Lebanon

Who gained from the Lebanon war of 1982 and what were the long term consequences for the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Although the initial objectives of Operation Peace for Galilee were achieved quickly in June 1982, the expansion into and prolonged presence of Israel in Lebanon brought about far reaching consequences, for not just Israel and the Palestinians, but the whole region and international community. As external involvement in Lebanon deepened, whether Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian or American, new threats and objectives emerged. It is for this reason that judging who benefited and lost is difficult. But the upheaval and violence that did occur in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion meant that there were significant consequences for all parties involved in the period after. An analysis of the consequences of the war can be considered by looking at the military results; the subsequent internal conflicts; developments in the occupied territories and peace process; the diplomatic community’s actions and shifts in regional relations.

Between the end of Lebanese civil war in 1975-6 and the Israeli invasion on 6 June 1982, PLO presence in South Lebanon had become of increasing concern to Israeli political leaders and military, and a plan to eliminate this presence developed under Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin of the Likud government. After exchanges between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1981 and early 1982, plus occasional terrorist operations in northern Israel, an invasion became inevitable. Planned and presented as a limited initiative[1], the initial objective was a 40km incursion into South Lebanon aimed at suppressing PLO artillery fire. Although a quick success, PLO guerrillas and leaders were able to retreat to Beirut. The IDF continued their northwards push, attacking Syrian positions in the Beqaa valley, and in alliance with Christian Phalangist forces completed an encirclement of the capital on June 30.[2] The siege of Beirut marked the final stage of Operation Peace for Galilee ending in late August with the evacuation of PLO guerrillas under the supervision of a multinational force. As the invasion developed, it revealed shifting Israeli objectives, in particular Sharon’s, creating additional consequences in the immediate and distant future.

After the evacuation of PLO guerrillas, Israel’s secondary objective of securing a peace treaty with Lebanon came to the fore. But the failure to implement the May 17th 1983 treaty under US mediation, led to Israel’s withdrawal and the establishment of a security zone in South Lebanon in June 1985. Internal Lebanese conflicts also re-emerged in 1983, as Druze and Christian militias fought in the Chouf mountains. During this period the conflict brought in the United States and regional states Iran and Syria, creating events that laid foundations for several long term problems in the Middle East.

Military and civilian casualties during not just the Israeli invasion, but the prolonged civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990, were significant. Total deaths during the civil war are estimated at 150,000, of which 17,825 casualties followed the 1982 invasion.[3] Beyond these figures, the impact on military structures and ideologies was profound for all sides involved.

Israel set about re-drawing the political map of the Middle East through their invasion.[4] A swift military victory was achieved, incurring far fewer losses than other sides, but Israel developed new enemies and lost significant self esteem along the way. Lebanese and Palestinian civilians suffered the most as the IDF pushed towards Beirut. The actual siege of Beirut resulted in an estimated 2,461 deaths.[5] After the expansion of its campaign against Syrian targets in early June, Israel destroyed the elite of the Syrian air force - gaining air superiority.

Each respective militaries experienced significant changes due to the 1982 war. The first stage of Operation Peace for Galilee was a success for the IDF, as a total of 80,000 troops, 1,240 tanks and 1,520 personnel carriers[6] advanced through 3 different zones, assisted by air and naval support along the Lebanese coast. This stage of the conflict witnessed heavy military force used against PLO targets in South Lebanon. Familiar military tactics were also employed during the siege of Beirut, with a 7 week aerial bombardment, as Israel attempted to crush Palestinian resistance. Israel’s position as the military superpower in the region was confirmed in autumn 1982, but as Israel started its withdrawal in 1983 and 1984, a new military challenge emerged.

The IDF had been initially welcomed by the southern Shia population, but the continued presence turned the indigenous population against them. Especially as the IDF established bases and detention camps, built roads with signs in Hebrew,[7] and adopted ‘iron fist’ tactics against guerrillas.[8] The Shia population provided the foundation for militant movements Hizbullah and Amal to develop, employing terrorist and guerrilla tactics against Israel, culminating in hundreds of attacks against Israel in December 1984[9] followed by suicide attacks in early 1985. Following its withdrawal in June 1985, Israel established a security zone 15km north of the border, in alliance with the predominantly Christian South Lebanon Army (SLA), who they had helped create under major Saad Haddad in 1976. The tensions in the security zone between the Hizbullah and Israel’s proxy force - the SLA - would be a military issue for the next 15 years. The initial invasion cost approximately 650 IDF lives, but the war of attrition that followed between Israel and Hizbullah would claim an average of 20-30 IDF lives per year.[10] The SLA lost 410 soldiers between 1985 and 1999.[11]

The Palestinians as the primary target of the invasion suffered the greatest losses. Accurate casualty figures are difficult to ascertain, partly due to the brutal nature of the invasion and lack of on the spot reports, but also due to the PLO’s integration into the infrastructure of south Lebanon.[1] PLO bases and artillery were overwhelmed and outnumbered by the IDF, as their inappropriate military tactics became apparent. Having been forced back into Beirut, the PLO remained under sustained attack from both Israeli and Phalangist forces, until the evacuation of their leadership, plus 10,054 guerrillas by sea and land.[12] A similar number of fighters would remain in Lebanon and would fight against Amal militia between 1985 and 1987 in the War of the Camps

In military terms the Lebanese Phalangist army, although allies of the IDF, were an inferior and less disciplined force. Under Israeli guidance, they completed the encirclement of Beirut, but expected the IDF to do all the work.[13] Israel hoped that they would provide the military support for a new friendly and Christian dominated Lebanese government, which would be a second regional peace partner after Egypt. This failed to happen as strong opposition to a Christian Maronite dominated government emerged. Israel also formed an alliance with the extremist militia The Guardians of the Cedars: an alarming move for Lebanese Palestinians, who had often been their previous victims.

Both the Amal and Druze militia initially avoided confrontation with Israel, but would indirectly involve the IDF during campaigns against the Palestinians in the south and Phalangists in the Chouf Mountains. Once the PLO evacuation had finished, Israel was placed in an uncomfortable role as peacemaker, and their withdrawal from this position re-ignited the Lebanese civil war.[14] Syria suffered severe initial losses: 30 surface-to-air missiles, 85 front-line aircraft and 350 tanks[15], but eventually regained a strategic advantage by its backing of different militias. The ceasefire between the IDF and Syrian army along the Beirut-Damascus highway was regarded as a victory of sorts for Syria, as they held the Israeli army at bay.[16] Syrian intelligence played an influential role as it cultivated alliances with militia leaders of all sectarian persuasions[17], and was implicated for the assassination of Phalangist leader Bashir Gemayel and the collapse of May 17 agreement. Syria backed the militias of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) and Al-Murabitun.

These militias exploited the power vacuum left by the PLO’s evacuation. Fuelled by the heavy weaponry left behind[18], they resumed their previous rivalries. Al-Murabitun and other Arab nationalist inspired militias co-ordinated under the National Movement, backed by Syria and headed by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and fought against Phalangists allied with the Lebanese army. Hizbullah and Amal would lead this anti-Israel resistance in the post 1985 period.

The war had a polarising effect for both Israel and the Palestinians, and initial gains transformed into negative outcomes and vice versa for both sides. After a swift victory, Israel’s prolonged presence in Lebanon would create internal political and social divisions. Despite a heavy defeat and dispersal of its political infrastructure, the PLO and - Yasser Arafat especially - emerged with an enhanced reputation.

Following the evacuation in August 1982, a proportion of PLO guerrillas were dispersed to other Middle Eastern countries, whilst part of the remaining PLO split from Arafat’s Fatah to indulge in a murderous fratricidal war.[19] Arafat’s leadership was questioned in the aftermath of the Lebanon war by guerrilla groups – the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Against a political settlement with Israel, they formed a ‘loyal’ opposition, critical of Arafat yet willing to accept his leadership and loyal to the PLO framework.[20] At the same time rejectionist groups PFLP-GC and Saiqa, based in Damascus, sought to overthrow Arafat.

These splits in the PLO were the direct result of the pressure brought on the Palestinians in Lebanon by a heavy defeat. The ejection from Beirut was blamed on “Arafat’s corruption, mistakes and concessions”.[21] Palestinian factions fought from May 1983 onwards, with Syrian backing emerging in late June.[22] The mutiny of PLO guerrillas forced Arafat to evacuate for the second time to Tunis, after the siege of Tripoli in December 1983. The rifts were repaired in July 1984 during talks held in South Yemen[23], but Arafat’s position remained precarious and he would be excluded from the diplomatic mainstream until 1987.[24] Despite this lack of direct influence, Arafat retained popularity in the occupied territories, and Fatah became influential in the occupied territories through Khalil Wazir’s Occupied Homeland Bureau.[25] Arafat’s position was secured as rejectionist groups lost support, the DFLP and PFLP joined Fatah at the 18th PNC meeting in April 1987, and the Palestinians sought greater independence – especially from Syria.

The upheaval that followed the 1982 invasion forced the Palestinian leadership to adopt a moderate line: recognising Israel and renouncing terrorism in 1988. However this placed them in a position of weakness for peace negotiations in the 1990s, as they had no military option and effective political strategy, making them an attractive peace partner for Israel.[26]

Syrian support for Palestinian terrorist organisations also split the moderate leadership from more extreme elements. The Abu Nidal organisation, a longstanding foe of Arafat, responsible for the assassination attempt on UK Ambassador Shlomo Argov that had triggered Israel’s invasion, embarked on a violent terrorist campaign in the 1980s. Whilst Arafat attempted to distance his movement from these acts; Israel sought to prove his links to international terrorism as justification for not negotiating with the PLO. The depth of these splits was shown by the assassination of Arafat’s 2nd in command, Salah Khalaf in 1991 by an Abu Nidal operative. Arafat’s efforts for peace negotiations during the 1980s were constantly hindered by these splinter groups. The Achille Lauro hijacking in October 1985 reinforced Israel’s refusal to deal with the PLO.

The Palestinians that resided in Lebanon experienced extremely turbulent times following the Israeli invasion. The PLO had been responsible for developing infrastructure in Lebanon, creating effectively a state-within-a-state. Israel’s invasion represented a systematic attempt to destroy the entire institutional infrastructure of the PLO, including its hospitals, clinics, factories, cultural bureaus, art galleries, schools and research centre.[27] Palestinian residents held a precarious position in Lebanese society. As refugees prior to 1982 they lacked any form of citizenship, and the enforcement of highly restrictive employment laws marginalized them further.[28] Attacked economically and militarily, the Palestinians’ problems were further compounded by squalid conditions in refugee camps, where sanitation was at a minimum. Palestinians remained a divisive element in Lebanese society, as they had been since 1967, and have remained second class citizens since.

The invasion of Lebanon was widely supported in Israel with 84% of the population in favour at the start, but support dropped to 51% by June 1983 and 36% in May 1985.[29] This decline in popularity was paralleled by emerging political and social divisions in Israel. Although initially successful, the war had significant intangible costs: political, military, economic and psychological, that would mark Israelis for years to come.[30]

The IDF was the social institution that was damaged by the war, as its role shifted from invaders to occupiers then part time peacekeepers. IDF morale, military effectiveness and reputation all suffered. As the strategy and justification of the war shifted under Sharon, political doubts filtered through to the IDF. The protracted occupation severely damaged the IDF as it became engaged in quasi-police functions experiencing continuous friction from the local population[31], and was frustrated by being unable to achieve ambitious political objectives set.

The war had cost in excess of $3.2bn by December 1984[32], a significant figure as Israel was in a period of economic difficulty. Faced with a large foreign debt and massive inflation rate, the Israeli government was forced to examine military expenditure in an unprecedented way, resulting in the defence budget being cut by $400m in 1984.[33]

These economic considerations fuelled political divisions, but it was on the front line where the Lebanon war had its greatest impact on Israeli society. As the IDF became booged down, previously unexperienced negative side effects developed included a high number of “friendly fire” incidents, young officers declining military careers and accidental deaths and injuries.[34] More seriously, were the effects of the war’s brutality and the “total lack of consideration for human life, human feelings and property”.[35] The Sabra and Shatilla massacre represented the pinnacle of this sentiment. The importance of the moral dimension was stated by Shimon Peres when justifying the 1985 withdrawal: “we have returned to our values as a nation, as a people, a nation that has principles”.[36] The shattering of Israel’s humanitarian image was a devastating moment in the country’s history.[37]

The 1982 war developed further the phenomenon of refuseniks, with the formation of Yesh-Gvul [2]. Israeli society has often been defined as militaristic or a “nation-in-arms”, with military service considered the most untouchable of Israeli society’s sacred cows.[38] As the war developed, and with it disillusionment, Yesh-Gvul collected 3,000 reserve soldiers’ signatures on a petition demanding exemption from military duty and criticising government policy.[39] Although never part of mainstream politics, the refuseniks reflected changes in Israeli society, with a decline in the acceptance of Zionist principles and preference for individualism over collectivism.[40] Peace Now which had formed in 1978, was also empowered by the war, and would play an important role in Israeli society, highly critical of government military policy.

The defining moment of the Lebanon war, that galvanised this opposition, was the Sabra and Shatilla massacre 16-17th September 1982, where 1,000 between 2,000 Palestinians were killed by the Phalangist militia.[41] Besides sparking large protests, there was a significant political fallout after the Kahan Commission led to resignations of Ariel Sharon (but who remained in the cabinet, as minister without portfolio) and chief of military intelligence Major General Yehoshua Saguy. The refusal of parts of Israeli society to acknowledge the massacre, plus Sharon’s continuing support from Likud members, were symptoms of political and social splits that emerged. Although a coalition government was formed in September 1984, harsh political debate had focused on the aftermath of the Lebanon war and there was increasing polarization between supporters and opponents of territorial compromise with the Palestinians.[42] These divisions provided the Israeli political background for peace negotiations in the future.

The implications of conflicts within the IDF and political system, was unprecedented self reflection of Israel’s military actions, an acute new sense of “the limits of power”[43], but most significantly the realisation that the Palestinian question still needed to be addressed. The genesis of the long process to peace negotiations in 1993 lies partly in the malaise that developed after the Lebanon war. Whilst the losses to Israeli society were significant, it gained a clear realisation that Palestinians represented an intractable problem and agreement with the Palestinians in the occupied territories was the priority.

Lebanese sectarians divisions were only worsened by the 1982 war. The absence of a PLO military and political presence created a vacuum, which the different militias tried to fill. The fragile balance that had existed since Lebanon’s formation in 1920, and had collapsed in the first stage of the civil war, was shattered by the removal of the PLO and the presence of Israeli troops. Inherent factionalism in Lebanon meant that civil war continued until 1989, when the Taif Agreement set out plans for political reform and withdrawal of Syrian troops, although no timetable was decided for this. Power was balanced towards the Muslim population, as the appointed Sunni prime minister and cabinet, attained more importance than the Maronite president. Lebanese Muslims were certainly the ultimate beneficiaries of the 1982 war, but this was due to Syria’s role. As will be discussed, Lebanese Christians were undone by their reliance on Israel and the United States, who failed to provide the necessary long term support.

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The reasons for the invasion of Lebanon differ on opposing sides of the conflict. Palestinians believed Israel’s intentions were to destroy the PLO and their aspiration for an independent state. Israel’s justification was to destroy the PLO, who was considered responsible for anti-Israel terrorism and representing the main source of disruption in the occupied territories. Chief of staff Rafael Eitan had stated that the Lebanon war was “a war to consolidate the Israeli hold on Judea and Samaria”.[44] Since 1976, for the Palestinians Lebanon had represented a ‘war of liberation’ bound up with the aspiration for a return to Palestine.[45]

April 1982 had seen an explosion of protest and riots in the West Bank and Gaza, which was countered by repressive Israeli tactics. The Camp David peace accords had been interpreted by the Begin government differently to Palestinians, as autonomy for the occupied territories only resulted in more settlements and Israeli controlled civil administrations. Whilst direct attempts were made to destroy Palestinian nationalism in Lebanon, Israel also developed policies in the occupied territories, such as anti-PLO regulation in higher education.[46]

Palestinian fears in the occupied territories deepened with Israel’s swift victory, especially after the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, but as Israeli policy fell apart in Lebanon, international diplomatic efforts focused on the West Bank and Gaza, with the Fez Plan and Reagan initiative. Even though the PLO leadership was split and forced to relocate around the Middle East, it gained popularity as it survived the siege of Beirut providing a source of inspiration.[47]

Although the Begin government was replaced in 1984, conditions in the occupied territories did not improve, paving the way for the first Intifada. The Intifada developed from the increasingly harsh measures undertaken by the Israeli military from 1985 onwards; an emerging and restless Palestinian youth movement; economic decline in the occupied territories. The failed diplomacy that followed Lebanon and the lack of leadership in the West Bank and Gaza, with Islamist movements emerging instead, were also factors. All these conditions can be seen as consequences of the Lebanon war. The occupied territories have been since 1982, the pre-eminent location for the Palestinian struggle.

For Israel, the Intifada was a battle against Palestinian nationalism and essentially a continuation of the Lebanon war. The lessons of Lebanon had been learnt by parts of the Israeli political system, with Labor leaders opposing settler involvement in suppressing the Intifada, drawing parallels with the Phalangists.[48] But the PLO was still seen as the source of disturbances in the occupied territories and Israel’s main enemy.

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European powers have been involved in Lebanon since France intervened in 1860 on behalf of the Maronites in the civil war against the Druze. An international commission met to develop new political structures in Lebanon, but sectarian divisions were exacerbated as European powers sought to influence and favour individual groups. Lebanon also absorbed European culture in the 19th century; the American University of Beirut was founded in 1866. Beirut’s strategic trading position reinforced Lebanon’s value, and from the First World War, European political and military power began to dominate Lebanon.[49]

Following this tradition of foreign intervention, the Multinational force (MNF) arrived in Lebanon in late August 1982 to supervise the evacuation of PLO fighters and provide stability. This objective was achieved, but as it attempted to bring stability, it would clash with Lebanese militias, and suffer heavy casualties itself. The simultaneous barracks bombings on 23rd October 1983 resulted in 241 American and 58 French casualties. The MNF completed its withdrawal on 31st March 1984. The MNF started its mission with benign intentions, but the complex and violent situation in Lebanon destined it to failure. No member gained from its participation and the United States’ reputation was especially damaged.

In the aftermath of the siege of Beirut and the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, US-Israeli relations were also strained. The Reagan administration sensed that they were misled by Israeli leaders’ objectives, seeing Israel now as the “Goliath” rather than the “David” of the Middle East[50]. The continued building of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza also met strong disapproval.[51] Sympathy for the Palestinian cause was certainly enhanced following the Beirut stage of the war, but despite initial pressure on Israel, relations were still strong and would be resumed by mid 1983. From the Israeli viewpoint, there were reassurances that they would retain US support, and this was reinforced by continued military aid. By 1986, America was pushing for closer relations with Israel through technological exchanges related to the Strategic Defense Initiative.[52] For the Palestinians, the belief that the United States was biased towards Israel only deepened, and this sentiment continued until the end of the Reagan administration. It was upon these opposing perceptions that the Reagan initiative was imposed, proposing a “far-reaching peace effort”, with the key points being: a freeze on the building of Israeli settlements, “self government by the Palestinians…in association with Jordan”, but not the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.[53]

The plan was opposed by the Israeli cabinet, because of its variance with the Camp David accords, the issue of East Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, the definition of autonomy, plus distrust of Jordan’s ability to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.[54] The United States’ failure to pressure Israel empowered their position and will to resist concessions[55], setting a precedent for future negotiations.

Palestinian opposition was based on Jordan’s involvement: partly by Arafat refusing to give King Hussein a mandate to speak for the Palestinians[56]; and partly from the rejectionist factions within the PLO. For Jordan, failure to find a common negotiating position with the PLO; lack of confidence in the United States’ ability to pressure Israel into concessions; and pressure from the Soviet Union to oppose the Plan, were all factors in King Hussein’s rejection.[57] Peace negotiations did not bring about the resolution of the conflict the United States had hoped for. Whilst the conflict continued with Israeli presence until May 1985 and fighting between Syrian backed militias and PLO until 1987, a comprehensive peace treaty was unlikely. PLO-Jordanian relations also slowly deteriorated culminating in the Arab summit in Amman, where Hussein snubbed Arafat.[58] The United States meanwhile resisted negotiating with the PLO during this period, as it did not recognise UN resolutions 242 and 338.

The United States role in the Lebanon war shifted during 1983, creating a distraction from peace negotiations, and changing its status in the Middle East. Just as Israel’s role in Lebanon shifted, the United States inevitably became involved in the conflict. As the Long Commission stated: “By the end of September 1983, the situation in Lebanon had changed to the extent that not one of the initial conditions upon which the mission statement was premised was still valid. The image of the USMNF, in the eyes of the factional militias, had become pro-Israel, pro-Phalange, and anti-Muslim.”[59] The bombings of the US Embassy in April 1983 and army barracks in October plus kidnappings of US citizens, revealed the animosity towards the American presence. It also elevated the war onto an inter-state level as Iran and Syria were accused of these attacks. United States warships attacked Syrian controlled areas in September 1983, during battles between the Lebanon army and Druze militia.[60] Once the United States had pledged support for Amine Gemayel’s Phalangists, it would be unable to withdraw peacefully. The failure of US policy in Lebanon sapped enthusiasm for involvement in the Middle East until 1991. It also escalated the rivalry with Iran, which had developed since the 1979 revolution through Ayatollah Khomeini’s foreign policy. The attacks on United States’ targets marked the birth of militant anti-Americanism. The mid 1980s saw an escalation in acts of international terrorism, and American presence in Lebanon made the United States a target.[61] The tactics used by Hizbullah were precursors to those adopted by Al-Qaida in the late 1990s.

As the 1982 war brought in the United States, it also increasingly involved the Soviet Union. Soviet support for the PLO and in particular for Syria was an increasingly significant factor in the post 1982 period, especially as Syria became in direct conflict with Israel and the United States. The initial invasion was difficult for the Soviet Union, as its two clients, were easily defeated by Israel, requiring a re-evaluation of Middle East policy.[62] The Soviets maintained support for Syria, providing $2billion worth of weapons and aircraft, sending 5,000 advisers and technicians, and installing an extensive command, control and communication structure.[63] As Syria increased its military strength in 1983, so did Soviet influence. Reagan laid partial blame for the barracks bombing on the Soviet presence. The Soviet Union also backed mediation efforts between PLO factions in July 1984.[64] Although Soviet influence in the region did not extend beyond the late 1980s, the assistance provided to Syria was significant. Firstly as it allowed Syria to undermine the United States mission militarily and to destroy the May 17 Agreement, secondly it ensured their political dominance in Lebanon in the future.

Syria was the state that gained most from the 1982 war. Its position from the 1975-6 civil war had been strong, having entered Lebanon to enforce a ceasefire in June 1976. Syria’s position strengthened after their defeat in June 1982, by assisting the Druze militia with artillery cover in the Chouf Mountains against the Phalangists;[65] and supporting Shia groups Amal and Hizbullah. Syria maintained a military presence of 40,000 troops, controlling 50 percent of Lebanon’s territory,[66] in particular the strategically important Bekaa valley.[67] From this position, Syria dominated Lebanon, whilst also strengthening relations with Iran and their negotiating position against Israel. Israel’s objective of installing a friendly government to its north failed, placing Syria in a strong position for any peace treaty. The Taif accords in 1989 confirmed Syria’s position in Lebanon. Assad’s desire for a Greater Syria, not just in Lebanon but Jordan and Israel, had been initiated by their successful result from the 1982 war. This would not be fulfilled despite an expansion of its military and sponsorship of terrorist attacks on Jordan, as the Syrian economy stagnated and the situation in Lebanon worsened in the late 1980s.

Relations between Syria and the PLO, in particular Arafat and Fatah, deteriorated from 1983 onwards. The rift developed from Arafat’s criticism of the lack of Syrian support for the PLO in June 1982, his refusal to move PLO headquarters to Damascus, and moves towards diplomatic negotiations with Israel.[68] The Syrian backed Fatah mutiny in May 1983 was aimed at restraining Arafat rather than deposing him. A consequence of this PLO weakness was its absorption into Arab states, with Arafat being without a regional headquarters or patron. As Assad, stated in January 1985: “Syria will lead the Palestinian struggle henceforth”.[69] The contrast between the Syrian opinion of Arafat and his image in the occupied territories was another factor in causing the Intifada.

Iran established a foothold in the Arab-Israeli conflict through its involvement in Lebanon. As Syria’s only Arab ally, they were encouraged to become involved, sending hundreds of revolutionary guards into the Bekaa valley to establish a military headquarters.[70] The bombings of the United States embassy and barracks have been attributed to Iranian linked terrorists. Following the embassy bombing, a phone call from an Islamic Jihad member stated that the operation was “part of the Iranian revolution’s campaign against the imperialist presence throughout the world”. A superpower in an unstable regional state provided an ideal target for Iranian foreign policy.

Iranian antipathy to the United States had existed since the revolution, but the Lebanon conflict also worsened Israeli-Iranian relations. Despite the existence of arms trade between the two states during the 1980s, relations deteriorated primarily through Iranian funding for Hizbullah’s military campaign and sponsorship of acts of international terrorism like the Buenos Aires bombings of Jewish targets in 1992 and 1994. Although Shi’ite antipathy to Israel was high in south Lebanon, the Iranian influence was critical in creating a new enemy for Israel. The mullahs who formed Hizbullah identified with the revolution’s ideology and professed allegiance to Khomeini.[71] Hizbullah and Iran also share the goals of recovery of Jerusalem and liberation of historic Palestine.[72] In addition, the IDF presence in south Lebanon and unpopular military tactics used presented an opportunity for Iran to gain influence which it holds up until the present day.

To counter Syria’s plans for dominance, Israel pushed for a peace treaty with Lebanon, backed by the United States. The May 17 agreement called for a termination of the state of war between the two countries, implementation of security arrangements on the border, and withdrawal of Israeli forces. Syria’s withdrawal was also a requirement and this was quickly opposed, then undermined by Syria. The withdrawal in May 1985 and establishment of a security zone had a long and painful legacy for Israel. For the IDF, the occupation of south Lebanon would extract a heavy toll of casualties, but the political and diplomatic impact was equally significant. Political disputes in Israel over withdrawal developed in the 1990s, whilst Syria continued to assist Hizbullah’s low level military campaign as a means of gaining an advantage in negotiations over the Golan Heights. The stalemate that existed had a draining effect on Israeli politicians and public.

Hizbullah was the only militia allowed to openly retain arms after the Taif Accords in 1989.[73] From 1985, they undertook a guerrilla war against the SLA and IDF. Israel responded with large military operations – Accountability (1993) and Grapes for Wrath (1996) – but different “conditions in the regional security environment” during the peace process of the 1990s, made large scale militarily action difficult to justify.[74] Public opposition to the occupation in Israel also developed at this time creating a political environment for a withdrawal and also a possible peace treaty with Syria in the late 1990s.

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The extreme and brutal nature of the Lebanon war left deep scars for all those involved. Military losses were significant, but the social and economic destruction, the development of numerous militias and alliances, and the political repercussions left a legacy that still exists in the Middle East. Whether the situation in Lebanon worsened solely due to Israel’s invasion is debatable, given the internal conflicts, but their presence created a new set of problems.

Lebanon’s strategic position brought foreign involvement from 1982 onwards. The opportunity for Syria and Iran to pressurise Israel and the United States via Lebanon was provided by the war. Consequentially, Israel-US relations were strengthened by military necessity; long term regional rivalries, in particular between United States and Iran, were developed.

It would be hard to argue that the Palestinians gained anything immediately from the invasion, but the excessive force and dire conditions that followed brought international support, where it had not existed before. The invasion developed internal Palestinian tensions, but the relocation and change of focus to the occupied territories, paved the way eventual peace negotiations in the early 1990s, despite the failed diplomacy in the immediate post war period.

Israel’s losses were spread over a longer duration, as they were drawn into a low level war with Hizbullah. The Lebanon war and occupation left a psychological legacy for Israel, and also slowly empowered regional enemies Syria and Iran. Having set out to destroy the PLO in 1982, they would be undertaking peace negotiations with them 9 years later.

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[1] PLO guerrilla casualties are estimated to be anywhere between 1,000 (Associated Press 5th March 1991) and 10,000 (An Nahar)
[2] Translated as “There is a limit/border”
[1] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.573
[2] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06/appa.htm.
[3] http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat3.htm.
[4] Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (Random House, 1991), p.259
[5] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.256
[6] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.574
[7] Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, ‘Israel’s south Lebanon imbroglio’, Middle East Quarterly, June 1997
[8] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.577
[9] Ibid, p.571
[10] Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, ‘Israel’s south Lebanon imbroglio’, Middle East Quarterly, June 1997
[11] Anthony H Cordesman, Israel and Lebanon: The Risk of New Conflicts (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p.23
[12] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.350
[13] Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (Simon & Schuster, 1984), p.190
[14] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.629
[15] William Claiborne, ‘Victory gives Israel new power in Mideast’, Washington Post, 19th June 1982
[16] Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (Simon & Schuster, 1984), p.307
[17] Daniel Nassif, ‘Maj. Gen. Ghazi Kanaan’, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, January 2000
[18] Loren Jenkins, ‘Leftists stake out territory; militias menace Beirut pact’, Washington Post, 29th August 1982
[19] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.529
[20] Yezid Sayigh, ‘Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of PLO politics since 1982’, International Affairs, 1989/2/ pp.247-271
[21] Mahmoud Labani, PLO rebels spokesman, quoted in Flora Lewis, ‘Rebels in PLO want it to be more militant’, New York Times, 16th October 1983
[22] Thomas Friedman, ‘PLO rebels seize 8 Arafat positions’, New York Times, 22nd June 1985
[23] Ihsan A. Hijazi, ‘Arafat says PLO rifts are healed’, New York Times, 2nd July 1984
[24] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.670
[25] Yezid Sayigh, ‘Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of PLO politics since 1982’, International Affairs, 1989/2/ pp.257
[26] Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Bedford / St. Martin’s, 2001), p.412
[27] Cheryl A. Rubenberg, ‘The Civilian Infrastructure of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation: An analysis of the PLO in Lebanon until June 1982’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.12, No.3, (Spring 1983) p.54
[28] Julie Peteet, ‘From Refugees to Minority: Palestinians in post-war Lebanon’, Middle East Report, July / September 1996.
[29] Edward Walsh, ‘Israel’s 3-year war in Lebanon ends, but some troops remain behind’, Washington Post, 7th June 1985
[30] Ibid
[31] Edward Walsh, ‘Lebanon has sapped Israel’s army’, Washington Post, 20th April 1985
[32] Ian Black, ‘The shelling of the military / cost of defence spending for Israeli economy’, The Guardian, 3rd December 1984
[33] Ibid
[34] Edward Walsh, ‘War shakes Israel’s reserves’, Washington Post, 21st April 1985
[35] Eitan Haber in Yediot Ahronot, cited in Edward Walsh, ‘War shakes Israel’s reserves’, Washington Post, 21st April 1985
[36]Henry Kamm, ‘For Peres, pullout has moral value’, New York Times, 1st May 1985
[37]Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.407-408
[38] Ariel Dloomy, ‘The Israeli Refuseniks: 1982-2003’, Israeli Affairs, Vol 11, No.4, October 2005, pp.696-7
[39] Ibid, p.702
[40] Ibid, p.695
[41] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.390
[42] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.648
[43] Shlomo Avineri, Professor of Political Science at Hebrew University and director general of Israeli foreign ministry quoted in Edward Walsh, ‘Israel’s 3-year war in Lebanon ends, but some troops remain behind’, Washington Post, 7th June 1985
[44] Joe Stork & Jim Paul, ‘The War in Lebanon’, Merip Reports, September / October 1982
[45]Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.79
[46] Edward Walsh, ‘Bitter pride; West Bank Arabs angry at US, feel PLO remains unbowed’, Washington Post, 10th October 1982
[47] Ibid
[48] Labor minister Moshe Shahal in Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.702
[49] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.61
[50] Steven R. Weisman, ‘Reagan said to see Israel as the Mideast’s “Goliath”, not “David”, New York Times, 23rd September 1982
[51] John M. Goshko, ‘US brands decision as “most unwelcome”’, Washington Post, 6th September 1982
[52] Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Bedford / St. Martin’s, 2001), p.412
[53] Ronald Reagan speech, 1st September 1982
[54] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.604
[55] Financial Times editorial, ‘Mr Reagan’s failure’, 12th April 1983
[56] William E. Smith, ‘Seeking safety in numbers; Arafat says no to Hussein – and to Reagan’, Time magazine, 18th April 1983
[57] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), pp.619-620
[58] Yezid Sayigh, ‘Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of PLO politics since 1982’, International Affairs, 1989/2/ p.265
[59] http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/index.html
[60] Thomas Friedman, ‘US warships fire on Lebanon area held by Damascus’, New York Times, 18th September 1983
[61] Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p.138
[62] William Claiborne, ‘Victory gives Israel new power in Mideast’, Washington Post, 19th June 1982
[63] Drew Middleton, ‘Syria’s build up called a tactic for talks’, New York Times, 12th May 1983
[64] Ihsan A.Hijazi, ‘Arafat says PLO rifts are healed’, New York Times, 2nd July 1984
[65] Thomas Friedman, ‘US warships fire on Lebanon area held by Damascus’, New York Times, 18th September 1983
[66] William Harris, ‘Syria in Lebanon’, Merip reports, July/August 1985
[67] James H. Scheuer, ‘How to stop Syria’, New York Times, 15th March 1984
[68] Loren Jenkins, ‘PLO, Syria talks fail to end rift’, Washington Post, 10th July 1983
[69] Charles Krauthammer, ‘Israel’s victory in Lebanon’, Washington Post, 18th January 1985
[70] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.468
[71] Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: the changing face of terrorism, (I.B.Tauris, 2005), p.16
[72] Ibid, p.200
[73] Simon Murden, ‘Understanding Israel’s long conflict in Lebanon’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2000, 27(1), p.35
[74] Ibid, p.46