To withdraw or not withdraw is the current political question on both sides of the Atlantic. But what about those other countries still present in Iraq, members of the so called Coalition of the Willing? One member, Slovakia, has announced this week its intention to withdraw by February 2007. What plans do the others have for withdrawal; what do their populations wish for out of the whole project? Originally, not an unhealthy number of 49, this group of predominantly Eastern European and US friendly Latin American and South-East Asian states, now totals 23 (not including US and UK). Their impact in this whole debate may be of little significance, you might say, given that the US accounts for over 90% of the troops, but they still retain the one quality that they have always held - providing legitimacy. Whether these countries provided a couple of tank mechanics, a few chefs for Coalition mess halls, or some conscripts to clean US army boots, is irrelevant, having 49 separate co-operating states adds plenty of political capital.
For these so called Allies, what are there actual objectives from being there? It’s ridiculous to imagine that Mongolia or Honduras could have felt threatened by Saddam’s WMD or by Al-Qaeda either. The cynic would say it was purely to improve US trade relations; an ardent multinationalist might argue that they attempted to show their humanitarian solidarity. But since when have the peoples of Iceland or Tonga cared for anyone in the Middle East. I have to admit I have never met anyone from either of these countries, but it’s hard to see their intentions as...quixotic. If US withdraws, then all the other countries would have to withdraw... or would they? Can you imagine Estonia single-handedly taking on the insurgents?
Poland, leader of the Multinational security force south of Baghdad, has been a staunch US ally, losing 20 soldiers to date. In July 2005, 59% of Poles surveyed by PBS Sopot said all Polish troops should be withdrawn from Iraq as soon as possible; whilst in another poll 67% felt that it had been the wrong decision to participate at all.
The totality of World War II could be considered the pinnacle of coalition building, but more as states faced the bleak choice of alliance or destruction. The use of multinational forces during the Cold War was sporadic: the Vietnam conflict gathered Australia, New Zealand and South Korea as allies; the ill-fated multinational force (MNF) that arrived in Lebanon after the PLO evacuation in August 1982 consisted of US, French, Italian and British troops. The post Cold War environment has been different. Wider coalition forming has been possible, with the absence of bipolar constraints. The first Gulf war was the yardstick for this new freedom of co-operation, with countries as diverse as Senegal and Norway taking part, and former Soviet spheres Syria and Czechoslovakia also involved. The establishment of IFOR (International Fellowship of Reconciliation) and SFOR in Bosnia after the Dayton peace accords, included NATO members and non NATO states: Morocco, Argentina and Russia. UN peacekeeping activities have played a greatly expanded role since 1989, acting to resolve regional conflicts which were often fuelled by the two superpowers during the Cold War.
Coalition building is often the key to legitimacy. With modern armies subject to financial and human limitations (bar the US), the burden needs to be spread globally. Participation by Third World states is also a means of enhancing international prestige and trade opportunities. But critically when this legitimacy is not achieved, public support collapses. The failure to achieve legitimate goals in Iraq has questioned domestic commitment to intervention like no other conflict. This will most likely be the legacy for these states.
Whereas for most Iraqis, they probably don't know where half these countries are, let alone have seen any impact on their daily lives by them.
This post is still in drafting…
Friday, October 20, 2006
Sunday, October 15, 2006
Sanctioned confusion
Given Kim Jong-il's eccentricity and its “Janus” status, I’m hoping that the sanctions imposed by the UN inadvertently resolve this crisis, but it’s not going to be that simple… The word sanction falls in the genre of autoantonyms, contranyms, or antilogies, yes it is true, or in other words - having dual meaning. Derived from the Latin, sancire, its original meaning was 'to make an offense punishable by law', but this developed to mean ‘express permission contained in a law to do something’, or simply authorise. In the world of high pressure international diplomacy and in particular the world of Kim Jong-il, unfortunate misinterpretations are only a slip of the tongue away. This varied etymology also seems to reflect its mixed success and consequences when applied to international relations over the years. Another baffling sanctions question is that no other word seems to rhyme with it....
Prior to 1990, sanctions had only been applied to the former Rhodesia and South Africa. Their use has been expanded since to include Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Sudan. The extent to these sanctions has varied from straightforward arms embargoes in particular for African conflicts to full economic sanctions, such as against Iraq from 1990 to 2003. Sanctions on the whole work, especially when carefully targeted, for example in the South African case when sports, cultural and trade restrictions hurt the white population, upon which apartheid governments relied. Libya is another success with Gaddafi coming in from the cold two years ago. The Iraq example represents the other end of scale, when they contained a dictator’s ambitions but at the cost of crippling an economy and causing nearly a million indirect deaths. The corruption of the UN oil for food programme exposed post Saddam and the apparent preservation of a WMD capability, pre 2003, marked their failure. The lesson drawn from Iraq for North Korea must be that successfully imposing sanctions against authoritarian dictators is exceptionally difficult. Creating enough pressure for a state to submit to international will is hard enough, but when a leader has a paranoid persecution complex, its only going to send him deeper into his bunker.
Solutions? This is far more difficult than Iraq, because a) they have the bomb, b) Kim il-Jong is not predictable and c) there is no current alternative to him. Credible opposition groups do not exist inside or outside North Korea. Realistically direct talks are the only solution here, as sanctions are only going to antagonise the situation further. Although it’s encouraging to see the international community united on this issue, the lack of options isn’t.
http://www.abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=2569249&page=1
http://www.nkfreedomhouse.org/resources/north-korea/state-of-affairs/
Prior to 1990, sanctions had only been applied to the former Rhodesia and South Africa. Their use has been expanded since to include Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Sudan. The extent to these sanctions has varied from straightforward arms embargoes in particular for African conflicts to full economic sanctions, such as against Iraq from 1990 to 2003. Sanctions on the whole work, especially when carefully targeted, for example in the South African case when sports, cultural and trade restrictions hurt the white population, upon which apartheid governments relied. Libya is another success with Gaddafi coming in from the cold two years ago. The Iraq example represents the other end of scale, when they contained a dictator’s ambitions but at the cost of crippling an economy and causing nearly a million indirect deaths. The corruption of the UN oil for food programme exposed post Saddam and the apparent preservation of a WMD capability, pre 2003, marked their failure. The lesson drawn from Iraq for North Korea must be that successfully imposing sanctions against authoritarian dictators is exceptionally difficult. Creating enough pressure for a state to submit to international will is hard enough, but when a leader has a paranoid persecution complex, its only going to send him deeper into his bunker.
Solutions? This is far more difficult than Iraq, because a) they have the bomb, b) Kim il-Jong is not predictable and c) there is no current alternative to him. Credible opposition groups do not exist inside or outside North Korea. Realistically direct talks are the only solution here, as sanctions are only going to antagonise the situation further. Although it’s encouraging to see the international community united on this issue, the lack of options isn’t.
http://www.abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=2569249&page=1
http://www.nkfreedomhouse.org/resources/north-korea/state-of-affairs/
Course schedule...
Here is a quick run-down of this year's course:
Week 1, The American Foreign Policy Tradition
Week 2, The Cold War, 1945-1991
Week 3, The Interregnum: 1991-2001
Week 4, The Bush Doctrine
Week 5, American Empire
Week 7, War and the Constitution
Week 8, The Presidency
Week 9, Congress
Week 10, The Executive Bureaucracy
Week 11, Public Opinions
Week 12, Interest Groups
Week 13, Defence Policy
Week 14, The CIA and Intelligence
Week 15, Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Week 17, The Middle East
Week 18, Europe
Week 19, The 'Special Relationship'
Week 20, Final session
Week 1, The American Foreign Policy Tradition
Week 2, The Cold War, 1945-1991
Week 3, The Interregnum: 1991-2001
Week 4, The Bush Doctrine
Week 5, American Empire
Week 7, War and the Constitution
Week 8, The Presidency
Week 9, Congress
Week 10, The Executive Bureaucracy
Week 11, Public Opinions
Week 12, Interest Groups
Week 13, Defence Policy
Week 14, The CIA and Intelligence
Week 15, Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Week 17, The Middle East
Week 18, Europe
Week 19, The 'Special Relationship'
Week 20, Final session
Saturday, October 14, 2006
General disorder!
It's always refreshing when our Establishment speak forth with a degree of veracity. General Sir Richard Dannatt's comments this week that British troops are exacerbating the problem, cuts through the hubristic face saving rhetoric that has drizzled out over the last 3 years from Number 10, MOD or any other participant in the war. It's hard to not feel immensely sorry for the soldiers out there; maybe they should re-introduce national service, but only for politicians so that they know the full implications of their decisions. I think the General's comments on outstaying our welcome are particularly sharp: "We are in a Muslim country and Muslims' views of foreigners in their country are quite clear." I don't actually believe it, but it is hard not to think that there has been no Muslim input into government policy on Iraq from day 1. The contrast between our aims and how we are perceived is pretty startling.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1921450,00.html
It seems that where we are now is not too dissimilar to post WWII and the painful process of decolonisation. Just as the British left India and Palestine, only for wars to erupt, we are at the same threshold. Withdrawal without proper security in tact could lead to full blown civil war, genocide and regional conflict. But Iraq is now a sovereign state and at some point they are going to have to resolve their own issues regardless of how difficult this may be. Those are the two sides of it, it isn't going to be pretty either way.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1921450,00.html
It seems that where we are now is not too dissimilar to post WWII and the painful process of decolonisation. Just as the British left India and Palestine, only for wars to erupt, we are at the same threshold. Withdrawal without proper security in tact could lead to full blown civil war, genocide and regional conflict. But Iraq is now a sovereign state and at some point they are going to have to resolve their own issues regardless of how difficult this may be. Those are the two sides of it, it isn't going to be pretty either way.
Thursday, October 12, 2006
The Sum of All Fears.......
Today's publication of the Lancet's report totalling the number of violent deaths in Iraq since the 2003 invasion, inevitably divides and jolts opinion as pretty much anything else relating to the "I" word does these days. Regardless of which side of the argument you fall, these figures are pretty shocking. Estimates of total deaths vary from Bush's conservative 30,000 earlier this year, which would probably be revised upwards to nearer 40,000 regardless of how opaque his bubble is; to the 48,000 cited on Iraqbody count; to wider anti war campaigner's estimates hitting the 200,000 mark; and finally the Lancet's 655,000 figure. Numbers never describe the full picture, but since on the ground narrative cannot paint the full picture beyond reports through high risk journalism; repetitive photos showing burnt out cars and blood stained concrete; or simple old fashioned fraternal embedding; we are forced into this numerical irrelevance. Add / subtract a zero, it really doesn't matter sadly; neither 2,973 (the same as 9/11) nor the Lancet's latest total creates any cause for happiness. These figures, shocking as they are, pale in comparison to history's wars, the 62 million who died in WWII is an almost unimaginable number. Would it be possible to record 62 million individual stories of pain, tradegy and death. No. Just in the same way as it wouldn't be possible to pay testimony to 655,000 either. It is this side of war numbers that is the most painful for history, life's insignificance and history's inability to record the memory of those who perished. Journalists and historians will try and focus on numerous key individuals but history is not able to treat all with equality.
http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-1900.htm
http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-1900.htm
Monday, October 09, 2006
The Nuclear Northerners!
This morning's news that North Korea has conducted its first nuclear test is pretty shocking to most people in the world, escpecially to those living in South Korea, Japan and probably China as well. The depiction of Kim Jong-il in the film Team America is probably not a million miles away. Extravagant tastes in lobster, silver chopsticks, outlandish neo Soviet architecture combined with support for regional terrorist groups and willingness to share nuclear technology with Iran and Sadamm Hussein's scientists, places him as the world's evil mastermind of death and destruction number two, behind the elusive UBL. The nexus of WMD and terrorism, dramatically eluded to prior to the Iraq war, is probably one step nearer as a result of today's events. With both military action and sanctions discredited as realistic responses, it's probably time for some third way thinking. Fortunately we are likely to see a South Korean approved as UN secretary general this week to offer some fresh perspective. I am hoping, like the majority, that he can get off to a flyer and impart wisdom for his northern bullying brethen.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6032525.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6032525.stm
Tuesday, October 03, 2006
This is a re-launch
Some minor re-branding has been going on behind the scenes here (well, audience figures dropped as this year went on). New term starts this week. American foreign policy.
This blog is going to expand, so watch this spoce...
This blog is going to expand, so watch this spoce...
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