The Other Allies

To withdraw or not withdraw is the current political question on both sides of the Atlantic. But what about those other countries still present in Iraq, members of the so called Coalition of the Willing? One member, Slovakia, has announced this week its intention to withdraw by February 2007. What plans do the others have for withdrawal; what do their populations wish for out of the whole project? Originally, not an unhealthy number of 49, this group of predominantly Eastern European and US friendly Latin American and South-East Asian states, now totals 23 (not including US and UK). Their impact in this whole debate may be of little significance, you might say, given that the US accounts for over 90% of the troops, but they still retain the one quality that they have always held - providing legitimacy. Whether these countries provided a couple of tank mechanics, a few chefs for Coalition mess halls, or some conscripts to clean US army boots, is irrelevant, having 49 separate co-operating states adds plenty of political capital.

For these so called Allies, what are there actual objectives from being there? It’s ridiculous to imagine that Mongolia or Honduras could have felt threatened by Saddam’s WMD or by Al-Qaeda either. The cynic would say it was purely to improve US trade relations; an ardent multinationalist might argue that they attempted to show their humanitarian solidarity. But since when have the peoples of Iceland or Tonga cared for anyone in the Middle East. I have to admit I have never met anyone from either of these countries, but it’s hard to see their intentions as...quixotic. If US withdraws, then all the other countries would have to withdraw... or would they? Can you imagine Estonia single-handedly taking on the insurgents?

Poland, leader of the Multinational security force south of Baghdad, has been a staunch US ally, losing 20 soldiers to date. In July 2005, 59% of Poles surveyed by PBS Sopot said all Polish troops should be withdrawn from Iraq as soon as possible; whilst in another poll 67% felt that it had been the wrong decision to participate at all.

The totality of World War II could be considered the pinnacle of coalition building, but more as states faced the bleak choice of alliance or destruction. The use of multinational forces during the Cold War was sporadic: the Vietnam conflict gathered Australia, New Zealand and South Korea as allies; the ill-fated multinational force (MNF) that arrived in Lebanon after the PLO evacuation in August 1982 consisted of US, French, Italian and British troops. The post Cold War environment has been different. Wider coalition forming has been possible, with the absence of bipolar constraints. The first Gulf war was the yardstick for this new freedom of co-operation, with countries as diverse as Senegal and Norway taking part, and former Soviet spheres Syria and Czechoslovakia also involved. The establishment of IFOR (International Fellowship of Reconciliation) and SFOR in Bosnia after the Dayton peace accords, included NATO members and non NATO states: Morocco, Argentina and Russia. UN peacekeeping activities have played a greatly expanded role since 1989, acting to resolve regional conflicts which were often fuelled by the two superpowers during the Cold War.

Coalition building is often the key to legitimacy. With modern armies subject to financial and human limitations (bar the US), the burden needs to be spread globally. Participation by Third World states is also a means of enhancing international prestige and trade opportunities. But critically when this legitimacy is not achieved, public support collapses. The failure to achieve legitimate goals in Iraq has questioned domestic commitment to intervention like no other conflict. This will most likely be the legacy for these states.

Whereas for most Iraqis, they probably don't know where half these countries are, let alone have seen any impact on their daily lives by them.

This post is still in drafting…