Forgotten soldiers in a forgotten war

Although the Korean war (1950-53) has the unofficial title of the "Forgotten War", the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s is probably ranked second, both in misunderstanding its context and its horrific side effects. World attention focused on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait two years after its ceasefire, condemning it to a hidden history where few remember who started it or how many died, and some don't even know the difference between the two protagonists (sharing the same first three letters is confusing I know). But it was a war that created conditions for the current Middle East conflict, both in terms of US involvement in the region and Sunni-Shia strife.

Nearly one million Iranians and Iraqis died over the period, but beneath these numbers few stories have been revealed. A series of films at the Barbican depict fictitiously and by documentary some of the stories. In Living in the Clouds, the lives of a group of Iranian soldiers in the Iraqi Kurdistan mountains are caught in painstaking detail. In a desolate region, soldiers boil down snow, re-construct shelters, call patiently for supplies, but apart from the odd gunshot seem distant from any conflict or any political authority. A soldier politely contacts his base for fuel, simply concerned with survival in a remote outpost. The enemy is mentioned, but is almost second priority to self preservation. True, for many soldiers on the frontline, death was only an instant away, but for every battlefield casualty there is a casualty elsewhere. Extreme cold is exchanged for Iraqi tanks. Either way is pointless. In Captive Waiting, Iraqi prisoners of war wait for their freedom. The final release was not until the eve of the 2nd Gulf war. POWs normally expect a release some time close to a war's conclusion, but 15 years on only adds to the bitterness. This is worsened by false dawns when Iraq fails to bring Iranian POWs in exchange. Not only are these soldiers imprisoned for crimes not committed but when the rest of the world can move on, they are trapped in this historic limbo.

Rendition - the silent partners

Whilst the Bush administration have pursued policies that test international standards of human rights and re-write international law in their fight against militant Islam; European nations have been considered as a rational counterweight, maintaining international norms and responsibilities. Well, until last week's European Parliament report, which accused several EU states of turning a blind eye and admitting flights operated by the CIA for illegal transportation of detainees. The key element of extraordinary rendition is transportation, and for the policy to work it needs other countries to act as end states where interrogation (and often torture) takes place, but also, given geographical distances, as transit states where refueling, recuperation or anything else required can take place. Just as the supply chain from drug producers to drug dealers cannot operate without innocuous middle men, rendition requires willing accomplices. Also, as the states most likely to undertake rigorous interrogations are in the Middle East or North Africa rather than closer Latin America, a leisurely stopover, or to use the correct terminology "layover", in European city makes perfect sense.

European states that could be generally considered liberal with solid human rights records have been implicated, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Of these Sweden, prone to Scandinavian passivity in foreign affairs, has also been ruled against by the UN for violating a global torture ban. The EU report also names Poland and Romania - who are both accused of deeper involvement in the process and hosting secret CIA prisons.

The standard governmental response is that these flights are either legal or that they do not exist. Rendition has still not caught public attention as other WOT contraversies, but the use of European sites for an American anti Al-Qaeda Gulag touches a nerve. Whilst America claims to be a legislatively precise society; Europe considers itself legislatively wiser. And the backlash has begun. Germany have issued warrants for CIA officers involved in rendition, and Italy (that staunch ally circa 2003) has ordered 26 CIA agents to stand trial for the kidnapping of an Italian citizen. Whilst justice systems tend to act autonomously of government; with a political issue as contentious as rendition, it is hard not to see a link. Sadly it is the courts pushing the politicians into action, not vice versa. A solid campaign by NGOs over the last 3 years has added the moral structure to the debate. Despite this opening, a secret war remains out there, virtually untouchable by the courts, media or human rights organisations. The release of Guatanamo pictures in January 2002 was a smokescreen in this regard, shocking us, but distracting from the larger picture.

So in the dock: the CIA; Bush administration policy and complicit governments in Europe and elsewhere. The response. Well, the response is denial, since any admission or justification simply would not stand up. Rendition has been used for over a century, but this enhanced and extreme version - extraordinary rendition - is on very thin ice legally, according to investigative reporter Stephen Grey. The author of the groundbreaking book Ghost Plane interviewed several CIA officers who disapproved of the policy, but were aware of the reality of its benefits in a dirty war. Speaking at SOAS this evening, Grey also explained that European complicity was borne out of the need for counterterrorist intelligence and concern at being out of the loop on possible threats, plots, etc. As for Middle Eastern states, where the suspects are usually tortured, there is the benefit of added intel on internal threats; hard cash ($10m is the going rate per suspect); and diplomatic credibility (although not fully received in Syria's case).

It was vice president Cheney, who said shortly after 9/11 that this would be a dirty war, although a man of few words, there is resonance to most of those he utters. Plots will be interrupted, but intelligence gained under duress is often flawed. Ask Ibn Sheikh al-Libi, who fed false information to CIA interrogators that was included in the US' case against Iraq. The CIA has a history of flawed programmes to gain intelligence, please watch these pages for a fortcoming essay. As for rendition, this issue isn't going away and it's only going to implicate governments further.

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0804522/

http://web.amnesty.org/pages/stoptorture-050406-feature-eng

What happened to the French?

As arguably the weakest member of the UN security council and having experienced a slow decline in world status since the 1950s, France has rightly developed an inferiority complex. Ever since the 1962 defeat in the Algerian War of Independence and the painful decolonisation process, France has sought to re-capture its lost historical eminence. Its international status was boosted as it carved a globally popular position against the US-UK alliance in 2003 before the Iraq war. On top of this, France retains it position on the security council often acting as a balance between Atlantic powers and Asian; is at the heart of the European Union; often contributes to peace-keeping or NATO operations whether in the Balkans or Lebanon; yet its influence and world position is still fragile.

This week's retraction by Jacques Chirac over comments about the possible threat from a nuclear armed Iran, may be the side-effect of a leader nearing the end of his tenure. But combined with his potential predecessors lack of foreign policy adeptness, seen by Socialist presidential candidate Segolene Royal's recent gaffes and centre-right rival Nicolas Sarkozy's tentative forays into the foreign policy arena when visiting Britain last month, reinforces the impression that France is struggling to find itself internationally, once again.

France's recent internal problems have shifted the focus of political debate overwhelmingly to the domestic. The last two years have seen the worse civil unrest since the 1968 student riots exposing deep social racism; unpopular labour legislation resulting in more protests; economic stagnation and an unprecedented identity crisis. The final insult being uncovered documents revealing that in the 1950s, Britain and France discussed the possibility of uniting with Queen Elizabeth II as France's head of state. With such insecurities, connected with the rest of world with coherent policy isn't easy.

But historically, and despite the acrimony prior to the invasion of Iraq, France has a role. Last summer's war in Lebanon led to France taking a primary diplomatic role and providing peacekeeping troops. France's historical ties to Lebanon during the 23 year mandate period, and Britain's discredited Middle East position, created an opportunity to mediate. France's demographic structure gives it a diplomatic advantage with the largest Arab and Jewish populations in western Europe. So in April this year, France will elect a new president and maybe a renewed foreign policy. Britain will also have a new leader by the summer, so a shift in European foreign policy as a whole could be upon us.

Algeria - an unfinished war

After a new front opened in the Horn of Africa earlier this year, and completing another little jihadist historical cycle, Algeria's militant GSPC group have adopted brand bin laden, changing their name to the al-Qaeda organisation in the Islamic Maghreb. A signed statement posted on the internet confirms fears that Al-Qaeda's influence is slowly spreading across North Africa, and that Algeria's civil war of the 1990s is not quite finished. How serious are either of these developments? The brand has been widely adopted by various jihadist groups of varying capability, but this does not necessarily imply an operational partnership. Know-how is widely available via the internet and thousands of Islamists in Algeria's civil war gained vital experience during the Afghanistan war against the Soviets. So the expertise and potential is there. But, a direct line between Pakistan's North West frontier and the Maghreb is probably pushing it.

More likely is that this represents another legacy of one of most brutal and forgotten wars of the late 20th century. Up to 200,000 Algerians died in this near ten year conflict, between Islamist and government forces, that erupted after the 1991 the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) election victory was cancelled. Within the context of Islamic political history, this was a seismic event. The compatability of Islam and democracy can be debated, but the war certainly shows Islamism's determination to gain power rather than adhering to democratic principles, the lengths authoritarian regimes will go to block it, and in the context of the 1990s - the ever increasing proliferation of militant Islam.

The FIS initially held a moderate leadership, and after their disbandment in March 1992, retreated to northern Algeria's mountains to conduct a guerrilla war. The resistance split into competing factions with different tactics, military/government targets or civilian. The violence evolved into an internecine conflict as hardline Islamist group the GIA (Armed Islamic Group), waged a brutal campaign against the government; previous allies FIS, who were considered collaborators; and thousands of civilians. Both the FIS and GIA sought an Islamic state, through democratic or violent means, but neither succeeded. Atrocities reached their peak in 1997. The GIA proved too extreme for most Islamists, and former members created the GSPC - which although not quite as extreme is constantly active.

Algeria fits neatly between Afghanistan and Iraq in the militant Islam chronology. Factionalism, fanatical commitment to overthrowing the state, and use of extreme violence are the common factors. A low level war is ongoing, but given that GSPC is numbering about 300 fighters, it is a low priority. Algeria's war is hopefully finished, and considering WMD trends across the region - Algeria and Jordan are looking to initiate nuclear programs - having one more state becoming unstable could have devastating consequences.

Big Brother: The end of an Empire

This blog looks at current events from a historico-political angle with a degree of high brow prose, so I am not dumbing down in any respect in this next post, but this concerns the latest media fed social-cultural experiment on wayward modern British attitudes in a very bizarre house. Aka (it's difficult to type this): celebrity Big Brother. I am not remotely interested in who is a racist, what it says about the British working classes or whether Channel 4 should be scrapped. The important issue is Britain and its history with India past, present and future. If Jade et al had victimised someone of another race, then the impact I think (this is controversial) would not have been as acute. Firstly they probably wouldn't have, but Indian culture despite integrating fully into British society, is misunderstood, patronised and, in the case of the witches of Elstree, feared. The relationship between the two has not overcome its mixed history and sadly it has taken a bit of TV as crass as this to show it. The Raj, the Jewel in the Crown, represented the best and worst of the British Empire. Between 1858 and 1947, Britain governed India and traded off its wealth, the success of which is remarkable given how diametrically opposed the two cultures are. Post World War II, the inevitable partition left an ugly stain, as it did in all former colonies. However the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 might be considered a turning point for British history - creating the conditions for a multi-cultural Britain. Given that this process began 45 years ago, attitudes like those on display are startling (to most liberal semi intellectual people), but where there is ignorance there is prejudice. The fortunes of both countries have been mixed since we parted 60 years ago this year. India took a long road to possible global domination (economically at least); Britain has taken a long road to global subservience (politically at least). Gordon Brown, caught in a storm of protests during his visit to India, puts the subcontinent as a key player in this century. And these events have probably done his political future a good turn, raising his profile and vision indirectly. Brown praises India and calls for a new world order, but thankfully Jade etc won't be part of it.

Who were the Safavids?

In another blow to Sunni-Shia reconciliation, yesterday's gruesome execution of former Ba'thist judge Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, was described with historical resonance as "the grudge of the Safavids" by his son-in-law. A misjudgment in the length of rope required to hang Saddam Hussein's half brother led to his decapitation, a scene thankfully not released by the Iraqi government to date. From the Yemen, Azzam Salih Abdullah, claimed that the beheading was an act of revenge by the newly empowered Shia leaders. Reference to the Safavids is significant, as it was this Iranian dynasty that established Shia Islam in Persia, creating the first Shi'a state. Originally from Iranian Azarbaijan, the Safavids built an empire between 1501 and 1736 that stretched eastwards to Kandahar, and bordered the Ottoman Empire along the Euphrates. Baghdad was sacked as part of an early campaign, and constant invasion by both the Safavids and Ottomans led to the city's decline until the 20th century. History in the Middle East enjoys cycles and the peoples feed on it and cherish it. History pays back them in return, and often with added tragedy.

The new Saddam..

2006 was a good year for ridding the world of the 20th century's worst dictators. In March Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic died in his cell in the Hague; Chile's General Augusto Pinochet departed after heart failure in December; the extremely eccentric President Niyazov of Turkmenistan passed before Christmas and Saddam Hussein was executed 2 days before the year's end. So far in 2007, Fidel Castro is on his death bed according to latest reports. The term dictator might now slowly become a thing of the past, reserved simply for politics students and the historian establishment. Globalisation, the spread of liberal democracy, and global appeals for equality in human rights have been chipping away at despotic principles the world over. Slowly peoples resist and dictators are exposed for what they really are. So who is left? The majority based around Africa, Middle East and South Asia and new additions do pop up occasionally (Thailand being a latest). http://www.arthuredelstein.org/worlddictators/
You would need to ask the peoples involved, but I would struggle to believe that all of these are in the Saddam, Milosevic category. Swaziland and Oman are, as far as I know, peaceful places where democracy isn't a priority but repression isn't the done thing either. But old favorites Mugabe, Kim Jong il, etc obviously fit into the classic definition. However the counter argument says that the international system is not advanced enough for a tyranny free world. Imbalances of power from poverty, post-colonialism or militarism prolong an international dictatorial presence.
Dictators often use history as an inspiration; Stalin's cult of personality inspired Saddam and Jong-il; and Saddam in turn provides a model for Burma's General Than Shwe. So whilst these ambitions to be added to the pantheon of meglomaniacs continue to exist and motivate in the Third world, dictators are going to be with us a little while longer.

Black Hawk Down: the sequel

Just when all the attention is on Iraq and the Bush administration's new strategy, US airstrikes have hit suspected Al-Qaeda targets in Somalia. The Horn of Africa has been simmering since the infamous Black Hawk Down disaster of October 1993, with no satisfactory political resolution, an ever increasing Islamist presence, and the recent conflict with Ethiopia. How connected the Islamists in Somalia are to those in Iraq is unclear. But if Sudanese fighters can be arrested in Baghdad, then why not Somalians? With both African states (Sudan and Somalia) experiencing greater penetration by Al-Qaeda related groups and exporting / importing similar ideologies, the region has become a little bit smaller (and dangerous). When you consider how close Somalia is to Saudi Arabia, maybe a new front might be opening in the war against Al-Qaeda. A short boat journey and the jihadist circle is squared once again.

But this might simply be unfinished business. The scars of Mogadishu 1993, Al-Qaeda's first significant attack against Kenya and Tanzanian embassies in 1998, are still there, despite being on Clinton's watch. For all the talk of preventive strikes in the wake of the Bush doctrine, only 1 similar attack has occured in the Yemen 2002. So given the low priority of these suspects, I would suspect that wider geopolitical goals are under consideration here. A new conflict could be emerging and the US wants to get an early blow in.

Bulgaria nEUw year...

Well I've just spent the last week in Bulgaria, eating casseroled rabbit; drinking local grappa and sharing entry into the EU. Bulgaria, no differently to any other Balkan state, has a very mixed past: wars, foreign occupation, political assassinations and ethnic tensions. Pretty average for the region, but Bulgaria has emerged smiling. With a population of 7 million and roughly the size of Liberia or Iceland, it's never going to change the world, but it has carved its own image as the responsible Balkan. No mean feat given, the region's history.

Entry to the EU may be considered a poisoned chalice to the sceptics, but it will ease investment restrictions, develop further its infrastructure (Bulgaria isn't short of building sites - most of which are idly waiting for that extra bit of cash to be injected). It also benefits the EU, in its eastern expansion (the Black Sea has been touched at last - Turkey further bordered) and circles its neighbours allowing a good view of EU offerings, making ascension more irresistable.

But Bulgaria has a long way to go. Whilst the metropolitan generation is upwardly mobile and reaching out to Western Europe, its political class are treated with cynicism and its rural classes isolated and uninterested. However the contrast to 17 years ago and also to the economic crises of the 1990s is uplifting to most Bulgarians. Whereas Czech and Hungarian entrance to the EU mainstream was swift, Bulgaria has been slow but it is better for it. Bulgaria has lived under two of history's greatest empires - Ottoman and Soviet - only to feel at home once again under another dominant structure.

Saddam - never forgotten...

Just got back from Bulgaria, so a little late on the biggest news story of the year - damm!

In the same way, that he tormented Iraq during his rule; baffled and mocked in his trial; and divided and embarrassed in his execution, Saddam has once again left an indelible mark on Iraqi society's psyche. Given the events of the last 3 1/2 years, who could expect a humane civilised end? The brutality that cuts across all things Iraqi was here in abundance. The execution reflected all that is bad there: cold violence; sectarian vengeance; chaotic disorganisation.

But Saddam cared little for his victims, so why should he receive any favours? One fundamental rule that has always been missing, whether at Abu Ghraib, in distribution of reconstruction contracts, or suppression of the insurgency, is a sense of moral altitude. Act like we as civilised nations expect to; not accept any method to achieve our aims. American society isn't too blame by any means, but gung ho military culture; marriage to corporate interests; "liberal" use of the death penalty; and ambiguous definition of human rights in Bush administration has all fed into this ugly disaster.

Iraq has moved on now. The insurgency that Saddam played a minor role in forming has outlived him and outgrown him as a threat to both the country and the region. Thousands died during his time, but were there executions, death squads, suicide bombers? He invaded two neighbouring countries, fired scuds at a third and threatened others, but WMD proliferation was contained, terrorism limited to domestic targets, and Shia-Sunni rivalry only seen along the Iraq-Iran border. Once Saddam was arrested and on trial, he appeared weak and lacked any menace, especially as new fears emerged, but to both his supporters and enemies he will never be forgotten.

How bad are the Saudis?

Last week's decision to suspend an investigation by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) into corruption between Saudi Arabia and BAE systems during one of the largest defence deals in UK history, raises old concerns about who our allies are and what we are prepared to indulge of them. The deal was undoubtedly beneficial to the UK in economic terms; Saudi Arabia is a key ally against international terrorism, especially when sharing intelligence; and of course there is the oil. But against these obvious positives in the relationship, we have allied with an undemocratic state with a poor human rights record, who wrongfully torture British citizens and plays host to Wahhibist extremism exported to Iraq, previously to Afghanistan and for a certain15 individuals to New York. With friends like these, who needs enemies - is the cry. In the world of realpolitik, yes this relationship is acceptable, in the same way that the UK and US have supported authoritarian regimes in the past. But remember those Bush words about states that harbour terrorism. Well the Saudis funded and recognised the Taliban, previously funded mujahedin that would form Al-Qaida, preside over a collection of charities that fund Hamas, so without going in to Michael Moore territory, this is all a bit dubious.

Regardless of their questionable actions and obvious excesses, what does the future hold and can the Saudis reform or will they implode. Parallels with the Shah and Iran exist, but the ruling family retain popularity and critically wealth. Poverty and unemployment are low, but any revolution won't be for another 40 years or at least while the oil revenues keep coming.

But the main point that Britain should consider is the human rights question. Human Rights Watch's analysis: "Saudi law does not protect many basic rights. The government does not allow political parties, and places strict limits on freedom of expression. Arbitrary detention, mistreatment and torture of detainees, restrictions on freedom of movement, and lack of official accountability remain serious concerns." This description would not be out of place for a Third world dictatorship, rather than a vital economic influence. But when Britain is prepared to be accused of double standards over economic and strategic interests, a spiral of antipathy will only continue. 15 of the 18 hijackers were Saudis for this reason.

The Clinton doctrine?

There was such a thing? Well any one leading a superpower in a turbulent period that was the 1990s, would have created some sort of foreign policy. His detractors believe that no doctrine existed.

To say that a Clinton doctrine was absent over the period 1993-2001 is not fully correct. From inauspicious beginnings, a range of foreign policy doctrines emerged but they often lacked coherence, or were flawed in their implementation. Three strands of foreign policy doctrine developed, directly influenced by the condition of the international system: enlargement; interventionism; containment of rogue states. However Clinton’s personal failings, plus difficulties within his administration; domestic factors and the practical implementation of these doctrines led to an often incoherent and ineffective foreign policy.

Clinton’s administration, elected three years after the end of the Cold War, was born in an international system described as unipolar and also uni-multipolar – one superpower and several major powers. The United States was pre eminent in this new era, in terms of economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological and cultural power. Major regional powers below held limited pre eminence but lacked the US global reach. Below this, lay secondary regional powers. A similar interpretation shows the United States, at the top level, as unipolar militarily; multipolar at an economic level; but below this, power is dispersed across borders and outside control of governments. Regional and ethnic conflicts could be included in this bottom level. Conflicts that had been simmering in the Cold war but fitted in rigid alliance structures had greater potential to develop under these new conditions. Lines in conflicts would be drawn between civilizations with threats from the Middle East and West Asia. The period also saw further globalisation and interdependence between states; the rise of non-state actors; transnational actors (multinational corporations, NGOs) and international actors (United Nations, World Trade Organisation, European Union).

Despite historic events – the collapse of communism and the Gulf War – taking place in the previous three years, the 1992 US election focused on economic issues. Foreign policy was an element of Clinton’s campaign and in televised debates he exhibited a tough stance on Bosnia and China, but domestic policy was his priority. Faced with inherited and emerging international issues but with no desire for active foreign policy, the Clinton administration was hesitant in adopting a strategy.

This is an abstract from my first essay of the year.

Pinochet - another dictator escapes justice

With the exception of his dedicated hardline supporters and Margaret Thatcher, the world will shed no tears at the death of General Augusto Pinochet today, aged 91. His death could be the second of three this year for notorious dictators: Milosevic died in March; Saddam is due to be executed before the year is out. But none of them are perceived to have received the justice they deserved or has at the least received a reciprocal of the injustice they gave out. Sadly all three had the foresight to cover their murderous tracks and make future criminal proceedings difficult and controversial. Secondly the international justice system has not developed sufficiently to prosecute dictators and war criminals with efficiency. The protracted Milosevic war crimes indictment and deeply flawed Saddam trial showed the difficulties in either form of justice.

Pinochet is the last client state leader of the Cold war to pass, on the US side at least. Castro and Kim Jong-il remain for the Soviets. The General who came to power on the other September 11th, in 1973, represented all that was bad under Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy. Project FUBELT, the codename for the CIA operations, against Allende's democratically elected government, created an environment for him to seize power and torture at will. Kissinger's motivation for sanctioning this action is beyond patronizing: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves."

What lessons can be drawn? Well, it was the same policy in 1973, that extended to Iran and the Shah, was also seen elsewhere in Latin America and also Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. That is, support for geo-politically strategic allies over human rights considerations. Despite the positive influence of the United States in ending the cold war, the side effect can be seen in anti-Americanism that developed after. Latin America has rejected American values in recent times, but on a political-economic level. However support for dubious leaderships in the Middle East during the Cold war has led to the current well of antipathy seen there today.

Litvinenko - local hero

Orginally broken by the Sunday Times 2 weeks ago, initially thought to be poisoned by toxic chemical thallium, then not, tabloid photos follow (with crass headlines), radiation poisoning due to unknown capsules develops, then his sad death on Thursday evening, with stinging accusations and state sponsored assassination seen as a highly probable cause of Alexander Litvinenko. All along there have been denials from the Kremlin, titbits of information from acquaintances of the Russian dissident, and British government trying to keep as much distance as possible. Truth is stranger and sharper than fiction, for all involved.

So who did it? No other question seems to matter at the moment. The main culprits proposed so far have been Putin, Chechens, former FSB colleagues, fellow dissidents and suicide. Given his obvious contacts with various underworld and intelligence figures, I believe that it could be none of these and is in fact an unknown individual that he had dealings with, under very covert circumstances.

If this had been a conventional murder, it would be mid level news, but murder by radiation is totally unprecendented ... anywhere. Polonium-210 as a radioactive substance is not easily obtainable. On the wider international relations question, where is Russia heading: assassinations of critics, ongoing wars, sales of missiles to Iran and shifts towards being a fascist state. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,6-2470215,00.html http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7005629014
Are we seeing a new threat emerging here? Russia has yet to be fully incorporated in the post Soviet world, and it probably won't. 15 years ago, Russia was still considered a serious threat to international security. Will all the talk of the Middle East as primary zone of conflict, everyone has forgotten that inter-state conflict is still always possible.

Closer to home Litvinenko actually lived in Muswell Hill, where this blog is from.

The Grand Bargain?

Call me a naive idealistic political fantasist, but put Ehud Olmert, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Bashar al-Assad and George W Bush together in a room, let each one make a significant compromise (return to pre 1967 borders, renouncing nuclear ambitions, end terrorist funding and threats of punitive sanctions, etc), sign on the dotted line (in blood if need be) and voila we have an enduring Middle East peace. Tony Blair and Hassan Nasrallah by the way, would be waiting outside desperate to get in on the deal, but Mahmoud Abbas and Nouri Maliki would be anxiously holding their breath for the right result.

Now this would be grandest of Grand Bargains, fairly inconceivable given how deep mistrust is and how fragile any sort of agreement is in the region. But the tectonic plates under the Middle East might just be heading in this direction. Not in one stride, but resembling a pyramid structure of lesser bargains upon which grander and grander bargains build up.

Despite the early jostling for position, the momentum seems to be heading for rapprochement with Syria and Iran, most likely after the publication of the Iraq Survey Group's findings. Attempts to split Syria and Iran will probably work, resulting in a lesser “Bargain” with al-Assad. The trade off being limited culpability for the Hariri assassination and cessation of Hamas support; for military co-operation in western Iraq and removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list. Iran will be harder, given the levels of animosity built up since 1979, and the regular rhetoric spurted out by Ahmadinejad, Bush and Olmert/Netanhayu. But with Syria in from the cold, a deal could provide momentum.

Tony Blair, in his speech to the Lord Mayor's banquet, disagreed that this was the starting point: "On the contrary, we should start with Israel/Palestine. That is the core." True it is the core, and has been so for nearly 60 years, but Israel whether under Olmert, Netanhayu or anyone else would not be prepared to make the necessary concessions without the removal of serious regional threats like Iran. That is why the Iran-US Grand bargain is the key.

Sadly the Iraq conflict and Iran's nuclear ambitions has pushed the Palestine question down the priority list, Israel an insecure paranoid state at best of times has no reason to compromise, with Hizbullah, Iran, etc, firing out the threats.

As for Iraq itself, I am not entirely convinced that Iran and Syria can make a significant difference. Neither can control Al-Qaeda (despite recent reports) and Shia militias are rife with rivalry rather than being one contiguous movement. Even if the Grand Bargain is achieved it might not guarantee results on Iran's side at least. And is it actually with the right countries, Saudi Arabia has an immense border with Iraq and is the source of the majority of Islamic radicals.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-2453802,00.html
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/93F34036-5AB5-46BD-8D8F-1A6F0EF17628.htm

The other election...

A few thousand miles away from the political earthquake in Washington last week, another election took place in the Americas. Just as the Republican era seemed to be ending, a former adversary Daniel Ortega was completing his presidential victory in Nicaragua. There is an irony here (I am sure of it), Tuesday's congressional election will surely lead to the final clear out of Reaganites who Bush brought in at the start of his administration; whilst their nemesis during the 1980s is resurrecting his political career.

As a leading member of the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional), Ortega assumed de facto control in 1981 of Nicaragua, bringing the central American state into a Marxist alliance with Cuba, in stark opposition to its right wing past under Somoza's Sandinistas. The ensuing guerrilla war against US backed "contras", led to thousands of deaths, but also came to represent probably the low point of the Reagan doctrine: preventing the spread of communism in the Americas by any means and using any proxy available.

So what future lies ahead for Nicaragua and Latin America for that matter in the post Bush world? Either he will follow the Chavez path of confrontation or he will, encouraged by consensus seeking Democrats, follow a more centrist path than 25 years before.

Kosovo - the next chapter

The tempestuous relationship between Serbia and Kosovo continued yesterday, as Serbia's parliament formally adopted a new constitution reasserting claims over the ethnic Albanian province. Possible independence was also ruled out, with preamble references to Kosovo as part of Serbia, despite its current status as a UN-protectorate and ongoing international negotiations over its future.

Kosovo's place in history was seared by the ethnic cleansing campaigns of 1998/99, and subsequent NATO bombing. Probably a pivotal moment for all three statesman/protagonists involved: Clinton, Milosevic and Blair. For Clinton, it was one final opportunity to define his "Doctrine", that of liberal interventionism and to make up for previous failings in Bosnia and Somalia. For Milosevic, it was the beginning of the end, indicted for war crimes soon after, he would be overthrown in September 2000. For Blair, the war marked his emergence as a leading global statesman, as well as further developing his belief in Clintonian liberal/humanitarian interventionism regardless of UN authority, a policy that peaked in the 2003 Iraq war.

Historic claims over Kosovo are central to Serb identity. The inception of Serb nationalism was in Kosovo; Serb religious and cultural tenets have emerged from the province. Kosovo had rested on the fringes of the Byzantine Empire, inhabited by Slavic and Illyrian peoples, until Serb Prince Stefan Nemanja seized parts of Kosovo in the 1180s. Serb Orthodox churches and monasteries developed in Kosovo throughout the next century, as Serbs became the majority over Albanians, in an economically important part of the Balkans. Ottoman pressure led to the Battle of Kosovo – a seminal moment for Serbia. The defeat of Prince Lazar in June 1389 by the Ottomans is often regarded as the birth date of Serb nationalism.

Fastforward exactly 600 years, and a Serbian nationalist politician Slobodan Milosevic makes a provocative and ultra-nationalistic speech, on his way to becoming Serbia's leader. Kosovo was not included in the 1995 Dayton Accords, and in the final chapter of 1990s Balkan wars, Serb security forces and the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) fought a guerrilla war resulting in 10,000 deaths and thousands displaced.

It's hard to say if this will be the final chapter, Kosovo's prime minister today announced that he might declare independence from Serbia unilaterally, if UN negotiations fail. Serbia will object, but they will ultimately have to accept, given the overbearing threat of NATO force. Serbia is a beautiful country with warm generous people and it would be tragic if another bloody chapter was to begin after these developments.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6202647,00.html
http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-11-09T122728Z_01_BYT933611_RTRUKOC_0_UK-SERBIA-KOSOVO.xml&pageNumber=0&imageid=&cap=&sz=13&WTModLoc=NewsArt-C1-ArticlePage2

Judgement day(s)

Two days: 5th and 8th of November 2006 will be significant dates for future historians. Representing book ends in the histories of both the United States and Iraq; reflecting their painfully intertwined pasts. Sunday 5th November, Iraqi courts announced that Saddam Hussein will be executed for crimes against humanity, marking the end of his iconic presence in Iraq's history. Wednesday 8th November, defeat in midterm elections for Bush and the Republicans, leads to the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense. As a principal architect of the war, his departure could possibly mark the end of a sorry chapter in Iraqi and depending on your viewpoint, US history. The appointment of Robert Gates and Democrat control of Congress will without doubt create a change of course for both countries and their relationship.

Rumsfeld and Saddam infamously met in 1983, sent their armies to battle each other 20 years later, and now have been consigned to face ignominious places in history within the space of the last four days.

It's all about oil....

Yes sadly my dissertation is.....all about oil. Currently on the back burner, but still in my thoughts, and tying in nicely with the US fp course. The research focus is the Shah of Iran, the 1973 oil crisis and US foreign policy under Kissinger and Nixon at that time. In December 1973, the Shah decided to increase oil prices by 400%, following the oil embargo during the October war between the Arabs and Israel. The result was an economic downturn in Western Europe, parts of Asia and the United States. Given that the Shah was one of the US' staunch allies in the region, why did he instigate such an increase?

Here lies the debate. The Shah's one time prime minister, and court confidante Amir Asadollah Alam, attributes it to re-assertion of Persian prestige and regional influence; Secretary of State Henry Kissinger places the Shah's ego as a key motivation; then mixed into these positions is William Engdahl's view that price rises were secretly conspired by Western elites (including Kissinger) on a Swedish island in May 1973. The histiorography is equally contraversial and compelling.

On top these diverse views, I will be considering US foreign policy at the time. The importance of Iran as a client state: as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and regional policeman. The advent of the Nixon doctrine; pursuit of Detente; outbreak of the Yom Kippur war; British de-colonisation in the Gulf also shaped the historical context for this economic shockwave.

So to summarise: What context drove this decision? What motivation defined this decision? And what impact did this decision have on Iran-US relations?

The Other Allies

To withdraw or not withdraw is the current political question on both sides of the Atlantic. But what about those other countries still present in Iraq, members of the so called Coalition of the Willing? One member, Slovakia, has announced this week its intention to withdraw by February 2007. What plans do the others have for withdrawal; what do their populations wish for out of the whole project? Originally, not an unhealthy number of 49, this group of predominantly Eastern European and US friendly Latin American and South-East Asian states, now totals 23 (not including US and UK). Their impact in this whole debate may be of little significance, you might say, given that the US accounts for over 90% of the troops, but they still retain the one quality that they have always held - providing legitimacy. Whether these countries provided a couple of tank mechanics, a few chefs for Coalition mess halls, or some conscripts to clean US army boots, is irrelevant, having 49 separate co-operating states adds plenty of political capital.

For these so called Allies, what are there actual objectives from being there? It’s ridiculous to imagine that Mongolia or Honduras could have felt threatened by Saddam’s WMD or by Al-Qaeda either. The cynic would say it was purely to improve US trade relations; an ardent multinationalist might argue that they attempted to show their humanitarian solidarity. But since when have the peoples of Iceland or Tonga cared for anyone in the Middle East. I have to admit I have never met anyone from either of these countries, but it’s hard to see their intentions as...quixotic. If US withdraws, then all the other countries would have to withdraw... or would they? Can you imagine Estonia single-handedly taking on the insurgents?

Poland, leader of the Multinational security force south of Baghdad, has been a staunch US ally, losing 20 soldiers to date. In July 2005, 59% of Poles surveyed by PBS Sopot said all Polish troops should be withdrawn from Iraq as soon as possible; whilst in another poll 67% felt that it had been the wrong decision to participate at all.

The totality of World War II could be considered the pinnacle of coalition building, but more as states faced the bleak choice of alliance or destruction. The use of multinational forces during the Cold War was sporadic: the Vietnam conflict gathered Australia, New Zealand and South Korea as allies; the ill-fated multinational force (MNF) that arrived in Lebanon after the PLO evacuation in August 1982 consisted of US, French, Italian and British troops. The post Cold War environment has been different. Wider coalition forming has been possible, with the absence of bipolar constraints. The first Gulf war was the yardstick for this new freedom of co-operation, with countries as diverse as Senegal and Norway taking part, and former Soviet spheres Syria and Czechoslovakia also involved. The establishment of IFOR (International Fellowship of Reconciliation) and SFOR in Bosnia after the Dayton peace accords, included NATO members and non NATO states: Morocco, Argentina and Russia. UN peacekeeping activities have played a greatly expanded role since 1989, acting to resolve regional conflicts which were often fuelled by the two superpowers during the Cold War.

Coalition building is often the key to legitimacy. With modern armies subject to financial and human limitations (bar the US), the burden needs to be spread globally. Participation by Third World states is also a means of enhancing international prestige and trade opportunities. But critically when this legitimacy is not achieved, public support collapses. The failure to achieve legitimate goals in Iraq has questioned domestic commitment to intervention like no other conflict. This will most likely be the legacy for these states.

Whereas for most Iraqis, they probably don't know where half these countries are, let alone have seen any impact on their daily lives by them.

This post is still in drafting…