Lebanon

Who gained from the Lebanon war of 1982 and what were the long term consequences for the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Although the initial objectives of Operation Peace for Galilee were achieved quickly in June 1982, the expansion into and prolonged presence of Israel in Lebanon brought about far reaching consequences, for not just Israel and the Palestinians, but the whole region and international community. As external involvement in Lebanon deepened, whether Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian or American, new threats and objectives emerged. It is for this reason that judging who benefited and lost is difficult. But the upheaval and violence that did occur in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion meant that there were significant consequences for all parties involved in the period after. An analysis of the consequences of the war can be considered by looking at the military results; the subsequent internal conflicts; developments in the occupied territories and peace process; the diplomatic community’s actions and shifts in regional relations.

Between the end of Lebanese civil war in 1975-6 and the Israeli invasion on 6 June 1982, PLO presence in South Lebanon had become of increasing concern to Israeli political leaders and military, and a plan to eliminate this presence developed under Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin of the Likud government. After exchanges between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1981 and early 1982, plus occasional terrorist operations in northern Israel, an invasion became inevitable. Planned and presented as a limited initiative[1], the initial objective was a 40km incursion into South Lebanon aimed at suppressing PLO artillery fire. Although a quick success, PLO guerrillas and leaders were able to retreat to Beirut. The IDF continued their northwards push, attacking Syrian positions in the Beqaa valley, and in alliance with Christian Phalangist forces completed an encirclement of the capital on June 30.[2] The siege of Beirut marked the final stage of Operation Peace for Galilee ending in late August with the evacuation of PLO guerrillas under the supervision of a multinational force. As the invasion developed, it revealed shifting Israeli objectives, in particular Sharon’s, creating additional consequences in the immediate and distant future.

After the evacuation of PLO guerrillas, Israel’s secondary objective of securing a peace treaty with Lebanon came to the fore. But the failure to implement the May 17th 1983 treaty under US mediation, led to Israel’s withdrawal and the establishment of a security zone in South Lebanon in June 1985. Internal Lebanese conflicts also re-emerged in 1983, as Druze and Christian militias fought in the Chouf mountains. During this period the conflict brought in the United States and regional states Iran and Syria, creating events that laid foundations for several long term problems in the Middle East.

Military and civilian casualties during not just the Israeli invasion, but the prolonged civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990, were significant. Total deaths during the civil war are estimated at 150,000, of which 17,825 casualties followed the 1982 invasion.[3] Beyond these figures, the impact on military structures and ideologies was profound for all sides involved.

Israel set about re-drawing the political map of the Middle East through their invasion.[4] A swift military victory was achieved, incurring far fewer losses than other sides, but Israel developed new enemies and lost significant self esteem along the way. Lebanese and Palestinian civilians suffered the most as the IDF pushed towards Beirut. The actual siege of Beirut resulted in an estimated 2,461 deaths.[5] After the expansion of its campaign against Syrian targets in early June, Israel destroyed the elite of the Syrian air force - gaining air superiority.

Each respective militaries experienced significant changes due to the 1982 war. The first stage of Operation Peace for Galilee was a success for the IDF, as a total of 80,000 troops, 1,240 tanks and 1,520 personnel carriers[6] advanced through 3 different zones, assisted by air and naval support along the Lebanese coast. This stage of the conflict witnessed heavy military force used against PLO targets in South Lebanon. Familiar military tactics were also employed during the siege of Beirut, with a 7 week aerial bombardment, as Israel attempted to crush Palestinian resistance. Israel’s position as the military superpower in the region was confirmed in autumn 1982, but as Israel started its withdrawal in 1983 and 1984, a new military challenge emerged.

The IDF had been initially welcomed by the southern Shia population, but the continued presence turned the indigenous population against them. Especially as the IDF established bases and detention camps, built roads with signs in Hebrew,[7] and adopted ‘iron fist’ tactics against guerrillas.[8] The Shia population provided the foundation for militant movements Hizbullah and Amal to develop, employing terrorist and guerrilla tactics against Israel, culminating in hundreds of attacks against Israel in December 1984[9] followed by suicide attacks in early 1985. Following its withdrawal in June 1985, Israel established a security zone 15km north of the border, in alliance with the predominantly Christian South Lebanon Army (SLA), who they had helped create under major Saad Haddad in 1976. The tensions in the security zone between the Hizbullah and Israel’s proxy force - the SLA - would be a military issue for the next 15 years. The initial invasion cost approximately 650 IDF lives, but the war of attrition that followed between Israel and Hizbullah would claim an average of 20-30 IDF lives per year.[10] The SLA lost 410 soldiers between 1985 and 1999.[11]

The Palestinians as the primary target of the invasion suffered the greatest losses. Accurate casualty figures are difficult to ascertain, partly due to the brutal nature of the invasion and lack of on the spot reports, but also due to the PLO’s integration into the infrastructure of south Lebanon.[1] PLO bases and artillery were overwhelmed and outnumbered by the IDF, as their inappropriate military tactics became apparent. Having been forced back into Beirut, the PLO remained under sustained attack from both Israeli and Phalangist forces, until the evacuation of their leadership, plus 10,054 guerrillas by sea and land.[12] A similar number of fighters would remain in Lebanon and would fight against Amal militia between 1985 and 1987 in the War of the Camps

In military terms the Lebanese Phalangist army, although allies of the IDF, were an inferior and less disciplined force. Under Israeli guidance, they completed the encirclement of Beirut, but expected the IDF to do all the work.[13] Israel hoped that they would provide the military support for a new friendly and Christian dominated Lebanese government, which would be a second regional peace partner after Egypt. This failed to happen as strong opposition to a Christian Maronite dominated government emerged. Israel also formed an alliance with the extremist militia The Guardians of the Cedars: an alarming move for Lebanese Palestinians, who had often been their previous victims.

Both the Amal and Druze militia initially avoided confrontation with Israel, but would indirectly involve the IDF during campaigns against the Palestinians in the south and Phalangists in the Chouf Mountains. Once the PLO evacuation had finished, Israel was placed in an uncomfortable role as peacemaker, and their withdrawal from this position re-ignited the Lebanese civil war.[14] Syria suffered severe initial losses: 30 surface-to-air missiles, 85 front-line aircraft and 350 tanks[15], but eventually regained a strategic advantage by its backing of different militias. The ceasefire between the IDF and Syrian army along the Beirut-Damascus highway was regarded as a victory of sorts for Syria, as they held the Israeli army at bay.[16] Syrian intelligence played an influential role as it cultivated alliances with militia leaders of all sectarian persuasions[17], and was implicated for the assassination of Phalangist leader Bashir Gemayel and the collapse of May 17 agreement. Syria backed the militias of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) and Al-Murabitun.

These militias exploited the power vacuum left by the PLO’s evacuation. Fuelled by the heavy weaponry left behind[18], they resumed their previous rivalries. Al-Murabitun and other Arab nationalist inspired militias co-ordinated under the National Movement, backed by Syria and headed by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and fought against Phalangists allied with the Lebanese army. Hizbullah and Amal would lead this anti-Israel resistance in the post 1985 period.

The war had a polarising effect for both Israel and the Palestinians, and initial gains transformed into negative outcomes and vice versa for both sides. After a swift victory, Israel’s prolonged presence in Lebanon would create internal political and social divisions. Despite a heavy defeat and dispersal of its political infrastructure, the PLO and - Yasser Arafat especially - emerged with an enhanced reputation.

Following the evacuation in August 1982, a proportion of PLO guerrillas were dispersed to other Middle Eastern countries, whilst part of the remaining PLO split from Arafat’s Fatah to indulge in a murderous fratricidal war.[19] Arafat’s leadership was questioned in the aftermath of the Lebanon war by guerrilla groups – the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Against a political settlement with Israel, they formed a ‘loyal’ opposition, critical of Arafat yet willing to accept his leadership and loyal to the PLO framework.[20] At the same time rejectionist groups PFLP-GC and Saiqa, based in Damascus, sought to overthrow Arafat.

These splits in the PLO were the direct result of the pressure brought on the Palestinians in Lebanon by a heavy defeat. The ejection from Beirut was blamed on “Arafat’s corruption, mistakes and concessions”.[21] Palestinian factions fought from May 1983 onwards, with Syrian backing emerging in late June.[22] The mutiny of PLO guerrillas forced Arafat to evacuate for the second time to Tunis, after the siege of Tripoli in December 1983. The rifts were repaired in July 1984 during talks held in South Yemen[23], but Arafat’s position remained precarious and he would be excluded from the diplomatic mainstream until 1987.[24] Despite this lack of direct influence, Arafat retained popularity in the occupied territories, and Fatah became influential in the occupied territories through Khalil Wazir’s Occupied Homeland Bureau.[25] Arafat’s position was secured as rejectionist groups lost support, the DFLP and PFLP joined Fatah at the 18th PNC meeting in April 1987, and the Palestinians sought greater independence – especially from Syria.

The upheaval that followed the 1982 invasion forced the Palestinian leadership to adopt a moderate line: recognising Israel and renouncing terrorism in 1988. However this placed them in a position of weakness for peace negotiations in the 1990s, as they had no military option and effective political strategy, making them an attractive peace partner for Israel.[26]

Syrian support for Palestinian terrorist organisations also split the moderate leadership from more extreme elements. The Abu Nidal organisation, a longstanding foe of Arafat, responsible for the assassination attempt on UK Ambassador Shlomo Argov that had triggered Israel’s invasion, embarked on a violent terrorist campaign in the 1980s. Whilst Arafat attempted to distance his movement from these acts; Israel sought to prove his links to international terrorism as justification for not negotiating with the PLO. The depth of these splits was shown by the assassination of Arafat’s 2nd in command, Salah Khalaf in 1991 by an Abu Nidal operative. Arafat’s efforts for peace negotiations during the 1980s were constantly hindered by these splinter groups. The Achille Lauro hijacking in October 1985 reinforced Israel’s refusal to deal with the PLO.

The Palestinians that resided in Lebanon experienced extremely turbulent times following the Israeli invasion. The PLO had been responsible for developing infrastructure in Lebanon, creating effectively a state-within-a-state. Israel’s invasion represented a systematic attempt to destroy the entire institutional infrastructure of the PLO, including its hospitals, clinics, factories, cultural bureaus, art galleries, schools and research centre.[27] Palestinian residents held a precarious position in Lebanese society. As refugees prior to 1982 they lacked any form of citizenship, and the enforcement of highly restrictive employment laws marginalized them further.[28] Attacked economically and militarily, the Palestinians’ problems were further compounded by squalid conditions in refugee camps, where sanitation was at a minimum. Palestinians remained a divisive element in Lebanese society, as they had been since 1967, and have remained second class citizens since.

The invasion of Lebanon was widely supported in Israel with 84% of the population in favour at the start, but support dropped to 51% by June 1983 and 36% in May 1985.[29] This decline in popularity was paralleled by emerging political and social divisions in Israel. Although initially successful, the war had significant intangible costs: political, military, economic and psychological, that would mark Israelis for years to come.[30]

The IDF was the social institution that was damaged by the war, as its role shifted from invaders to occupiers then part time peacekeepers. IDF morale, military effectiveness and reputation all suffered. As the strategy and justification of the war shifted under Sharon, political doubts filtered through to the IDF. The protracted occupation severely damaged the IDF as it became engaged in quasi-police functions experiencing continuous friction from the local population[31], and was frustrated by being unable to achieve ambitious political objectives set.

The war had cost in excess of $3.2bn by December 1984[32], a significant figure as Israel was in a period of economic difficulty. Faced with a large foreign debt and massive inflation rate, the Israeli government was forced to examine military expenditure in an unprecedented way, resulting in the defence budget being cut by $400m in 1984.[33]

These economic considerations fuelled political divisions, but it was on the front line where the Lebanon war had its greatest impact on Israeli society. As the IDF became booged down, previously unexperienced negative side effects developed included a high number of “friendly fire” incidents, young officers declining military careers and accidental deaths and injuries.[34] More seriously, were the effects of the war’s brutality and the “total lack of consideration for human life, human feelings and property”.[35] The Sabra and Shatilla massacre represented the pinnacle of this sentiment. The importance of the moral dimension was stated by Shimon Peres when justifying the 1985 withdrawal: “we have returned to our values as a nation, as a people, a nation that has principles”.[36] The shattering of Israel’s humanitarian image was a devastating moment in the country’s history.[37]

The 1982 war developed further the phenomenon of refuseniks, with the formation of Yesh-Gvul [2]. Israeli society has often been defined as militaristic or a “nation-in-arms”, with military service considered the most untouchable of Israeli society’s sacred cows.[38] As the war developed, and with it disillusionment, Yesh-Gvul collected 3,000 reserve soldiers’ signatures on a petition demanding exemption from military duty and criticising government policy.[39] Although never part of mainstream politics, the refuseniks reflected changes in Israeli society, with a decline in the acceptance of Zionist principles and preference for individualism over collectivism.[40] Peace Now which had formed in 1978, was also empowered by the war, and would play an important role in Israeli society, highly critical of government military policy.

The defining moment of the Lebanon war, that galvanised this opposition, was the Sabra and Shatilla massacre 16-17th September 1982, where 1,000 between 2,000 Palestinians were killed by the Phalangist militia.[41] Besides sparking large protests, there was a significant political fallout after the Kahan Commission led to resignations of Ariel Sharon (but who remained in the cabinet, as minister without portfolio) and chief of military intelligence Major General Yehoshua Saguy. The refusal of parts of Israeli society to acknowledge the massacre, plus Sharon’s continuing support from Likud members, were symptoms of political and social splits that emerged. Although a coalition government was formed in September 1984, harsh political debate had focused on the aftermath of the Lebanon war and there was increasing polarization between supporters and opponents of territorial compromise with the Palestinians.[42] These divisions provided the Israeli political background for peace negotiations in the future.

The implications of conflicts within the IDF and political system, was unprecedented self reflection of Israel’s military actions, an acute new sense of “the limits of power”[43], but most significantly the realisation that the Palestinian question still needed to be addressed. The genesis of the long process to peace negotiations in 1993 lies partly in the malaise that developed after the Lebanon war. Whilst the losses to Israeli society were significant, it gained a clear realisation that Palestinians represented an intractable problem and agreement with the Palestinians in the occupied territories was the priority.

Lebanese sectarians divisions were only worsened by the 1982 war. The absence of a PLO military and political presence created a vacuum, which the different militias tried to fill. The fragile balance that had existed since Lebanon’s formation in 1920, and had collapsed in the first stage of the civil war, was shattered by the removal of the PLO and the presence of Israeli troops. Inherent factionalism in Lebanon meant that civil war continued until 1989, when the Taif Agreement set out plans for political reform and withdrawal of Syrian troops, although no timetable was decided for this. Power was balanced towards the Muslim population, as the appointed Sunni prime minister and cabinet, attained more importance than the Maronite president. Lebanese Muslims were certainly the ultimate beneficiaries of the 1982 war, but this was due to Syria’s role. As will be discussed, Lebanese Christians were undone by their reliance on Israel and the United States, who failed to provide the necessary long term support.

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The reasons for the invasion of Lebanon differ on opposing sides of the conflict. Palestinians believed Israel’s intentions were to destroy the PLO and their aspiration for an independent state. Israel’s justification was to destroy the PLO, who was considered responsible for anti-Israel terrorism and representing the main source of disruption in the occupied territories. Chief of staff Rafael Eitan had stated that the Lebanon war was “a war to consolidate the Israeli hold on Judea and Samaria”.[44] Since 1976, for the Palestinians Lebanon had represented a ‘war of liberation’ bound up with the aspiration for a return to Palestine.[45]

April 1982 had seen an explosion of protest and riots in the West Bank and Gaza, which was countered by repressive Israeli tactics. The Camp David peace accords had been interpreted by the Begin government differently to Palestinians, as autonomy for the occupied territories only resulted in more settlements and Israeli controlled civil administrations. Whilst direct attempts were made to destroy Palestinian nationalism in Lebanon, Israel also developed policies in the occupied territories, such as anti-PLO regulation in higher education.[46]

Palestinian fears in the occupied territories deepened with Israel’s swift victory, especially after the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, but as Israeli policy fell apart in Lebanon, international diplomatic efforts focused on the West Bank and Gaza, with the Fez Plan and Reagan initiative. Even though the PLO leadership was split and forced to relocate around the Middle East, it gained popularity as it survived the siege of Beirut providing a source of inspiration.[47]

Although the Begin government was replaced in 1984, conditions in the occupied territories did not improve, paving the way for the first Intifada. The Intifada developed from the increasingly harsh measures undertaken by the Israeli military from 1985 onwards; an emerging and restless Palestinian youth movement; economic decline in the occupied territories. The failed diplomacy that followed Lebanon and the lack of leadership in the West Bank and Gaza, with Islamist movements emerging instead, were also factors. All these conditions can be seen as consequences of the Lebanon war. The occupied territories have been since 1982, the pre-eminent location for the Palestinian struggle.

For Israel, the Intifada was a battle against Palestinian nationalism and essentially a continuation of the Lebanon war. The lessons of Lebanon had been learnt by parts of the Israeli political system, with Labor leaders opposing settler involvement in suppressing the Intifada, drawing parallels with the Phalangists.[48] But the PLO was still seen as the source of disturbances in the occupied territories and Israel’s main enemy.

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European powers have been involved in Lebanon since France intervened in 1860 on behalf of the Maronites in the civil war against the Druze. An international commission met to develop new political structures in Lebanon, but sectarian divisions were exacerbated as European powers sought to influence and favour individual groups. Lebanon also absorbed European culture in the 19th century; the American University of Beirut was founded in 1866. Beirut’s strategic trading position reinforced Lebanon’s value, and from the First World War, European political and military power began to dominate Lebanon.[49]

Following this tradition of foreign intervention, the Multinational force (MNF) arrived in Lebanon in late August 1982 to supervise the evacuation of PLO fighters and provide stability. This objective was achieved, but as it attempted to bring stability, it would clash with Lebanese militias, and suffer heavy casualties itself. The simultaneous barracks bombings on 23rd October 1983 resulted in 241 American and 58 French casualties. The MNF completed its withdrawal on 31st March 1984. The MNF started its mission with benign intentions, but the complex and violent situation in Lebanon destined it to failure. No member gained from its participation and the United States’ reputation was especially damaged.

In the aftermath of the siege of Beirut and the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, US-Israeli relations were also strained. The Reagan administration sensed that they were misled by Israeli leaders’ objectives, seeing Israel now as the “Goliath” rather than the “David” of the Middle East[50]. The continued building of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza also met strong disapproval.[51] Sympathy for the Palestinian cause was certainly enhanced following the Beirut stage of the war, but despite initial pressure on Israel, relations were still strong and would be resumed by mid 1983. From the Israeli viewpoint, there were reassurances that they would retain US support, and this was reinforced by continued military aid. By 1986, America was pushing for closer relations with Israel through technological exchanges related to the Strategic Defense Initiative.[52] For the Palestinians, the belief that the United States was biased towards Israel only deepened, and this sentiment continued until the end of the Reagan administration. It was upon these opposing perceptions that the Reagan initiative was imposed, proposing a “far-reaching peace effort”, with the key points being: a freeze on the building of Israeli settlements, “self government by the Palestinians…in association with Jordan”, but not the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.[53]

The plan was opposed by the Israeli cabinet, because of its variance with the Camp David accords, the issue of East Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, the definition of autonomy, plus distrust of Jordan’s ability to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.[54] The United States’ failure to pressure Israel empowered their position and will to resist concessions[55], setting a precedent for future negotiations.

Palestinian opposition was based on Jordan’s involvement: partly by Arafat refusing to give King Hussein a mandate to speak for the Palestinians[56]; and partly from the rejectionist factions within the PLO. For Jordan, failure to find a common negotiating position with the PLO; lack of confidence in the United States’ ability to pressure Israel into concessions; and pressure from the Soviet Union to oppose the Plan, were all factors in King Hussein’s rejection.[57] Peace negotiations did not bring about the resolution of the conflict the United States had hoped for. Whilst the conflict continued with Israeli presence until May 1985 and fighting between Syrian backed militias and PLO until 1987, a comprehensive peace treaty was unlikely. PLO-Jordanian relations also slowly deteriorated culminating in the Arab summit in Amman, where Hussein snubbed Arafat.[58] The United States meanwhile resisted negotiating with the PLO during this period, as it did not recognise UN resolutions 242 and 338.

The United States role in the Lebanon war shifted during 1983, creating a distraction from peace negotiations, and changing its status in the Middle East. Just as Israel’s role in Lebanon shifted, the United States inevitably became involved in the conflict. As the Long Commission stated: “By the end of September 1983, the situation in Lebanon had changed to the extent that not one of the initial conditions upon which the mission statement was premised was still valid. The image of the USMNF, in the eyes of the factional militias, had become pro-Israel, pro-Phalange, and anti-Muslim.”[59] The bombings of the US Embassy in April 1983 and army barracks in October plus kidnappings of US citizens, revealed the animosity towards the American presence. It also elevated the war onto an inter-state level as Iran and Syria were accused of these attacks. United States warships attacked Syrian controlled areas in September 1983, during battles between the Lebanon army and Druze militia.[60] Once the United States had pledged support for Amine Gemayel’s Phalangists, it would be unable to withdraw peacefully. The failure of US policy in Lebanon sapped enthusiasm for involvement in the Middle East until 1991. It also escalated the rivalry with Iran, which had developed since the 1979 revolution through Ayatollah Khomeini’s foreign policy. The attacks on United States’ targets marked the birth of militant anti-Americanism. The mid 1980s saw an escalation in acts of international terrorism, and American presence in Lebanon made the United States a target.[61] The tactics used by Hizbullah were precursors to those adopted by Al-Qaida in the late 1990s.

As the 1982 war brought in the United States, it also increasingly involved the Soviet Union. Soviet support for the PLO and in particular for Syria was an increasingly significant factor in the post 1982 period, especially as Syria became in direct conflict with Israel and the United States. The initial invasion was difficult for the Soviet Union, as its two clients, were easily defeated by Israel, requiring a re-evaluation of Middle East policy.[62] The Soviets maintained support for Syria, providing $2billion worth of weapons and aircraft, sending 5,000 advisers and technicians, and installing an extensive command, control and communication structure.[63] As Syria increased its military strength in 1983, so did Soviet influence. Reagan laid partial blame for the barracks bombing on the Soviet presence. The Soviet Union also backed mediation efforts between PLO factions in July 1984.[64] Although Soviet influence in the region did not extend beyond the late 1980s, the assistance provided to Syria was significant. Firstly as it allowed Syria to undermine the United States mission militarily and to destroy the May 17 Agreement, secondly it ensured their political dominance in Lebanon in the future.

Syria was the state that gained most from the 1982 war. Its position from the 1975-6 civil war had been strong, having entered Lebanon to enforce a ceasefire in June 1976. Syria’s position strengthened after their defeat in June 1982, by assisting the Druze militia with artillery cover in the Chouf Mountains against the Phalangists;[65] and supporting Shia groups Amal and Hizbullah. Syria maintained a military presence of 40,000 troops, controlling 50 percent of Lebanon’s territory,[66] in particular the strategically important Bekaa valley.[67] From this position, Syria dominated Lebanon, whilst also strengthening relations with Iran and their negotiating position against Israel. Israel’s objective of installing a friendly government to its north failed, placing Syria in a strong position for any peace treaty. The Taif accords in 1989 confirmed Syria’s position in Lebanon. Assad’s desire for a Greater Syria, not just in Lebanon but Jordan and Israel, had been initiated by their successful result from the 1982 war. This would not be fulfilled despite an expansion of its military and sponsorship of terrorist attacks on Jordan, as the Syrian economy stagnated and the situation in Lebanon worsened in the late 1980s.

Relations between Syria and the PLO, in particular Arafat and Fatah, deteriorated from 1983 onwards. The rift developed from Arafat’s criticism of the lack of Syrian support for the PLO in June 1982, his refusal to move PLO headquarters to Damascus, and moves towards diplomatic negotiations with Israel.[68] The Syrian backed Fatah mutiny in May 1983 was aimed at restraining Arafat rather than deposing him. A consequence of this PLO weakness was its absorption into Arab states, with Arafat being without a regional headquarters or patron. As Assad, stated in January 1985: “Syria will lead the Palestinian struggle henceforth”.[69] The contrast between the Syrian opinion of Arafat and his image in the occupied territories was another factor in causing the Intifada.

Iran established a foothold in the Arab-Israeli conflict through its involvement in Lebanon. As Syria’s only Arab ally, they were encouraged to become involved, sending hundreds of revolutionary guards into the Bekaa valley to establish a military headquarters.[70] The bombings of the United States embassy and barracks have been attributed to Iranian linked terrorists. Following the embassy bombing, a phone call from an Islamic Jihad member stated that the operation was “part of the Iranian revolution’s campaign against the imperialist presence throughout the world”. A superpower in an unstable regional state provided an ideal target for Iranian foreign policy.

Iranian antipathy to the United States had existed since the revolution, but the Lebanon conflict also worsened Israeli-Iranian relations. Despite the existence of arms trade between the two states during the 1980s, relations deteriorated primarily through Iranian funding for Hizbullah’s military campaign and sponsorship of acts of international terrorism like the Buenos Aires bombings of Jewish targets in 1992 and 1994. Although Shi’ite antipathy to Israel was high in south Lebanon, the Iranian influence was critical in creating a new enemy for Israel. The mullahs who formed Hizbullah identified with the revolution’s ideology and professed allegiance to Khomeini.[71] Hizbullah and Iran also share the goals of recovery of Jerusalem and liberation of historic Palestine.[72] In addition, the IDF presence in south Lebanon and unpopular military tactics used presented an opportunity for Iran to gain influence which it holds up until the present day.

To counter Syria’s plans for dominance, Israel pushed for a peace treaty with Lebanon, backed by the United States. The May 17 agreement called for a termination of the state of war between the two countries, implementation of security arrangements on the border, and withdrawal of Israeli forces. Syria’s withdrawal was also a requirement and this was quickly opposed, then undermined by Syria. The withdrawal in May 1985 and establishment of a security zone had a long and painful legacy for Israel. For the IDF, the occupation of south Lebanon would extract a heavy toll of casualties, but the political and diplomatic impact was equally significant. Political disputes in Israel over withdrawal developed in the 1990s, whilst Syria continued to assist Hizbullah’s low level military campaign as a means of gaining an advantage in negotiations over the Golan Heights. The stalemate that existed had a draining effect on Israeli politicians and public.

Hizbullah was the only militia allowed to openly retain arms after the Taif Accords in 1989.[73] From 1985, they undertook a guerrilla war against the SLA and IDF. Israel responded with large military operations – Accountability (1993) and Grapes for Wrath (1996) – but different “conditions in the regional security environment” during the peace process of the 1990s, made large scale militarily action difficult to justify.[74] Public opposition to the occupation in Israel also developed at this time creating a political environment for a withdrawal and also a possible peace treaty with Syria in the late 1990s.

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The extreme and brutal nature of the Lebanon war left deep scars for all those involved. Military losses were significant, but the social and economic destruction, the development of numerous militias and alliances, and the political repercussions left a legacy that still exists in the Middle East. Whether the situation in Lebanon worsened solely due to Israel’s invasion is debatable, given the internal conflicts, but their presence created a new set of problems.

Lebanon’s strategic position brought foreign involvement from 1982 onwards. The opportunity for Syria and Iran to pressurise Israel and the United States via Lebanon was provided by the war. Consequentially, Israel-US relations were strengthened by military necessity; long term regional rivalries, in particular between United States and Iran, were developed.

It would be hard to argue that the Palestinians gained anything immediately from the invasion, but the excessive force and dire conditions that followed brought international support, where it had not existed before. The invasion developed internal Palestinian tensions, but the relocation and change of focus to the occupied territories, paved the way eventual peace negotiations in the early 1990s, despite the failed diplomacy in the immediate post war period.

Israel’s losses were spread over a longer duration, as they were drawn into a low level war with Hizbullah. The Lebanon war and occupation left a psychological legacy for Israel, and also slowly empowered regional enemies Syria and Iran. Having set out to destroy the PLO in 1982, they would be undertaking peace negotiations with them 9 years later.

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[1] PLO guerrilla casualties are estimated to be anywhere between 1,000 (Associated Press 5th March 1991) and 10,000 (An Nahar)
[2] Translated as “There is a limit/border”
[1] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.573
[2] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06/appa.htm.
[3] http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat3.htm.
[4] Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (Random House, 1991), p.259
[5] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.256
[6] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.574
[7] Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, ‘Israel’s south Lebanon imbroglio’, Middle East Quarterly, June 1997
[8] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.577
[9] Ibid, p.571
[10] Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, ‘Israel’s south Lebanon imbroglio’, Middle East Quarterly, June 1997
[11] Anthony H Cordesman, Israel and Lebanon: The Risk of New Conflicts (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p.23
[12] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.350
[13] Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (Simon & Schuster, 1984), p.190
[14] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.629
[15] William Claiborne, ‘Victory gives Israel new power in Mideast’, Washington Post, 19th June 1982
[16] Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (Simon & Schuster, 1984), p.307
[17] Daniel Nassif, ‘Maj. Gen. Ghazi Kanaan’, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, January 2000
[18] Loren Jenkins, ‘Leftists stake out territory; militias menace Beirut pact’, Washington Post, 29th August 1982
[19] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.529
[20] Yezid Sayigh, ‘Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of PLO politics since 1982’, International Affairs, 1989/2/ pp.247-271
[21] Mahmoud Labani, PLO rebels spokesman, quoted in Flora Lewis, ‘Rebels in PLO want it to be more militant’, New York Times, 16th October 1983
[22] Thomas Friedman, ‘PLO rebels seize 8 Arafat positions’, New York Times, 22nd June 1985
[23] Ihsan A. Hijazi, ‘Arafat says PLO rifts are healed’, New York Times, 2nd July 1984
[24] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.670
[25] Yezid Sayigh, ‘Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of PLO politics since 1982’, International Affairs, 1989/2/ pp.257
[26] Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Bedford / St. Martin’s, 2001), p.412
[27] Cheryl A. Rubenberg, ‘The Civilian Infrastructure of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation: An analysis of the PLO in Lebanon until June 1982’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.12, No.3, (Spring 1983) p.54
[28] Julie Peteet, ‘From Refugees to Minority: Palestinians in post-war Lebanon’, Middle East Report, July / September 1996.
[29] Edward Walsh, ‘Israel’s 3-year war in Lebanon ends, but some troops remain behind’, Washington Post, 7th June 1985
[30] Ibid
[31] Edward Walsh, ‘Lebanon has sapped Israel’s army’, Washington Post, 20th April 1985
[32] Ian Black, ‘The shelling of the military / cost of defence spending for Israeli economy’, The Guardian, 3rd December 1984
[33] Ibid
[34] Edward Walsh, ‘War shakes Israel’s reserves’, Washington Post, 21st April 1985
[35] Eitan Haber in Yediot Ahronot, cited in Edward Walsh, ‘War shakes Israel’s reserves’, Washington Post, 21st April 1985
[36]Henry Kamm, ‘For Peres, pullout has moral value’, New York Times, 1st May 1985
[37]Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.407-408
[38] Ariel Dloomy, ‘The Israeli Refuseniks: 1982-2003’, Israeli Affairs, Vol 11, No.4, October 2005, pp.696-7
[39] Ibid, p.702
[40] Ibid, p.695
[41] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.390
[42] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.648
[43] Shlomo Avineri, Professor of Political Science at Hebrew University and director general of Israeli foreign ministry quoted in Edward Walsh, ‘Israel’s 3-year war in Lebanon ends, but some troops remain behind’, Washington Post, 7th June 1985
[44] Joe Stork & Jim Paul, ‘The War in Lebanon’, Merip Reports, September / October 1982
[45]Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.79
[46] Edward Walsh, ‘Bitter pride; West Bank Arabs angry at US, feel PLO remains unbowed’, Washington Post, 10th October 1982
[47] Ibid
[48] Labor minister Moshe Shahal in Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.702
[49] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.61
[50] Steven R. Weisman, ‘Reagan said to see Israel as the Mideast’s “Goliath”, not “David”, New York Times, 23rd September 1982
[51] John M. Goshko, ‘US brands decision as “most unwelcome”’, Washington Post, 6th September 1982
[52] Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Bedford / St. Martin’s, 2001), p.412
[53] Ronald Reagan speech, 1st September 1982
[54] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.604
[55] Financial Times editorial, ‘Mr Reagan’s failure’, 12th April 1983
[56] William E. Smith, ‘Seeking safety in numbers; Arafat says no to Hussein – and to Reagan’, Time magazine, 18th April 1983
[57] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), pp.619-620
[58] Yezid Sayigh, ‘Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of PLO politics since 1982’, International Affairs, 1989/2/ p.265
[59] http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/index.html
[60] Thomas Friedman, ‘US warships fire on Lebanon area held by Damascus’, New York Times, 18th September 1983
[61] Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p.138
[62] William Claiborne, ‘Victory gives Israel new power in Mideast’, Washington Post, 19th June 1982
[63] Drew Middleton, ‘Syria’s build up called a tactic for talks’, New York Times, 12th May 1983
[64] Ihsan A.Hijazi, ‘Arafat says PLO rifts are healed’, New York Times, 2nd July 1984
[65] Thomas Friedman, ‘US warships fire on Lebanon area held by Damascus’, New York Times, 18th September 1983
[66] William Harris, ‘Syria in Lebanon’, Merip reports, July/August 1985
[67] James H. Scheuer, ‘How to stop Syria’, New York Times, 15th March 1984
[68] Loren Jenkins, ‘PLO, Syria talks fail to end rift’, Washington Post, 10th July 1983
[69] Charles Krauthammer, ‘Israel’s victory in Lebanon’, Washington Post, 18th January 1985
[70] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.468
[71] Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: the changing face of terrorism, (I.B.Tauris, 2005), p.16
[72] Ibid, p.200
[73] Simon Murden, ‘Understanding Israel’s long conflict in Lebanon’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2000, 27(1), p.35
[74] Ibid, p.46

New term - Arab-Israeli conflict

Fitting in well with my essay - focusing on Zionism - and with current world events - Ariel Sharon's illness and forthcoming elections - means that my new course has extra relevance. After the core course which was not necessarily close to my background knowledge, I am on quite familiar ground here and the next 11 weeks should be much more in depth and analytical than before - as I would expect an MA to be. Although I don't compare myself to other students, I think that my background knowledge on the Arab - Israeli conflict was above average for the class. It is probably the one subject that I have read more about than any other prior to the course. It is certainly, to me, the most interesting and important issue in contemporary international relations.

A quarter of my current essay is on Zionism, as an example of a nationalist movement. From the outset on the course, I have tried to establish links between modules I take and have looked for overlaps to reinforce my knowledge - with the aim of having a very strong dissertation. My dissertation will be on Middle Eastern politics. My main idea at the moment is an analysis of 1979 as a year of significant developments within the Islamic world - both politically and spiritually - and the long term effects of these events. Namely the Islamic revolution in Iran; the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan; Saddam Hussein's seizure of power in Iraq and possibly the signing of the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Another avenue I want to explore is producing some shorter pieces using material in my essays. These would have a contemporary slant. Anthony Beevor who gave a lecture on Total War to us in November, was on Channel 4 news this evening, discussing Gordon Brown's proposed British day - a celebration of a unified nation. There is a lot of scope here based on previous research - Hobsbawm's Inventing Traditions springs to mind.

History online.....

After my last comments on archive technology, here is a link to bbc, who have put some of their archive footage online.... http://www.bbc.co.uk/calc/news/index.shtml

Essay plan....

Here is my essay plan - advice is welcome...

Was the development of nationalism shaped by class interests? Illustrate by comparison of several nationalisms arising in different eras and regions?

Intro

Historical Background (500 words)
Enlightenment
French Revolution
Liberalism
Creole nationalism
Modernisation & Industrialisation

Theory and Historiography (500 words)
Marxist theory
Anderson: Print capitalism & Creole nationalism
Development of vernacular
Gellner & modernisation
Hobsbawm & education
Official nationalisms

Class interests objectives – a comparison (3500 words)

· Secessionist: Basque/Welsh
· Aspirational: Serbian
· Displaced: Zionism
· Anti-Imperial: Arab

Conclusion (500 words)


Class interests and their goals. The objectives of nationalist movements can be divided and defined by what they are against and what they have to overcome. The driving force to nationalism has been the interests of certain areas of society. Nationalism must have a goal however this goal will not always be the same for separate parts of society. Class interests will vary with these varying objectives.

The development of nationalism was shaped not by factors such as language, religion, race or culture, but by class interests. Nationalism like any other ideology has an objective and that objective of gaining political power; different class groups used nationalism to gain political power and advance their own class interests. The objective of different class groups can be divided between ……….

Will history forgive anyone.....

A very relevant article in the New Statesman recently http://www.newstatesman.com/200512190017
The value of history whether in education or current affairs seems to be an ever growing hot topic. Coinciding with my studies... Its value as a political tool is growing exponentially. Firstly as advances in archive technology and freedom of information provide better access to events in the past. Secondly as we live in fast changing and difficult times where the future is seen with increasing intrepidation; creating an equation between past present and future is a political requisite...



On this particular quote, since history has become more and more politicised and subjective, then history will probably forgive them. After all some historians believe that Hiroshima, Vietnam, etc were justified.

Christmas break .....

Time for another blog. Apologies for the lack of posts since end of November - I have been busy, I assure you!

After finishing my background reading, have got an essay plan together, which I will put in the next post. Met my tutor and have written 1,000 words thus far. So with 1 month till the deadline, I think I am on track. But have got a 1 week break now, so hope to get over half way by the end of the year. This stage is certainly more enjoyable than long hours in the library, although it can be quite painstaking, as each sentence can take an age to construct, and even then I might edit it out later. But that is all part of the process - the sum is greater than all the parts.

Sloggin away...

Been putting in the hours recently - so been pretty much braindead when returning to the my laptop - so the blog has gone down in the priorities. I have decided to go for the nationalism question. Firstly because it is one of the questions asking for an argument to be constructed rather than a historical narrative, which is something I prefer, although I would like to undertake the latter on this course at some point. The subject matter is quite universal, meaning that the work I do now will provide a solid background and foundation for the rest of the course. I have been reading about Arab nationalism and Zionism, and I will be doing further Middle East studies. The other questions don't necessarily have this, since all politics and international relations can be considered through the nationalism prism, genocide for example is not a concept linked to all states, as is Fascism or Empire - directly at least.

After being daunted by the size of the subject, I am slowly narrowing things down. I have discovered some valuable texts that cover the essay question well. In particular as regards zionism and also Arab nationalism.

Nationalism .......... possible essay

Been looking at nationalism over the last week. It's a pretty wide ranging topic, since its relevant to virtually every country or state. I've been focusing on its origins, which lie mid way through the 19th century, and some specific types of nationalism - Hindu and Arab in particular. Although one of the essay questions, is on nationalism, so this reading is directly relevant to that, I was looking at the other essay questions today and nationalism is a vital concept that needs discussing in those as well. Like the state, it is a central concept to international relations theory. Other possible essays could be on genocide or imperialism or totalitarianism and to understand these, I think you need to have a satisfactory understanding of nationalism first. So this work here is important and will do me good for the future. In fact if you look at each of the weekly topics, it's obvious now that they are strongly interlinked, whereas at the start of the course, I thought some were quite autonomous. So it's going to be necessary to do core reading and further reading each week as comprehensively as possible, regardless of the essay i answer.



As regards the essay: the question is based on whether class interests shaped nationalism. My initial thoughts on approach was that it would be to look at the genesis of nationalism and what social elements drove that forward, then see whether this was repeated elsewhere. I was thinking of dedicating the first half of the essay to comparing late 19th century European nationalism to Latin American nationalism then the second to 20th century forms such as Zionism and Arabism.

Also need to do some research on essay writing skills...... before I start.... although my essays over the last year have been pretty good, my structure and style is quite improvised and obviously could be improved....

Empire - What is it?

Tonight, we discussed empires: what is the meaning of empire? what type of empires are there? what are the problems related to them? and how do they end? The definition is not necessarily geographical or politically based, but something more abstract. Size, prestige and dominance are the key characteristics. So although the United States is not an empire in the geographical sense with global territories, it does have those 3 traits. Although you could argue that US military prescence across the globe makes it empirical. Having a solid sphere of influence as the United States does in its region could also define it as an empire. Then again, you could say that an empire is really just a large state - if that's your definition. I'll stop there, as that's a possible essay question.

But reading about how empires developed, you find that economic factors play a greater and greater role. The industrial revolution and an excess of capital, fuelled 19th century colonialism, as demand for resources became capitalist's priority. To answer the essay question - Is US an Empire? - then it would be important to consider US demand for resources - it's all about oil! It's a well known cry, but sadly it's very true.

Here is an article that gives some further information on US energy policy and the politics that drive it.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-americanpower/oil_2887.jsp

American Power: Global Sheriff – International Outlaw?

Tonight I attended my first public debate of the term at LSE. These excellent events are a great resource and forum for ideas, free to attend and always entertaining. This evening’s debate was between Professor Paul Rogers of University of Bradford and Professor Bill Wohlforth of Dartmouth University, USA. Below is a prose summarisation of the debate.

To quote the Chinese saying, we live in “interesting times”. The United States is not an international outlaw. Its compliance rate with the vast majority of international treaties is very high; it does resist new treaties but only when they are not in line with US foreign policy. This does not make the United States an international outlaw. It operates in a passive sheriff role often, such as its enforcement of its treaty with Japan preventing Japan’s development of nuclear weapons. Its actions are mostly responses to the demands of intervention. The last 15 years has seen a shift to interventionism in international relations. When it does intervene it is not necessarily alone. In recent conflicts, whether in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or Iraq, it has intervened with allies.

The post Cold War period has seen major changes in state of world security: a 40% decline in global conflicts; 35% decrease in world arms sales. The world is a safer place as a result and the United States poses less threat to international threat stability.

The Neo-con phase which peaked in 2003 is now over. The US electorate has seen the failings of this policy and has shown itself to be shifting away from President Bush. Other politicians are also trying to distance themselves from this policy as well. The idea of the United States as an international outlaw is fading in the Iraq quagmire.

******

There have been some very dangerous developments in the global security environment in the last 5-6 years. What we are now seeing is an “Entry strategy” being set up in Iraq that will effect the geopolitical situation for the next 20 to 30 years.

The ideological foundation for these developments is the right wing think tank Project for New American Century, established in 1997, and incorporating both current Bush administration and early Reagan officials. The combination of Christian / Zionist beliefs and Neo-conservatism marked a new era of US foreign policy, where the role of Sheriff and Outlaw has often been mixed up.

The aim of the September 11th terrorist attacks was in part to draw the United States into a protracted war in Afghanistan, where they would be bogged down like the Soviet Union in the 1980s and suffer high military casualties. This did not happen as heavy aerial bombing, special operations tactics and a rearmed Northern Alliance, brought a swift victory. Rogers encountered a Bush official in Washington in 2002, who said that doing Iraq meant not having to do Iran. The speed of victory and hubris that went with the Afghan victory encouraged preparation for this new war. Arms manufacturers had to operate 24/7 for the next 10 months to provide enough ammunition for Iraq.

The termination of the Iraqi regime has provided an opportunity for a revitalised Al-Qaida. Al-Qaida’s long term goals have become more apparent. The restoration of a Caliphate being an ultimate one. The resolution of the Israeli occupation of Palestine is a side issue. The greatest Caliphate between 750 and 1250 had its capital as Baghdad, now occupied the US, thus antagonising this movement further. Iraq has now become the ideal training ground for jihadis, where Afghan paramilitaries now go to Iraq to receive training to fight in Afghanistan.

The siege of Fallujah in November 2004 could be seen from two very different perspectives: the abundant TV crews in embedded US army patrols and the Al-Jazeera Arab journalists broadcasting images of dead civilians to the Middle East. This split in perspectives defines the current situation in the Middle East.

The Iraq war was not driven by a need to increase the United States oil power base, but by long term trends. The importance of the Persian Gulf has become ever increasing. Its initial moment of significance was the start of the Yom Kippur war on October 17th 1973 and the oil embargo that followed. Now it would not be surprising if the US has bases in Iraq in 10 years time. Al-Qaida should be looked at as a symptom of these current trends rather than an entity in its own right. The next question is the invasion of Iran. Iran feels surrounded by United States and feels nuclear weapons are needed to defend itself.

Since September 11th, the United States has gone badly wrong on foreign policy, behaved in an outlandish way and needs to change its long term security strategy to get out of this predicament.

Previous work

I haven't worked out how to link to word documents yet, but this is one of my previous essays.

What challenges does transnational terrorism pose to the international system?

The conventional definition of terrorism is an act or threat of violence to achieve a political objective, of a regional or national nature. When using the term transnational terrorism, the properties of traditional terrorism are retained, but shifted to a dimension beyond these national considerations. So the funding, infrastructure, and personnel have a multinational form; the acts of terrorism can occur anywhere internationally; and the objectives of the terrorists are not limited by international boundaries. By operating without regard for national frontiers and international laws, terrorist groups force the individual states to respond collectively, but the challenge for the international system is how best to co-ordinate this response.

Historically acts of terrorism have aimed to achieve a regional or national socio-political objective. Likewise the actual acts of terrorism have been against local targets or interests related to those local targets. With often limited funds and limited objectives, terrorism has had a narrow remit for its struggle.

Terrorism’s origins can be traced to the 11th century Middle East, where the Hashshashin murdered their enemies through low level tactics. Terrorism has always existed as a tool of insurgency and as a way of seeking political change. It is only since the start of the post war period, that it has become an organized and self conscious phenomenon. The Irgun in Israel adopted terrorist tactics in its attempt to establish a Jewish state. As did the Algerian FLN undertook a terrorist campaign in 1954, in its war of independence against France. Terrorist groups slowly shifted their operations onto the international stage, partly to hit softer targets and partly to gain international attention. The Provisional IRA was one of the first local militant groups to undertake this migration, attacking targets on the UK mainland in the 1970s.

Transnational terrorism was born in the early 1970s. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) always held the same central objective, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, but experienced a similar shift to the IRA, albeit more rapid, in the direction of its terrorist campaign. They fought a prolonged guerrilla war against their ‘occupier’, but also exported this campaign beyond the Middle East and into mainland Europe. Hijackings, hostage taking and assassinations were commonplace in the 1970s, mostly against Israeli targets or targets loosely connected to Israel.

Historically terrorism has been counteracted at a local level, internal disputes have been dealt with through internal laws or force if necessary. As terrorist groups formed into transnational structures with transnational plots, the international community has, slower than perhaps originally anticipated, responded collectively. International mechanisms, such as UN Resolutions or law enforcement treaties, have slowly developed to counteract the growing threat.

Terrorism became truly transnational during the 1990s. Militant Islamic groups, having been formed during the Afghanistan war against the Soviet Union, tried to spread their struggle across the Middle East and into Western Europe. Although regional grievances, were a driving force – whether US military presence in Saudi Arabia or the Israel-Palestinian conflict – the groups involved formed transnational structures, aiming at US targets, regardless of where they were. During the 1990s targets ranging from New York to Riyadh to Nairobi were all attacked. Militant Islam previously was concerned with parochial grievances, such as attempts to overthrow governments in Algeria and Egypt, but a shift in strategy by Al-Qaeda from the ‘lesser enemy’ to the ‘greater enemy’ occurred in the mid 1990s. This shift would galvanise the support of disparate militant groups operating at the time. [1]

The term transnational is defined as transcending national boundaries. A transnational organization can be defined by the types of movements it undertakes: movement of physical objects, including human populations; movement of money or credit; and movement of information and ideas. A transnational terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda fits this definition through its movement of personnel across the Middle East and especially prior to October 2001 through Afghanistan; its transfer of funds through the international financial system via Islamic charities, unsuspecting legitimate businesses, organized crime and other money laundering ventures; and its intent to spread a militant radical form of Wahhabism Islam. One of the ultimate aims of Al-Qaeda, is the creation of a transnational Islamic superstate or Caliphate.

Although transnational terrorism is not committed solely by Islamic groups, the international system has had to respond to this threat specifically. As the response incorporates cultural and religious factors, it has provided a greater challenge to states. How states respond to political Islam is discussed later.

***

Terrorist groups have traditionally operated as non-state actors: vehemently opposing states and their policies. However the distinction between terrorists and the states has blurred, when states have used terrorism as a proxy for conflict, providing logistical support, funds and arms to these groups. When terrorism is state sponsored, the threat to international order increases, since the culpability cannot be simply passed off onto an unaccountable rogue group.

State terrorism became an international issue in the 1980s, having previously only existed in a covert capacity. Palestinian affiliated groups had been the main perpetrators of terrorist acts throughout the 1970s, but never received consistent state backing. Transnational terrorism would gain greater momentum from the growing regional influence of states such as Syria, Iran and Libya.

The transition from terrorism being the perpetrated by rogue groups to individual states, albeit indirectly, made the issue international. The bombing of a West Berlin nightclub in April 1986 led to US air strikes on Libya 10 days later, and was the first occasion in modern times that an act of terrorism had created an inter state conflict.

Although the US and Libya had clashed covertly previously, the bombing presented a challenge to the international system, as it polarised international opinions on the appropriate response to such acts. Operation El Dorado Canyon was condemned by France, the Soviet Union and all Arab states, but supported by Britain, Australia and Israel.

The prosecution of terrorist groups through international law enforcement was a laborious and frustrating process, so the US – having suffered a series of terrorist acts in the 1970s and early 1980s – decided to prosecute individual states, who it perceived as the driving force.[2] As states are unable to attack other states in open conflict, terrorism has been used, as a way to stay within international law and attack other states covertly. As will be discussed later, the link between states and terrorism is complex and states have tried to establish links, so as to justify their own policies.

***

The growth of transnational terrorist groups has meant that very few states within the international system are unaffected. Historical alliances within Western Europe and the Middle East have been reshaped as greater preventative co-operation has developed, with other states playing important roles. The international system has always operated in a state structure, through institutions such as the UN or alliances like NATO. But the nature of transnational terrorism is that it is not state defined, so a new approach has been adopted. Ideological and religious factors are harder to counteract with traditional interstate methods.

As terrorism developed from a local to a transnational issue, international institutions responded. Since 1963, 12 major conventions and protocols have been established by the United Nations relating to states’ responsibilities in combating terrorism. These range from civil aviation safety to attacks on senior government officials and diplomats to the financing of terrorism. Additionally numerous UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions have been passed – relating to specific terrorist incidents. The UN is made up of many different organizations, agencies and programmes, which also have counterterrorist functions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is concerned with the proliferation of nuclear materials to terrorists. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) deals with airline and airport security. The Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP) looks at the links between drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism.[3]

Greater coordination in law enforcement has underpinned these international agreements. Terrorism is ultimately a criminal activity and has been recognised as such, on an international level since the 54th General Assembly in Washington in 1985 when Resolution AGN/54/RES/1 was passed calling for the creation of a specialized group within Interpol’s Police Division to 'co-ordinate and enhance co-operation in combating international terrorism'.[4]

International law enforcement agencies were exposed as failing to effectively prevent terrorism, firstly by the September 11th attacks and then the 2004 Madrid bombings. Agencies like Europol, established in 1999 after the relaxation of European border controls, have increased in importance, as inter state co-operation has become a necessity. At the US-EU summit on counterterrorism cooperation in May 2002, both sides of the Atlantic agreed to joint initiatives covering terrorist funding, extradition laws, criminal trend data, identifying of terrorist organisations and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Madrid terrorist attacks underlined the need for a coherent EU anti-terrorism policy. A summit held in the wake of the attacks proposed the creation of a ‘counter-terrorism czar’, enforcement of the use of the European Common Arrest Warrant, and creating a clearer definition of the term ‘terrorism’. Europol’s effect had been limited; as its remit did not include a coherent anti-terror policy.[5]

Despite a long history of cooperation between international intelligence organisations, recent acts of terrorism have forced governments to re-examine the effectiveness of this co-operation. Traditionally strong ties have existed between US and Western European intelligence agencies, having worked closely during the Cold War. The expansion of operations by Middle Eastern and South Asian terrorist groups has required a reciprocated expansion of intelligence gathering as a counterterrorist measure.

After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United States sought greater co-operation with countries with far from obliquitous reputations. The intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran contain elements sympathetic to terrorist groups, but were asked to provide assistance for US investigations. States without any history of international co-operation in intelligence operations have also been brought into the fold. This spread of co-operation travels from North African states, such as Morocco and Algeria to South East Asian states, including the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.
"The extent of co-operation with other intelligence agencies around the world is unprecedented, as is the willingness on the part of many governments - including some unexpected ones - to co-operate,"[6]

***

Establishing conventions and structures to deal with terrorism is only a limited solution and an obvious one at that. Given that terrorism is not arbitrary and has an ultimate objective, governments or groups of governments have to look at the root causes of terrorism; either to develop a way of eliminating by means such as force or to consider how to resolve the issues driving it.

The creation of transnational mechanisms is a preventative move against terrorism, but ultimately states are forced to undertake a deeper analysis of the causes of terrorism. In a recent interview, Tony Blair’s analysis was that it was possible to “take security and military measures against terrorism but ... the best prospect of peaceful coexistence [lied] in the spread of democracy and human rights".[7]

Terrorism is a method of conflict used to achieve certain goals, but it is driven by a combination of factors including economic inequality, political misrepresentation, religious tension and ideological conflict. All acts of terrorism are motivated by at least one of these factors. Governments have ultimately needed to look at these factors, when constructing their response to terrorism.

Transnational terrorism developed as a result of migration from the Middle East and North Africa, but is driven by globalisation. The end of East-West confrontation, rapid developments in means of communication, easing of travel restrictions, greater fluidity in international finance markets, changed the face of terrorism.[8] Immigration control is a key preventative measure against transnational terrorism. Porous borders in the Middle East and also in Europe have led to a proliferation of terrorist groups in terms of personnel, ideology and expertise, and international agreements on immigration (in particular within the EU) have been renegotiated since the increased threat of transnational terrorism.
The structure of transnational terrorism has changed as a result of globalisation and counterterrorist measures have had to respond to this change. Globalisation has opened new opportunities for terrorists and presented new challenges to state security. The proliferation of information and ideology has travelled from the Middle East across to South East Asia, through religious teachings and technologies like the internet. Post Cold War economic development has been driven by privatisation, deregulation, the free movement of capital and labour, and technological advances, which has in turn fed the finances of terrorist groups. Globalisation has allowed non state transnational entities, such as terrorist groups, freedom to flourish in a more economically liberal world. It is estimated that the terrorist economy - including legitimate businesses, drug trafficking, organised crime and arms sales - could be valued at up to $1.5 trillion.[9] The extent to which transnational terrorism has integrated into global systems, has presented unprecedented challenges to the international system, leading to the need for greater co-operation. ***
Regional terrorism is normally resolved by regional actors, with occasional assistance from a neutral party. Attempts to resolve the Northern Ireland troubles have been undertaken by the British and Irish governments, with input from US Senator George Mitchell on the issue of decommissioning. This is the traditional model for resolving regional issues that give rise to terrorism. Transnational terrorism is more complicated as it involves more actors and its remedy is often less defined.

The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is essentially a regional political and geographical conflict, but it has become a transnational issue, as it has drawn in other states. Palestinian terrorist groups have been supported by states such as Iran and Syria, likewise Israel’s response to terrorism has been endorsed by the United States. Palestinian terrorism is unique in that although its objectives are regional, its practice, backing and the response to it has been transnational.

Modern terrorism has developed as Western societies have formed complex multicultural structures. The spread of political Islam has been across national boundaries; as a result disillusionment in one country can be determined by the situation in another state. Muslims have opposed government foreign policy in states such as Iraq, despite not sharing any common national identity. Acts of terrorism that have followed are caused in part by this interdependence. Transnational terrorism is driven by transnational causes – one state’s foreign policy can fuel acts of terrorism against it. The Madrid bombs were seen as an act of revenge against Spain’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq. Muslim communities exist across Europe, and as the Madrid bombs showed, Western societies need to strike the balance between protecting these communities and having effective law enforcement.

Western governments have been consistently intransigent in the face of groups like Al-Qaida, but they would not deny, that they are ultimately seeking to resolve some of the grievances that are also driving terrorism. Greater equality and democratic rights in the Middle Eastern countries, resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a peaceful end to the US occupation of Iraq, are political objectives shared by Western governments and these terrorists. Al-Qaeda has tried to divide the international community by exploiting the divisions between US and Europe in how to treat these causes of terrorism. [10]

Foreign policy has played a major role in driving modern terrorism. Al-Qaeda has cited US foreign policy - whether support of Israel, a military presence in Saudi Arabia or imposing strict sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s – as its prime motivation. The United States response to the September 11th attacks has been criticised because it further antagonised militant Islamic movements, firstly in Afghanistan and then Iraq. States opposing the invasion of Iraq cited growth of terrorism as one of their major concerns. Divisions in the international response towards terrorism have been created by contrasting internal politics, historical standpoints on international issues and established alliances with other states. For example France’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq was partly driven by having a large Arab population, strong historical ties in the Middle East and a centre left government.

As transnational terrorism operates outside national boundaries, the response traverses national boundaries, which in turn can jeopardise individual state sovereignty. Terrorist groups who reside in certain states may become retaliatory targets, for example Israel has targeted Hamas activists in Syria, and in February 2004 Russia assassinated the Chechen rebel Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev in Qatar.[11] As terrorist groups now operate with an international infrastructure, states have had to respond across borders. The international system has had to strike a balance between defending a state’s right to manage its own internal affairs and to prevent states from (if not always intentionally) harbouring terrorist groups.

Preserving this balance has been pushed to the limit, in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. Both states were accused of supporting terrorism. Both invasions received mixed international support: Middle Eastern states generally opposed both; Western states mostly favoured the former but only a handful the latter. When the response to terrorism is interstate – the international community does not always share the same outlook.

The preservation of international law has been a critical issue for the international system, both in terms of preserving state sovereignty when dealing with counterterrorist measures and preservation of human rights. The law enforcement measures discussed earlier have had to consider human rights legislation. Although clear differences have emerged, with European powers understanding how consideration of human rights in law enforcement is crucial to stemming the growth of terrorism. The United States has adopted a more draconian approach to counter terrorist law enforcement.

***

Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US State Department designated seven states as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. This linkage between states and terrorist groups may be framed by one state’s definition. “State sponsors of terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. These countries provide a critical foundation for terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have a much more difficult time obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations.”[12] Other states may not always share this assessment, partly through their own intelligence, partly because of their own definitions of the term ‘state sponsor’. Some Arab states believe Israel’s policies during the current Intifada constitute state terrorism. Although Israel might not support individual terrorist groups, its operations against Palestinians fall within certain definitions of terrorism. The links between states and terrorism are also often hard to prove. The US government tried to assert a link between the September 11th terrorists and Iraqi intelligence, in the build up to the invasion. Iraq was also accused of providing a safe haven for Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, despite being ideological opposites. Unclear and divided definitions present the international system with a challenge when providing a clear and unified response to terrorism.

An independent terrorist group is harder to counteract than a group that relies on state funding. The process of being able to successfully link states to terrorist groups, which begun under the Reagan administration, has underpinned counter terrorist foreign policy. The use of economic sanctions had been the standard counter measure, prior to recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their effectiveness is limited in comparison to military or covert actions, but has been successful with certain states. The imposition of sanctions on Libya, eventually led to the extradition of two agents suspected of involvement in the 1988 Pan-Am bombing. Sanctions have also been used to encourage co-operation in fighting terrorism: Pakistan had its previous sanctions waived in exchange for supporting the United States attempts to overthrow the Taliban in October 2001.

Issues driving transnational terrorism have often been resolved through diplomatic means. As discussed earlier, terrorist groups are often reliant on state sponsorship, a role Syria and Iran have both recently been accused of. Western states fear that state sponsorship can empower a terrorist group with biological or chemical weapons, but this threat of terrorism is often overstated to maintain diplomatic pressure. States like Iran and Syria have been accused of harbouring terrorists, developing WMD and financing terrorist groups. The reality is that the threat from transnational terrorism has been developed as much by non state actors. The blackmarket for nuclear technology was developed by Pakistani scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in the 1990s, supposedly without state knowledge. Charities and businesses in the Middle East channel funds to terrorist groups in large quantities.

***

Since almost all modern forms of terrorism have a transnational element, the international system will always have to respond, but whereas terrorism has developed a transnational structure; the international system has not always mirrored this effectively with transnational countermeasures of its own. Traditional responses to terrorism - whether sanctions and conflict at the state level, or intelligence and law enforcement at sub state level - have not always succeeded, as individual states have not always been united in their responses.










[1] Al-Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror, Jason Burke p.149-150
[2] World Politics since 1945, Peter Calvocoressi P101.
[3] UN website: The United Nations system and terrorism

[4]Interpol website: Interpol’s involvement in the fight against international terrorism
[5]BBC news online: The European terror challenge, 24/03/2004
[6] Financial Times: A Catastrophic failure of Intelligence, 29/11/2001 – unnamed CIA official.
[7] The Guardian: The Twin Pillars, 20/01/2005 – Tony Blair interviewed by Timothy Garton Ash.
[8] International Terrorism: What kinds of response? Rohan Gunaratna. http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/
[9] Modern Jihad Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks by Loretta Napoleoni. Extract in The Guardian 3/11/2003
[10] See BBC News 15/04/2004. Straw rejects Bin Laden truce. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3627943.stm
[11] See also US assassination of Al-Qaeda suspects in Yemen – November 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2402479.stm
[12] Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism, US Department. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31944.pdf