Slimane Zeghidour, "Entretien avec Abbasi Madani," Politique Etrangere, No. 49, 1990, p. 180. quoted in Takeyh, R., ‘Islamism in Algeria: A struggle between hope and agony’, Middle East Policy, Summer 2003
[12] James Ciment, Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge, (New York, 1997), p.131
[13] Andrew J. Pierre & William B. Quandt, The Algerian crisis : policy options for the West, (Washington, 1996), p.6
[14] Peter Ford, ‘Unnamed Western Diplomat quoted in Algeria's Tortuous Road to Democracy’, Christian Science Monitor, 10.10.1991,
[15] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.99-100
[16] Benjamin Stora, Algeria: 1830 – 2000, (Ithaca: London, 2001), p.196
[17] Mohand Salah Tahi, ‘The Arduous Democratisation Process in Algeria’,The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3. (Sep., 1992), pp. 397-419.
[18] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.119-121
[19] Frederic Volpi, Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria, (London: Sterling, 2003), p.47
[20] Ibid, p.47
[21] Ahmed Rouadjia, Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement (1986-1992), in Laura Guazzone, (ed.), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, (Reading, 1995), p.80-81
[22] Ibid p.81
[23] Ibid, p.83
[24] Francis Ghiles, ‘FLN still looks backwards as Algeria seeks a way forward’, Financial Times (London,England), 28.11.1989, AND Peter Hiett, ‘Algerian police to investigate security force’, The Guardian, 23.11.1989
[25] Algeria Islamic Salvation Front Leader Interviewed After Meeting with President Benjedid, Algerian TV – 8 1.1990
[26] Algeria Islamic Leader Sets Out His Party’s Policies, Algerian TV, 27 2.1990
[27] Ibid
[28] Philip Shehadi of Reuters, ‘Muslims show their strength at Algiers rally’, The Independent, 21.4.1990
[29] Francis Ghiles, ‘Algerians demonstrate in support of democracy’, Financial Times, 11.5.1990
[30]Rabia Bekkar; Hannah Davis, ‘Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The Islamist Occupation of Urban Algeria’, Middle East Report, No. 179, Islam, The State and Democracy. (Nov. - Dec., 1992), pp. 11-15.
[31] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.134
[32] Algerian agency comments on FIS victory in elections, APS in English, 17.6.1990
[33] Susan MacDonald, ‘Poll results in Algeria bring Islamic state nearer’, The Times, 14.6.1990
[34] Howard LaFranchi, ‘Local Elections Are First Step For Democracy, but Most Algerians Want More’, Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 12.6.1990
[35] Ibid
[36] Rabia Bekkar; Hannah Davis, ‘Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The Islamist Occupation of Urban Algeria’, Middle East Report, No. 179, Islam, The State and Democracy. (Nov. - Dec., 1992), pp. 11-15.
[37] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.160
[38] Algeria Islamic Salvation Front supporters impose morality controls, Radio France Internationale, 14.7.1990
[39] Howard LaFranchi, ‘Algerians Test Support for Islam in Free Vote’, Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 7.6.1990
[40] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.164
[41] Abassi Madani, speech to party rally in Oran, 3.5.1991, Summary of World Broadcasts
[42] Frederic Volpi, Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria, (London: Sterling, 2003), p.51
[43] Rabah Kebbir, head of the FIS political commission, quoted in Peter Ford, ‘Algeria's Tortuous Road to Democracy’, Christian Science Monitor, 10.10.1991
[44] Francois Burgat, Islamic Movements in North Africa, (London, 1994), p.299
[45] Interview with Abdelkader Hachani, Algérie Actualité, 1.8.1991
[46] Algerian President Announces Elections for 26th December 1991, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 15.10.1991, Text of address to the nation by President Chadli Bendjedid
[47] Fundamentalists accused of ballot rigging, intimidation, Agence France Presse, 30.12.1991 AND Francis Ghiles, ‘Establishment takes fright at Algeria election results’, Financial Times, 2.1.1992
[48] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.238
[49] Ibid, p.239
[50] Ibid, pp.239-240
[51] Boudiaf says Algeria needs ''Radical change'' to escape from crisis, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 22.4.1992
[52] Algeria Boudiaf holds news conference for foreign journalists, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 16.2.1992
[53] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.166
[54] Jonathan Randall, ‘Algerian Elections Cancelled’, Washington Post, 13.1.1992
[55] Platform for a Political and Peaceful Solution to the Algerian Crisis, 13 January 1995
[56] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.345
[57] Ibid p.117
[58] John P. Entelis, Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non Violent Dimension, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.59
[59] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.102
[60] Ibid, p.151
[61] John P. Entelis, Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non Violent Dimension, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.57
[62] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.159
[63] Azzedine Layachi, Political Liberalisation and the Islamist Movement in Algeria in Bonner, M., Reif, M., & Tessler, M. (ed.s), Islam, democracy and the state in Algeria: lessons for the western Mediterranean and beyond, (London, 2005), p.58
[64] M. Al-Ahnaf, B. Botiveau, F. Frégosi.El Mounquid, no.23, L’Algérie par ses islamistes, p.93
[65] Alger Republicain, December 1989, quoted in L’Algérie – Catherine Belvaude, p.108
[66] John P. Entelis, Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non Violent Dimension, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.60
[67] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.149
[68] Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, (London, 2003), pp.168-169
[69] Translated as “those leaning against the wall”. Slang for the urban poor unemployed.
[70] Algeria FIS founder members criticise Madani in Television appearance, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 29.6.1991
[71] Algeria Islamic Salvation Front Leader Interviewed After Meeting with President Benjedid, Algerian TV, 8.1.1990
[72] al-Mawdudi quoted in John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.23
[73] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.23
[74] Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam in Khurshid, A., Islam: Its Meaning and Message, (Leicester, 1976)
[75] Ibid
[76] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.27
[77] James Ciment, Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge, (New York, 1997), p.12
[78] John. O. Voll & John L. Esposito, ‘Islam’s Democratic Essence’, Middle East Quarterly, September 1994
[79] Mamoun Fandy, ‘Algerian Opposition Isn't 'Fundamentalist'’, Christian Science Monitor, 17.6.1991
[80] Ahmed Rouadjia, Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement (1986-1992), in Laura Guazzone, (ed.), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, (Reading, 1995), p.82
[81] Ehud Ya'ari, ‘Democracy and Shuracracy’, The Jerusalem Report, 27.6.1991
[82] Gudrun Kramer, ‘Islamist Notions of Democracy’, Middle East Report, No. 183, Political Islam (Jul. - Aug., 1993), pp. 2-8
[83] Difraoui, Abdelasiem el-. 1994. La critique du système démocratique par le Front islamique du Salut. In Keppel, G. (ed.), Exils et royaumes, (Paris, 1994), 105–24
[84] Francois Burgat, Islamic Movements in North Africa, (London, 1994), p.125
[85] Paul Berman: Terror And Liberalism, New York 2003, p.155-156 and Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror, (London, 2003), p.181
[86] William A. Zarman, The International Politics of Democracy in North Africa, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.209
[87] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.166
[88] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.151
[89] Ibid, p.150
[90] John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, (New York: Oxford, 1999), p.180
[91] Robin Wright, ‘Islam, Democracy and the West’, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992
[92] Roula Khalaf, ‘Algerian opposition parties draft peace plan’, Financial Times, 12.1.1995
[93] Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, (London, 2003), p.172
[94] John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, (London, 2002), p.167
Wednesday, June 06, 2007
And on the 6th day, God created.....
Justifiably a whole range of articles, documentaries and images have focused this week on the Middle Eastern events of June 1967 and their longstanding legacy. The changes to the region primarily geographically, but politically and demographically as well, have shaped the painful chain of events that has led to the dire situation now witnessed. To the Israelis, victory has been a poisoned chalice. Although in a dominant position after their 6-day victory, the moral high ground has since been eroded and international respect diminished with the burden of occupiers, also, critically, there is still no guaranteed security. For the Palestinians, more displacement followed, with less possibilities for creating coherent political leadership or institutions, but for the first they became central to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite this, the manipulation by Arab despots of the Palestine question continued.
The war created, as many wars do, extremism on both sides. For the victors, the occupation of the West Bank meant that ancient ambitions for a Greater Israel could be fulfilled. Despite their political and strategic value, the settlements have always been spiritually fuelled. The dominant party of the 1980s - Likud - would combine political with the religious, in their policies. Islamic extremism would take longer to develop in Palestine itself, but its original source did develop from the 1967 aftermath. The Muslim Brotherhood expanded rapidly in Egypt, after Nasser's defeat and the discrediting of Arab socialism. The failure of this ideology embolden another; Islamism strengthen in Egypt and created the foundations for Hamas to rise in the late 1980s.
Nasserist politics had been in decline prior to 67, but Egypt's defeat confirmed the sense of failure that had existed in the Arab world since decolonisation. Critically, the Arabs attributed Israel's victory to their adoption of a religious formula. Nasser's reforms had expanded the education system but created vast urban populations. A restless educated generation was looking for a new direction. Religious political movements were able to provide this. The 1967 defeat created confusion and a power vacuum in Egyptian society, which would be filled by Islamism.
Likewise prior to 1967, Israeli nationalism had a strong socialist tradition. This continued, but expansion into historic Judea and Samaria was ultimately religiously and nationalist motivated. The occupation of the West Bank originally had limited practical use, but was a powerful bargaining chip. Arab rejection of negotiation left Israel with excess territory and fed territorial maximisation - a central mantra of Likud. It also presented religious political parties with a new quest for Israel: expansion into historic territory that once made up ancient Israel. Archeology certainly flourished as the settler movement did.
The 1967 war re-shaped the region in many ways, but also re-awakened religious sentiments formed thousands of years prior. Since these sentiments drive the extremism and the polarisation we now see today, maybe we should look to analyse and understand them first, if we want to find a solution.
The war created, as many wars do, extremism on both sides. For the victors, the occupation of the West Bank meant that ancient ambitions for a Greater Israel could be fulfilled. Despite their political and strategic value, the settlements have always been spiritually fuelled. The dominant party of the 1980s - Likud - would combine political with the religious, in their policies. Islamic extremism would take longer to develop in Palestine itself, but its original source did develop from the 1967 aftermath. The Muslim Brotherhood expanded rapidly in Egypt, after Nasser's defeat and the discrediting of Arab socialism. The failure of this ideology embolden another; Islamism strengthen in Egypt and created the foundations for Hamas to rise in the late 1980s.
Nasserist politics had been in decline prior to 67, but Egypt's defeat confirmed the sense of failure that had existed in the Arab world since decolonisation. Critically, the Arabs attributed Israel's victory to their adoption of a religious formula. Nasser's reforms had expanded the education system but created vast urban populations. A restless educated generation was looking for a new direction. Religious political movements were able to provide this. The 1967 defeat created confusion and a power vacuum in Egyptian society, which would be filled by Islamism.
Likewise prior to 1967, Israeli nationalism had a strong socialist tradition. This continued, but expansion into historic Judea and Samaria was ultimately religiously and nationalist motivated. The occupation of the West Bank originally had limited practical use, but was a powerful bargaining chip. Arab rejection of negotiation left Israel with excess territory and fed territorial maximisation - a central mantra of Likud. It also presented religious political parties with a new quest for Israel: expansion into historic territory that once made up ancient Israel. Archeology certainly flourished as the settler movement did.
The 1967 war re-shaped the region in many ways, but also re-awakened religious sentiments formed thousands of years prior. Since these sentiments drive the extremism and the polarisation we now see today, maybe we should look to analyse and understand them first, if we want to find a solution.
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