And on the 6th day, God created.....

Justifiably a whole range of articles, documentaries and images have focused this week on the Middle Eastern events of June 1967 and their longstanding legacy. The changes to the region primarily geographically, but politically and demographically as well, have shaped the painful chain of events that has led to the dire situation now witnessed. To the Israelis, victory has been a poisoned chalice. Although in a dominant position after their 6-day victory, the moral high ground has since been eroded and international respect diminished with the burden of occupiers, also, critically, there is still no guaranteed security. For the Palestinians, more displacement followed, with less possibilities for creating coherent political leadership or institutions, but for the first they became central to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite this, the manipulation by Arab despots of the Palestine question continued.

The war created, as many wars do, extremism on both sides. For the victors, the occupation of the West Bank meant that ancient ambitions for a Greater Israel could be fulfilled. Despite their political and strategic value, the settlements have always been spiritually fuelled. The dominant party of the 1980s - Likud - would combine political with the religious, in their policies. Islamic extremism would take longer to develop in Palestine itself, but its original source did develop from the 1967 aftermath. The Muslim Brotherhood expanded rapidly in Egypt, after Nasser's defeat and the discrediting of Arab socialism. The failure of this ideology embolden another; Islamism strengthen in Egypt and created the foundations for Hamas to rise in the late 1980s.

Nasserist politics had been in decline prior to 67, but Egypt's defeat confirmed the sense of failure that had existed in the Arab world since decolonisation. Critically, the Arabs attributed Israel's victory to their adoption of a religious formula. Nasser's reforms had expanded the education system but created vast urban populations. A restless educated generation was looking for a new direction. Religious political movements were able to provide this. The 1967 defeat created confusion and a power vacuum in Egyptian society, which would be filled by Islamism.

Likewise prior to 1967, Israeli nationalism had a strong socialist tradition. This continued, but expansion into historic Judea and Samaria was ultimately religiously and nationalist motivated. The occupation of the West Bank originally had limited practical use, but was a powerful bargaining chip. Arab rejection of negotiation left Israel with excess territory and fed territorial maximisation - a central mantra of Likud. It also presented religious political parties with a new quest for Israel: expansion into historic territory that once made up ancient Israel. Archeology certainly flourished as the settler movement did.

The 1967 war re-shaped the region in many ways, but also re-awakened religious sentiments formed thousands of years prior. Since these sentiments drive the extremism and the polarisation we now see today, maybe we should look to analyse and understand them first, if we want to find a solution.

The New Cold War?

Despite a recent rejection of a new Cold War between the United States and Russia, a key player in that conflict has spoken out today against "US imperialism". Although Mikhail Gorbachev did not go as far as depicting current relations as another East-West standoff, in a Radio 4 interview, he accuses the US of "empire building" and undermining trust between the two, highlighting Iraq and Missile Defense as major sources of tension. Just as key figures in Reagan era Cold War policy re-emerged in Bush's first term, Gorbachev still holds sway in the foreign policy arena. Gorbachev could never be described as a peace envoy for Putin, but his comments represent an attempt by Russian figures past and present to defend Russia's case - expect a major PR offensive at this week's G8 meeting. Despite his usual optimism, Gorbachev paints a gloomy picture about the future. Diplomatic relations have certainly detiorated recently, in particular with Britain over the Litvinenko investigation. An arms race is on the horizon - Putin has stated that Russia will match US missile defence systems in Eastern Europe by directing its own missiles at European targets. The US response is that their intentions have been transparent with regular briefings, but Russia has preferred "unhelpful rhetoric over actual collaboration". Russia has also sought to extend its influence over former Soviet satellites, in disputes with Georgia over gas, plus Estonia over statues of Soviet war dead and cyberterrorism.

This decline in relations lies more within Russia and its internal failings than in a mutual polarisation between East and West. The slow modernisation process in Russia, rampant corruption and political or economic inequality, have fed a bitter isolationist attitude that Putin encapsulates. Russia has had some very bad PR of late, whether over gay protests, former KGB spies or murdered journalists, but this hardly represents pariah status. It is not a solid excuse for lack of progress, but Russia did exist in what seems a very alien ideological system compared to today for nearly 70 years, up until 1991. As for Putin, he is set to stand down next year, so either, like Blair, he is looking for a legacy but the more radical version or he is setting out the conditions whereby his successor can continue to assert an aggressive Russian foreign policy.